has of assembling Parliament. "In our admirable constitution, in that part of it that bears a popular character, in its democratic portion-if it were not restrained by wise and wholesome restrictions, it would be quite inconsistent with the Monarchy, and would trench on and annihilate all the other branches of the State. The King comes and opens this Parliament and can dissolve it-the Catholic Association acknowledges no authority, no power higher than itself." But though the King may choose the time of assembling Parliament, he cannot postpone it indefinitely; and it appears hardly correct to consider a power of calling a dormant body into action, a means of controlling its action. Secondly, the King's power of dissolving. The reason why this power is vested in the Crown, is said to be, the danger of the democratic part of the constitution_encroaching upon, and overwhelming the other estates. The power of dissolving possessed by the Crown, certainly affords some security against democracy, but, unless connected with other securities which it calls into action, its value would not be either great or constant. The people have in the dissolution of Parliament by efflux of time, a stronger security against oligarchy, because in the case of the Crown, though it can dissolve, it cannot recompose; in the other, though the law dissolves, yet the dissolution cannot be deferred, and the people recompose the assembly as they please.* The object of a dissolution upon any apprehended design of the Commons, being to procure a new assembly, less democratic in its sentiments, (the preponderance of that power being the danger feared,) it seems a strange remedy to appeal from the democratic Representative to the Democracy itself, since, if their opinions coincide (and it has seldom happened that a democratic tendency has been displeasing to the people) Antæus will rise from the earth stronger than he fell, and (not to speak irreverently) "the last state will be worse than the first."+

The mere power of dissolving might sometimes become nugatory as a check, or even pernicious; for when the measures of the Commons are obnoxious to the Crown, and yet

If the mere power of dissolving afford a security to the Crown and the Aristocracy against the House of Commons, it would, at first sight, seem as if the two former ought to join in opinion with the advocates for short Parliaments, who propose their plan as a security for the People against the Crown and the Aristocracy: but there is this essential difference in their doctrines; it is the policy of the People that the House of Commons should have a short life; of the Crown, that it should have an uncertain one.

+ The parable seems peculiarly applicable to a septennial Parliament.

approved of by the People, the effect of a dissolution would be to return the same body inflamed with irritation at an ineffectual attempt to control it. If, on the other hand, the very improbable case should occur, of the measures of the Commons being alike obnoxious to the Crown and the People, though the dissolving power might then operate either to control or extinguish such a body, yet it would in that case be used as a security, not against the spirit of demoeracy, but of oligarchy, since it is manifestly incorrect to say, that a democratic spirit preponderated in an assembly whose measures were obnoxious to the people. It is not intended to push the argument against the use of this power, to the absurdity of saying that a power of dissolving implies none of controlling an assembly. The fear of incurring the expense and risk of a new election, will doubtless work on the minds of such individual members as have not committed themselves too rashly in favor of popular doctrines. Whenever a marked discordance between the sentiments of the people and their representatives exists, the latter body will feel that the dissolving power is an obvious mode of control, and will accordingly be influenced by the apprehension of its exercise. But in every case the propriety of exercising it, must be decided with reference to the state of the public mind, and by that its value will be regulated, because upon that the character of the new assembly must depend,*

* Perhaps it may be said, that Mr. Plunkett's observations have either been misunderstood or misrepresented, by rigidly adhering to their verbal expression: that what he meant was, not that the restriction consisted in the King's power of assembling Parliament, but in the incapacity of the House of Commons to assemble itself; and that the dissolving power, whether dormant or actively exerted, is a check, in the one state working on the discretion of the individual members; in the other, directly stopping any objectionable measures entertained, or preventing any noxious humours from spreading and attaining consistency. It will not be improper to examine the argument as thus stated. The incapacity of the House of Commons to assemble itself, being considered a check upon it, the great power possessed by that body, must plainly be the reason why that, or any other check is necessary. But when this body is actually assembled, without claiming any right to assemble itself in future, it invariably takes measures, by which the Crown is compelled to convene it, annually at least, for the purpose of obtaining supplies and renewing certain acts. Thus it ensures its meeting within a limited period, and the utmost the Crown can do, is to accelerate or retard the particular day for a few months. The great power of the Commons, is therefore, immediately and effectively employed to impair the efficacy of this supposed check. But another, and probably the original reason why this power has been ostensibly deposited with the Crown has been overlooked; namely, necessity; for Parliament could not sit always; a fixed time of meeting would be inconvenient, as there might be some urgent public occasion for its meeting long before the fixed period; to suppose, that in its corporate capa

It is by other and more effectual means, that the Crown can restrain the Commons; the dissolving power is subservient to those means, and is useful chiefly in affording an occasion for their employment.

It will hardly be denied by anybody, and many persons justify it as essential to the constitution, that the real controlling power is influence, good and bad, honest and corrupt. As long as this influence prevails in the House of Commons, it will prevent its encroaching upon and overturning the other estates. Many members will resist the natural tendency of this body to arrogate sole power, because they sincerely believe a mixed form of Government better. Many also, whatever may be their real sentiments, will bend to the prejudices and interests of others, and some also will be warped by their own. If all these forms of influence be feeble against the democratic tendency, a dissolution sends the members of the body back to those who made, and can alone recompose it. But with the fiat of dissolution, goes forth also the power of influence, now exerting itself on the constituent body, of which a large portion is favourable to the Crown and the Aristocracy-by deliberate opinion, by prejudice, by a multitude of social ties, and lastly by direct and indirect interests. It is obvious, therefore, that the different qualities of the constitution, are not to be sought for, as if they existed and wrought in a pure, unmingled form in each of the three great estates. Can any one believe that each estate, were this its condition, would do otherwise than seek to augment its own power? It is only human nature to do so, and there is no disguising that those august bodies are framed of that material. In so far as their existence is city it could convene itself, is to suppose it already assembled; lastly, this power could not be safely trusted to any individual member of the body. The object of meeting at all, is to supply the wants of the Nation, therefore the King, whose station enables him to know better than any other person what is the actual state of the country, is unquestionably the fittest to possess this power. But this view of the matter contains no idea of restriction or control. The fear of a dissolution is admitted to have some effect; depending, however, on the character, situation, and circumstances of each individual; therefore its efficacy must be indeterminate. But as the Crown knows the members fear a dissolution, lest they should lose what they possess, so the members know that the Crown may fear to dissolve, lest it should thereby call forth a still less tractable body. There have been Stork, as well as Log Parliaments. The state of public sentiment alone, can determine the propriety of an actual dissolution, so that when the Crown might most desire to dissolve Parliament, it could perhaps least venture to do so; and as the Commons can discern the state of public feeling as easily as the Crown, they might presume upon the hensions of the latter, whose dissolving power would thus become a feeble instrument of control.

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distinct, and their interests separate, the desire for increased power probably exists in each, though an open expression of that desire by the Crown or the House of Lords, would be imprudent; yet it seems to exist, for if it did not, the democratic spirit might always be as plainly traced in those estates, as the Monarchical and Aristocratical in the Commons.

It is in the Commons that the real working of these elements will be found, producing that extolled mixed character in the laws and government. The coin may require the royal stamp, before it goes forth into circulation, but the quality of the metal, on which its intrinsic value depends, must be determined in the House of Commons. The real strife of the conflicting elements will be found there; and when the democratic prevails, (for the preponderance of the Monarchical quality has never, and of the Aristocratical has seldom, been a source of alarm to the dissolving power, the Crown,) the battle is transferred to another field, and under the system now existing it is not difficult to conjecture which will gain the victory. The Nation itself contains the several qualities supposed to be so happily blended in our mixed constitution. The strife is going on there also. It is going on even in the breast of each individual, according to the measure of his interests, real or imagined; and as the more powerful of these interests side with the one or the other principle, they will determine the preponderating character of the government and the laws.

Involuntary testimony is borne to the supremacy of the democratic interest, and the democratic power, by the constant effort of the Crown and the Aristocracy to influence, and their caution in openly opposing its Representative Body; and when the individuals of that body are supposed to arrogate more power than the people intended to commit to their charge, a complete acknowledgement of the paramount power of the people is made by a direct appeal to them. If there be any offence, it is in the words, not in the doctrine. Let the interest and power of the Commons, that is of the Nation, (for where the great mass of wealth, knowledge, and numbers is found, there is the Nation,) be substituted instead of the stigmatised term Democracy, and few will deny the doctrine; the fact of appeal none can deny.

Thus it appears, that in the most unquestionable and emphatic manner, the opinion of the people is resorted to as the last and most powerful judicial and executive authority in the State. For it is when one, and that their own, the Democratic estate, is found by its preponderance to threaten the whole structure, that the people are called on to judge

between it and the others, and to restrain its authority by recomposing it of less dangerous materials.

The people are made the judges between the parties, thus implying great reliance on the rectitude of their judgment: in a case too, where one party is their own organ, thus implying great faith in their integrity: lastly, they are called on to execute their own righteous sentence, since no other existing power is competent to the task.

If all these consequences be involved in the exercise of the dissolving power of the Crown, (and can they be denied?) they afford most ample evidence of the legal, the essentially constitutional power of public opinion; and can it then be politic, is it wise or just, does it accord with the spirit of the constitution, to repress the public opinion of six millions of people when assuming, and because it assumes, a distinct and impressive form and character? If the Association represent, as the writer has argued, merely the opinion of the Catholic body, it is sufficient for the argument. If, as its opponents would infer, it represent both the opinion and the absolute power, the question is still more deserving of a deliberate and well-considered answer.

The next consideration is, how far such control and responsibility as have been described, should attach to the Association, to prevent its noxious qualities quickening into mischief, and how far they do attach to it. First, as to a previous control exercised by any peculiar authority in the State, since it is plain that the strong, not the weak, require control, if the arguments that have been employed, have been sufficient to prove that the Association by its constitution is not, and cannot be strong except from the support of public opinion, there can be no pretext for any previous restraint upon its proceedings, until its strength becomes great by a great accession of public opinion in its favor; but strength from such a source, it has been argued, is of a wholesome nature,-not formidable to any of the well-constituted authorities of the State. It is but one form in which that paramount power, the opinion of the People, exhibits itself; a power recognized as that to which all others must appeal in the last resort; and the restraint to be really effectual ought to be applied to this power itself. It is true the public opinion here spoken of, is but a part of the universal public opinion, but it is a large part, it is strongly felt and adequately expressed. No counter opinion has been declared, either intensely or extensively, by the rest of the nation; yet it may be presumed that it has not been an unconcerned observer, nor without any opinion on the ques