I make no excuse for bringing this question of the House of Lords before the public, for it is one of vast importance, not only to ourselves but to the whole civilised world, and especially to men of our race beyond the seas. The opinion of England, the mother of Parliaments, on the relative merits of a single or of a double Chamber system, and of the functions, constitution, and powers of a Second Chamber, cannot fail to be interesting to European nations, and more than interesting to our colonies and to the great Republic of the West. Believing as I do in the necessity of a strong Second Chamber under a parliamentary and democratic form of government, it appears to me that the fitness of the House of Lords to exercise the functions of a Second Chamber is a question second to none in national importance.

Reform, if possible, should be evolved from within our existing system, and not forced upon it from without. Unfortunately this question does not commend itself especially to any political party. Conservatives are foolishly afraid of change, and Radicals who aim at a single Chamber naturally object to any reformation of a salutary character. They prefer the House of Lords as it is; that is to say, as weak and as open to attack as possible.

Independently of the respect which is entertained for the House of Lords throughout the country, a factor in politics which is probably underrated by many who discuss the subject, its chief safety lies in the fact that Radicals are divided in opinion on the point. Some Radicals hold that a Second Chamber is unnecessary and mischievous, provided that due representation is given to minorities in the House of Representatives. Others object to a Second Chamber under any circumstances, but deprecate the abolition of the House of Lords on the ground that as many of its members would find seats in the House of Commons, that assembly would in consequence be completely swamped by the Conservative element. This is a most ignoble objection. Those who entertain it fear to abolish the House of Lords. lest the result should be inimical to their views. They dislike a Second Chamber because it checks and regulates the formulation of their opinions in Acts of Parliament. Their object, therefore, is to maintain the House of Lords, but to make it as impotent as they possibly can.

It is on this ground they should be fought. If a Second Chamber is desirable, it should be strong. If it is unnecessary or injurious, it should be swept away. The House of Lords, if imperfect, ought either to be strengthened or abolished. There is a strange reluctance on the part of Conservatives to touch the venerable fabric of the House of Lords. They forget that no assembly has ever gone through so many changes or has been so much benefited by them. It is the most ancient institution in the land. Developing gradually from the great Council of Freeholders of former days, it has, by constantly changing to suit changing circumstances, braved all the vicissitudes of time, and be

come what it now is, an essential and useful portion of the Constitution. It can maintain its usefulness and its existence only by the same process of reasonable and timely change.

The objections to reform appear to group themselves under two heads. Some imagine that the fabric is so shaky that the slightest touch will precipitate its fall. Others hold that we have the best possible Second Chamber in the existing House of Lords. The first argument is a most foolish one. The House of Lords is by no means in so decrepid and moribund a condition. It has plenty of vitality, it does good work in a business-like way, and, in spite of what Radicals may say, its decisions are still looked upon with much respect; but it is undoubtedly weakening, and this is due to disadvantages which can be removed. If it is so shaky as to be incapable of reform, the sooner it falls the better. If your house is so unsafe as not to bear the smallest repairs, why it is better to pull it down and make what use you can of the materials, than to suffer it to fall about your ears unexpectedly, in some sudden gust, without giving time to the inmates and neighbours to cry Stand from under!' The House of Lords. works fairly well, too well for the Radicals, though not well enough for the country. It is better to meet the Radical one-Chamber men now on the issue of improving and strengthening the House than on the question of its total abolition at some time of great popular excitement.

6

As to the House of Lords being the best possible Second Chamber, that is a proposition hard to prove. It certainly is difficult to see how a better Chamber could be formed in the place of the House of Lords if that institution were abolished, but it does not follow that the existing House cannot be greatly improved. It is not my business. to enter upon a defence of the House of Lords, or to vindicate its action from the charges of selfishness and devotion to class interests. Its merits do not concern me now. It is of its demerits I wish to speak, and I shall content myself with commenting on those weak points which appear to be capable of improvement.

I am considering the peerage now as a legislative assembly, as constituting the Second Chamber in our parliamentary system, and as a necessary portion of the Constitution. The functions of a Second Chamber are to insist upon the due consideration of weighty matters ; to prevent violent organic changes in obedience to sudden manifestations of popular feeling which are liable to be as suddenly reversed; to so check and balance the expression of opinion in the other House as to insure stability in legislation and continuous progress; to address itself to the consideration of grave matters of foreign and colonial policy; and to carefully and impartially examine the details of Bills. To enable it to perform these duties well, it must be composed of men possessed of aptitude for business details, of men of administrative experience in the colonies and dependencies, of men representing various interests at home, of men representing colonial interests,

of men understanding the resources of the Empire by sea and land, and of men of such proved general experience and capacity that their opinions must command respect.

The chief, the most glaring, and most obvious evil in the House of Lords as at present constituted consists in the fact that questions of vast importance are frequently decided by majorities composed of men who take little interest in public affairs, and who rarely attend the House; of men, in fact, who have not time, health, or inclination to devote themselves to the public service, and who would never dream of seeking a seat in Parliament, but who exercise the privilege of their birthright in obedience to the command of a political chief. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that decisions so arrived at are just, it is evident they must lack the weight, authority, and convincing power over popular opinion which they would possess if given by men of tried experience and proved capacity, or by men who had evinced an ambition to make themselves acquainted with the requirements of the nation and the relative merits of political and social questions.

Secondly, the permanent predominance of one political party in the Upper House is not an unmixed blessing, for there is always some danger that a party which is in a majority in the Upper House, and in a minority in the House of Commons, might use its power in the Lords for party purposes and for mere obstruction. It is true that the House has not condescended to allow itself to be applied to such base uses; and well it is for it that it has not done so. But the possibility of such obstruction for party purposes is an evil which, if it cannot be obliterated altogether, can at least be lessened by the elevation to the peerage of eminent men of independent views and free from party ties.

Again, there is no way in which a peer can now be relieved of his legislative duties. He cannot abdicate, neither can he be deposed. If the House finds itself in a conflict with the House of Commons, or tied to a decision contrary to the will of the people, as expressed in a general election, the individual members of the House must either maintain their conscientious views at all hazards, or reverse their former votes, or partially, and very partially, relieve themselves of responsibility by abstaining from voting altogether. For a man to change his views, and acquiesce to-day in what he objected to yesterday, is justifiable if the conversion be honest; and to abstain from expressing any opinion at all on a question is unobjectionable, for it is not given to every man to have definitely formed ideas on every matter under the sun. It is also perfectly natural and right that a man should be at liberty to refuse to occupy a position that entails on him a great responsibility. But it is not just that great responsibility, which he has not fitted himself to discharge, and which he is not anxious to assume, should be placed upon the shoulders of any man, and that he should find himself, without possibility of escape, in the

dilemma of having either to vote contrary to his deliberately formed convictions, or to invite a serious quarrel between the two branches of the Legislature, reduce Parliamentary government to a deadlock, and bring about grave dangers to the Constitution. Every legislator in either House should have the power of resigning his position, and the privilege of submitting his actions to the endorsement of some body of his countrymen.

Our Empire is the largest and the most sensitive the world has ever seen. So diversified are our interests, that they are constantly in danger of clashing with each other, or of coming into collision with those of some other Power. Our colonies and settlements are necessary to us. We have to rely more and more upon them as markets. We have to thank them also for our control of the seas and for the advantages we possess over all the other European Powers put together in dealing with foreign nations and trading in neutral markets. Our existence as a great trading nation and a firstrate Power depends upon them. Their prosperity, in turn, as growing States, depends upon the mother-country. But, if they derive inestimable blessings from their connection with us, they suffer also from every danger that affects us. If we receive incalculable benefits from them, so also do we incur risk and responsibility from every difficulty or danger that menaces them. The Queen's dominions, though scattered over the whole surface of the globe, are yet so closely connected by natural ties and responsibilities, that no one portion can be affected without a corresponding effect being produced throughout the Empire. Yet there is scarcely an echo of colonial opinion heard in the Imperial Parliament. This is not as it should be. The great colonies should be represented; and for many and obvious reasons the Upper House is the body in which their voices should be heard.

All the evils and defects inherent in the present Second Chamber could be remedied, or at least diminished, by allowing the creation of life peerages, by a reduction in the number of legislating peers, by the creation of colonial peers representing the colonies in the Imperial Parliament, and by recognising a distinction between the peerage as a class and the peerage as a legislative assembly, between a peerage as a distinction and reward for merit, and a peerage as conferring of necessity the right to legislate. The elective principle, as it now exists in the case of representative peers for Scotland and Ireland, should be extended to the whole body. The Crown should be empowered to create life peerages; the Crown should be authorised to create a certain number of life or of hereditary peers for each colony which enjoys legislative independence, selecting those peers from men recommended by the Legislatures of the colony.

For legislative purposes the existing peerage is too numerous. Numbers do not insure efficiency. It may be true that in a multi

tude of councillors there is wisdom;' but if so, the wisdom frequently remains concealed in them, and does not come to the surface for the benefit of the country. The strongest, most efficient, and most capable ·legislative assembly in the world is to be found in the Senate of the United States, which consists of seventy-six members only. Our Upper House should not consist of more than about one hundred members.

What would be the practical working of these reforms? The first great difficulty arises as to the constitution of an electoral body. On this point the example of other nations affords us no assistance whatever, for there is nothing analogous in our circumstances to those affecting any other European Power. The illustration afforded by our colonies cannot be made to apply to us; neither can that of the United States, where the Senate represents the rights of the several sovereign independent States. We have not even among us any system of county government that could be used as a basis for the election of members to the Upper House as representing the territorial divisions of the country. If our system comprised small local parliaments, they would probably form the best electorate for the Second Chamber; but such institutions do not exist, and it is useless considering what might be. If the Upper House desired to return as nearly as possible to the earliest traditions of our history, it should be elected by the freeholders of the country; but such a system is, for many reasons, inapplicable at the present day, and it would give an undue importance to freeholders, who are already fully represented in the House of Commons. If the members of the Upper House are to be elected by the people, there can be no logical reason for insisting upon a higher franchise than that which entitles a man to vote for a member of the House of Commons; and though absolute uniformity of opinion between the two Houses could be avoided by electing the Upper House for a fixed period of, say, ten years, yet the idea of basing both Houses on one and the same constituency is open to vast objections, and would be a complete departure from the system embodied in the Constitution. The Upper House might be elected by the House of Commons; such a plan might perhaps work well, provided that the Upper House were elected for a fixed period, and divided, like the United States Senate, into classes, vacating their seats by rotation. Although it is possible that, if every new House of Commons elected a new House of Lords by ballot, some curious differences in expressed opinion would be manifested, yet it is obvious that, if members of the Lower House voted according to the principles they profess, parties would be always equally represented in both Houses, and that would be absurd. If the House of Lords were elected for a fixed term, any large shifting of the balance of parties could result only from the long continuance in office of one party; and it is doubtful whether the Upper House would adapt itself as easily as it now does to well-matured changes of