XV.

CONSCIENCE THE MINISTER OF JUDGMENT.

"I am tormented in this flame." LUKE xvi, 24.

"God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or evil." ECCL. xii, 14.

"There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked." ISA. lvii, 21.

"Then shall ye return and discern between the righteous and the wicked, between him that serveth God and him that serveth him not." MAL. iii, 18. "A wounded spirit who can bear?" PROV. xviii, 14.

THE doctrine of a future and general judgment is a doctrine of Revelation; and as such, must be judged of by the written Word. By "the law and by the testimony" it must stand or fall.

It is no part of our present object to enter into a set defense of this doctrine by collating or comparing it with the Scripture testimony. This has been so often and so ably done; indeed, the doctrine itself holds so prominent a place in the teachings of Revelation that but few who reverence the Bible, and receive its teachings, without change or detraction, as Divine, will dare say aught against the Scripture fact. But there are thousands who are full of the philosophical doubt, on the question of a future judgment. To such persons there is something inexplicably intricate connected with the facts and the modus operandi of a judgment-day. They see not how, or by what process, God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil. They limit not the power of God, but question the exercise of that power for the registration of things, many of them

so insignificant and so contemptible. Again, to them it seems inexplicable that every tongue in that day shall confess, and all men give an account of every idle and sinful thought, word, and act. And the objection is often raised, that the condemned soul can never realize the justice of the verdict that seals its everlasting doom, without a full and clear knowledge of the facts on which that decision is based; and such knowledge they deem impossible. We will not stop to expose the fallacy of these objections. They manifestly originate in imperfect views of the economy of the Divine government, and of the vast resources of intellectual and moral power with which the human mind has been endowed.

We again repeat, that we are not proposing to establish the doctrine, that we now argue not the Scripture fact, but the philosophic doubt upon the doctrine of a final judgment. Its Scripture authority must be regarded as settled. The doctrine is so fully enunciated, so explicitly declared, and so frequently reiterated and urged, and men are so constantly warned of its approach, that, though human reason should tower like a bulwark against it, it were worse than idle to attempt to evade its Scripture authority.*

"It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the judgment." (Heb. ix, 27.)

"And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened; and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works." (Rev. xx, 12.)

"For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or evil." (Eccl. xii, 14.)

"As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God. So, then, every one of us shall give account of himself to God." (Rom. xiv, 11, 12.)

"But I say unto you, That every idle word that men shall speak they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment." (Matt. xii, 36.)

"Woe unto the wicked! it shall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands shall be given him." (Isa. iii, 11.)

"There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked." (Isa. Ivii, 21.) “Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings?" (Isa. xxxviii, 14.)

What we now propose, is to look into our own nature, to examine the susceptibilities of our own minds, to see if we may not there find corresponding powers and capacities.

If we recur to the general experience of mankind, we shall see enough in the operation of moral causes to convince us that memory and conscience, connected as they are with a knowledge of the moral character and consequences of our sins, have an important agency in the great system of moral government, with which we are indissolubly connected. And, if we find them thus empowered and performing these high functions here, is there not every reason to infer that they are destined to fill the same office and perform the same functions hereafter? If so, then man contains within himself all the elements of that process that shall determine his future destiny.

The general doctrine we proposed to establish is this: That in memory, with its mysterious power and its inalienable laws, is to be found the "book of remembrance" in which our sins are recorded; and that in conscience is to be found a principle that will respond to the inexorable decree of the final Judge, and that will execute the mandate of Heaven upon us—that it is the undying worm and the unquenchable fire.

We have already seen how memory responds to the functions of this high office. It now only remains to inquire whether, in the conscience, may be found a corresponding capacity and power.

Without aiming at scientific precision, we would define conscience to be a power of moral judgment or discrimination, combined with a susceptibility of moral emotion. This definition, which is at once concise and comprehensive, presents conscience under a twofold point of view.

I. A MORAL JUDGMENT OR A DISCRIMINATION OF THE MORAL QUALITY OF OUR ACTIONS, BY WHICH CONSCIENCE DETERMINES THAT THEY ARE RIGHT OR WRONG.

ance.

This judgment passes its decisions upon the moral quality of our acts, not only before, but also after their performThe perceptions of this moral judgment are more or less distinct, as circumstances and habits are favorable or unfavorable. The sinner who yields to the impulses of passion, and refuses to obey the monitions of conscience, gradually, but surely, impairs its discriminating power. With him, "the dividing line between right and wrong seems gradually to become obliterated." And yet the fearful distinctness with which conscience sometimes reveals his guilt to the sinner-notwithstanding the force of habit, and prejudice, and passion, and interest-gives us at least a faint indication of the keen, piercing power of discrimination that it still possesses.

But, again, this discriminating power of the conscience may be improved as well as impaired. Reflection upon the past-especially when aided by a vivid recollection of our acts-will often arouse the discriminating power of conscience to an intense and astonishing degree. It would seem as though it were our very judge, bringing out every shade of darkness and holding it up to our view. May we not, then, infer that in a future state of being-when this cumbersome vehicle of clay shall have been thrown off, and the soul shall revive its crippled powers, and call back its energies at present straitened and enfeebled-the conscience shall possess a keenness of moral discrimination, of which, at present, we are able to form very inadequate conceptions?

We will not pause longer upon the discriminating power

of conscience. Every individual is conscious of its existence. Every individual recognizes a right and a wrong in his own action. And, indeed, this power of moral discrimination forms one of the broad lines of separation between man and the brute. It can never become extinct without disrobing the soul of some of its essential characteristics. Death, then, has no power over it. Eternity shall not dim its eye; but from the inconceivably-distant recesses of futurity shall it throw back its piercing glance upon time, whose record is eternal.*

II. A SUSCEPTIBILITY OF MORAL EMOTION.

It is

This moral emotion is also of a twofold character. both prospective and retrospective. That is, it is experienced before as well as after a deed has been committed. And if the deed be one that the moral judgment decides to be right, the moral emotion prompts us to do it; and on the other hand restrains us from the commission of that which the moral judgment disapproves.

This power of moral emotion is seen in the clear and strong notes of remonstrance which conscience whispers in the sinner's ear. Shakspeare, a close observer and critical delineator of human nature, in a masterly manner portrays the workings and the power of this moral emotion, even in the bosoms of abandoned men. One of the murderers of the Duke of Clarence, while struggling to suppress his moral emotions, preparatory to the act of assassination, is represented as thus speaking of his conscience: "I'll not meddle with it; it is a dangerous thing; it makes a man a coward; a man can not steal, but it accuseth him; a man can not swear, but it checks him. 'Tis a blushing, shamefaced spirit, that mutinies in a man's bosom; it fills one full

*See Wayland's Moral Phil. for a fuller discussion of this topic.