XI.

POPULAR OBJECTIONS TO THE RESURRECTION.

"Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the dead?" ACTS xxvi, 8.

"How are the dead raised up, and with what body do they come?" 1 Cor. XV, 35.

WE have already shown that the doctrine of the resurrection of the human body is deeply imbedded in the teachings of both the Old and the New Testament Scriptures. In the Gospel, especially, it becomes a foundation truth, radiating from the very center of the system, and illuminating every part. Whatever, then, of absurdity or of philosophical impossibility skepticism has to urge against the resurrection, is so much, essentially, urged against the Bible itself. It is for this reason, with others, that we now propose a more particular examination of the popular objections urged against the resurrection.

When Paul preached "Jesus and the resurrection" among the Epicureans and Stoics of Athens, they said, "he seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods!" So to many, in every age, the doctrine of the resurrection of the body seems little less than a misty fable, because it has never yet been encircled within the scope of their rational philosophy. Others give to the subject little reflection or thought, but, with Pliny, the ancient heathen philosopher, affirm that "the calling of the dead back to life is among the impossible things that God neither can nor will do." Others would go still further and, with Celsus. denounce

the resurrection as the hope of worms-an abominable as well as impossible thing." Cæcilius, who personates a heathen in the dialogue of Mincius Felix, says of Christians: "They tell us that they shall be reproduced after death and the ashes of the funeral pile, and believe their own lies, so that you might think that they had already revived. O, twofold madness! to denounce destruction to the heaven and stars, which we leave as we found them, but to promise eternity to themselves, when dead and extinguished." There seems, indeed, to have been arrayed against this doctrine a persistency of opposition, wonderful to contemplate, when we consider how clearly it is revealed, and by how many and striking miracles it is demonstrated; and especially when we take into account how very little, that is really valid, reason, or science, or philosophy can urge against it.

In our own day the objections to the resurrection of the body have been drawn out in precise philosophical forms and statements. They thus assume definite and tangible shape. This is well. We can now gain access to them, and subject them to careful examination and analysis. It is often the case that there is a broad, undefined idea that a doctrine is unsound or a thing incredible. The idea, from its very vagueness, presents no salient points of approach, and seems absolutely insurmountable. But the moment the objection assumes definite form, and is distributed into parts, so that each by itself may be subjected to the critical process of examination, one after another they are dissolved, and disappear before the scrutiny of reason and truth.

Let us apply ourselves to an examination, in their order, of the chief objections urged against the resurrection of the dead. If the main intrenchments of the enemy are carried, we need not concern ourselves much about the rest.

I. IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS ASSERTED THAT THE DOCTRINE OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD IS UNPHILOSOPHICAL AND ABSURD.

This objection is a mere vague generality, and might be left to itself; but it will help us to a clearer understanding of the nature of this discussion, and of the points at issue, if we clear away somewhat of the rubbish it heaps up before us.

An opinion may be unphilosophical without being absurd. To be unphilosophical, is to be at variance with the principles of sound reason. When this variance attains a high degree, so as willfully to stand in opposition to manifest truth, and to the plain dictates of common-sense, it reaches

up to the absurd. An unphilosophical proposition may

seem to be true, though in reality contradictory to some of the hidden principles of philosophy. An absurd proposition is contradictory to obvious or known truth. The proposition, then, that "the dead are raised," is not absurd, because it is not contradictory to any known truth or obvious principle; for its opposite never has been and never can be established.

To say that it is unphilosophical, is only to say that it can not, so far as we can see, be brought about upon philosophical principles. And this, after all, may amount to nothing more than this—that we have not as yet attained to the knowledge of those high philosophical elements employed in bringing about the resurrection of the dead. To assume that we know it to be absolutely unphilosophical, is to assume that we have mastered all philosophy; and that we have made the application of its principles to the subject and found them inconsistent. The absurdity of such an assumption is too obvious to require exposure. Philosophy

is continually enlarging her domain. Even within the present age she has developed new principles and new applications that would have been to former generations as incredible as raising the dead.

But, then, there is another reply to this whole objection. This is not a doctrine of philosophy, but of revelation. The question, then, is, not whether the dead can be raised upon the principles of human philosophy, but whether God, by his own miraculous power, can and will do it. Whatever God does may be above us, and consequently mysterious. It may be incomprehensible to us. Our philosophy may be too contracted, too feeble to rise to the full comprehension of the Divine ways; but his purposes and his acts will ever be in harmony with the sublime philosophy of the universe. They may seem to contradict both our reason and our sense-just as the doctrine of the diurnal revolution of our earth seems to contradict both the sense and the reason of the untutored mind; but the higher revelation of truth may make apparent that it is inconsistent with neither. The objection, then, is nothing more nor less than the opposition of our ignorance to the wisdom and the power of God.

II. THE SECOND OBJECTION IS DRAWN FROM THE FACT THAT THE LIVING HUMAN BODY IS UNDERGOING A PERPETUAL CHANGE.

Stating this objection in full, it is this: As the human body is undergoing a perpetual change, each individual has many bodies during his life-each one of which the soul has inhabited, and it is, therefore, as much his body as that he possessed at the moment of his death; and therefore it is absurd to claim for this last body-possessed, perhaps, but a very little while-an exclusive resurrection. It is contended that

this change extends to every material particle that enters into the body. The time required for this complete renovation of the human body is, by some, limited to seven years. Others extend it to twenty. The caviler inquires whether all these particles that have ever entered into the composition of the human body, and which consequently as much belonged to it as those it happened to be in possession of at the particular moment of death, are to enter into the composition of the resurrection body? and if not all, what portion of them is to be rejected? Some have pushed this objection so far as to descant in terms of ridicule upon the bulky appearance of that resurrection body, which, after remaining here its fourscore years, and being changed many times, should call back all the particles which ever entered into its composition.

This is the old objection encountered by the apostle: "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" It is an attempt to apply the little we know, and know imperfectly, too, to the mysteries that lie beyond. It richly merits the reply of the apostle-"Thou fool!" We might content ourselves by replying to the technical form of this objection; that its claim for the body of the ownership of all the particles which ever entered into its composition, is a stretch of fancy that would hardly be thought of in any other connection. Just as well might the individual prefer a claim to all the bits and parcels of property he had ever owned during his life, however long ago he might have parted with them, and however regular the process, or full the equivalent received for them. But it will be more satisfactory to enter upon the subject in detail.

Now, with reference to this entire change of the body, it is rather assumed than proved. Some change is, undoubtedly, constantly going on in our system; but that every