employer dear, and on the whole he has a greater variety of amusement. For he rarely goes on his rounds without his gun, ready to knock over a hawk, or a magpie, or a hooded crow, or to take a snapshot at a stoat or a weasel. He has never been taught that trapping may be cruel, and we are sorry to think it would be next to impossible to persuade him of it; and, cruelty apart, it must be confessed that there is a good deal of interest in circumventing the different wild animals, whose instincts make them portentously distrustful. As for the mountain shepherd, his avocation is as innocent as poetic; and the morbidly sentimental Cockneys who set their faces against all man

ner of field-sports, can have nothing in the world to say against him. Apropos to Cockneys, we may admit of cities that they have certain advantages of their own, while the metropolis in especial has its attractions for us. But the brightest moments we have passed even there are those that reminded us of the country: as when strolling in the season among the flower-beds in the Park, before the trees had lost the first freshness of their green; or walking homewards along Piccadilly in the early summer morning, before the smoke-clouds had gathered between you and the Surrey heights, and when the palace at Sydenham was sparkling in the sunbeams.

J. R. S.

1. GENIUS has been somewhere defined as being simply "a vast capacity for taking trouble ;" and although that definition is very far indeed from being correct-since, although sometimes found in conjunction, there is no natural affinity between those gifts-there is no doubt that success in any enterprise, or any walk of life, must depend mainly on the possession and exercise of the latter quality.

2. Indeed, genius would seem to be quite as frequently dissociated from industry as allied with it. The race between the hare and the tortoise is a symbol of the contest between genius per se and plodding industry, wherein the prize of success falls to the latter quality in the fable, as it usually does in the race of real life.

3. But where genius and industry are united, their fortunate possessor is a king among men; he chains fortune to his chariot-wheels, and the world lies at his feet. One of the most signal contemporary examples of this happy combination is Field-Marshal Von Möltke, to whom Germany is chiefly indebted for her military pre-eminence; for the successes of the German arms in 1870 are attributable, not to the display of any remarkable ability by the commanders of armies, corps, or divisions, but to that organised foresight, forethought, painstaking -in short, to that "vast capacity for taking trouble"-which, under the guidance of Von Möltke, were displayed in the offices of the Prussian General Staff in anticipation of war; and by means of which the lines by which the different corps should move to encounter the earliest shocks of war were as clearly laid down as the rails on

which a railway train travels to its destination.

4. Since the war of 1870, the other European Powers have manifested a tendency more or less to take Germany as a guide in the matter of military organization; and in no particular more markedly than in a painstaking preparation during peace against a time of

war.

5. Such preparation in general terms involves

(a) The measures necessary for placing in the field on the outbreak of war, in the shortest possible time, and in the highest efficiency, as large an army as is possibly compatible with the peace military expenditure; and these measures are expressed by the technical term, "mobilization."

(b) The most judicious distribution of the different corps, divisions, and brigades of that army.

(c) The measures for concentrating the different corps, either for defence against invasion, or for the invasion of an enemy's country.

6. Of two coterminous States declaring war against each other, that which can the most quickly mobilize its military force already counts at the outset nearly all the points in its favour, more especially where it is a question as to which of the combatants shall first cross the intervening frontier to invade the enemy's territory.

7. Time, of which it may now be said more emphatically than ever with respect to military affairs, that it is "more precious than rubies"

time is the most important element in military operations; it is either the most valuable of allies or the most dangerous of enemies. If "time" be adverse, warlike pre

parations, though directed by the most consummate ability, and backed by unlimited wealth, will be probably only preparations after the event, and too late to influence the issue.

8. In the war of 1870, the German armies, of which the component divisions had been previously assembled and completed in their respective territorial districts, were concentrated on the French frontier, in their several striking positions, from thirteen to eighteen days after the declaration of war; and they actually entered French territory and fought on the same day two victorious battles on French soil, on the twenty-second day after war was declared.

9. The different corps of the French army had been assembled in their respective positions on the frontier even earlier than the Germans; but the difference between the two in point of efficiency was immense; for the French, numerically inferior to their enemies even though their cadres had been full, were, when sent to the front, complete neither in men, nor transport, nor supplies their deficiences had to be made good by degrees, and at the cost of fatal confusion in the presence of the enemy; whereas every brigade of the German army was in all respects ready to go into action on the day when it quitted its territorial district.

Thus the Germans had completed their "mobilization" before they took the field: while the French, from want of forethought and previous arrangement, were unable to complete their mobilization except by slow degrees after the actual contest had begun; and they were thus caught flagrante delicto.

10. The earlier events of the campaign of 1870 point the moral in a very striking manner as to the all-importance of rapidity in mobi

lization, and explain the reason why the different European nations are running a race with each other, and straining every nerve, if by any means one can forestall the other even by a day in the accomplishment of that object.

11. In England the problem is to a certain extent simplified by her insular situation, which renders invasion by an enemy impossible without a certain time being allowed for preparation. But England is on that account by no means absolved from the necessity of that painstaking forethought which will enable her to pass at once from a state of peaceful repose into vigorous warlike activity,-just as a warrior who, having laid himself down in his harness, springs from his couch fully armed and accoutred when awakened by the blast of the trumpet.

12. "The streak of silver sea" can only be calculated on as affording to England a somewhat longer breathing-space than in the case of a Continental nation, before an enemy can be upon her. For the navy, which is usually regarded as the natural external defence of these islands, has such diverse duties to perform, and at points so remote from each other all over the globe, that it might not be available to intercept the approach of a hostile fleet just at the time and place required.

13. Indeed it is certain that, in a war of large dimensions, the navy will be called on to play an offensive rather than a defensive rôle.

For, the British empire consisting of a small metropolitan nucleus, the population of which is largely dependent on foreign countries for its food-and of large possessions all over the world, separated from each other and from these islands by large tracts of ocean-it follows that the navy must be the arm with which we strike out, while the

army must be that with which we ward the blows of an enemy.

And this consideration supplies a strong argument in favour of maintaining a thoroughly efficient army for home defence; since, without such an army, the navy could not be liberated for those operations at a distance from our shores on which the maintenance of England's imperial position must absolutely depend.

14. In any case it is always prudent, in preparing plans of defence, to base them on the most unfavourable conditions it is possible to foresee; and it is for this reason that, in any scheme for the defence of England against invasion, it should be assumed that an enemy will be able to effect a landing in force somewhere on British soil, in spite of all our efforts to the contrary.

15. The English mobilization scheme, which was last year published to the world-and which it is erroneously supposed that the late military gatherings at Aldershot and Salisbury were designed to test -is really only a part, and that the most mechanical part, of the general comprehensive scheme for the defence of these islands, which, as we understand, is now being worked out in the offices of the Headquarter Staff, under the immediate superintendence of the commander-in-chief, and which has already made very considerable progress.

16. But, between the mobilization scheme, as approved by his Royal Highness on paper, and the late military gatherings referred to, there is really no resemblance beyond the fact that the different battalions, squadrons, and batteries which should compose the 2d and 5th Army Corps of the mobilization tables were brought together at the alarm-posts of the different brigades and divisions.

17. And the criticisms which

VOL. CXX.-NO. DCCXXXII.

have been directed against the mobilization scheme, on the ground of the deficiencies in respect to men, transport, and matériel, which the late gatherings have revealed, have betrayed so much misconception, that the attempt is here made to describe clearly the object and meaning of "mobilization," and the part which it is designed to play in the general defence of these islands.

18. And first, it should be distinctly understood, that the mobilization scheme could only deal with our military establishments as it found them ;-that it could only propose a certain distribution of existing materials. In building the edifice, it could only make use of bricks already on hand: it was no part of its functions to make bricks.

19. The formation of the different units of the military force in corps, divisions, and brigades, was a necessary measure in order to save the time of the commander-in-chief and his military assistants from being taken up after the outbreak of war with arrangements which, although mechanical, are very important, and which demand very careful consideration.

But the establishment of an army corps in respect to its component divisions and staff; of a division in respect to its component brigades and staff; of a brigade in respect to its component battalions and staff,-had been settled by the labours of a committee which was appointed to consider the subject so long as seven years ago.

20. Thus the establishment of a corps, of a division, of a brigade, as given in the mobilization tables, is rigidly that prescribed by authority. But the peace establishment of the different battalions, squadrons, and batteries, in men and horses, is much below their proper war 2 L

strength and the existing number of artillery cadres is far below that which would be required to place the authorised number of army corps complete in the field.

21. The publication of the mobilization scheme could have no effect in adding a single man, horse, or gun to our military strength; but it has had the useful effect of revealing the existing deficiencies; and it now rests with the British public to say whether they shall be supplied.

22. To assert, as some critics have asserted, that the mobilization scheme is a failure, because the military gatherings of the present year have revealed that cadres were weak, and that guns and transport were deficient, is extremely unreasonable. It is, in fact, to convert into a reproach that which must be held to be one of the principal merits of the scheme; unless the British public should wilfully prefer to shut their eyes to the shortcomings of their military system, until they shall be opened by the painful logic of facts.

23. "War is the condition of this world. From man to the smallest insect, all are at strife." And so long as human nature remains unchanged, the nation which is content to dispense with military armaments, and to confide in the honesty of its neighbours, will be gobbled up, just as poor foolish Lampe was gobbled up by Reinike in Goethe's inimitable fable.

24. In the above view, it would be a great advantage to any nation if it could possibly maintain during peace an army always perfectly appointed for war. But however desirable from a soldier's standpoint such a state of preparedness might be, in the present age of gigantic armaments it is simply impossible. No country, without incurring financial ruin, could for

many years together maintain during peace its army on a war footing.

a

25. It is for this reason that the military powers have been driven to a compromise between their inclinations and their necessities. And this is the explanation of the system, now generally adopted, of "short service and reserves system which was devised by Scharnhorst, the great Prussian organizer, for the purpose of passing a large number of the population through the mill of the Prussian regular army, which, after Jena, Napoleon had fixed at a very low figure, to prevent future danger from Prussian revenge.

26. The officer who commands a crack battalion would naturally like to keep up its numbers during peace to the proper fighting strength. But the number of battalions which in England we could maintain on those terms during peace would fall far short of the number actually maintained at a reduced strength. And in view of possible war, the maintenance during peace of a large number of weak cadres is far more profitable than that of a smaller number of strong battalions.

27. But the maintenance of battalions during peace at a reduced strength necessitates the provision of means by which the weak battalions may be converted into strong battalions immediately on the outbreak of war. And it was for the purpose of that provision that the expedient of short service with the colours, in conjunction with a certain period of service in the reserve, was adopted.

28. Whatever may be thought of the above expedient in the abstract, it affords the only means by which, under a Parliamentary system of Government, the people of England can hope to possess at the

commencement of a war an army