jusmodi Inductio producit quam conjecturam probabilem. Quis enim in se recipiet, cum particularia quæ quis novit aut quorum meminit ex una tantum parte compareant, non delitescere aliquod quod omnino repugnet? Perinde ac si Samuel acquievisset in illis Isaï filiis quos coram adductos videbat in domo, et minime quæsivisset Davidem, qui in agro aberat.1 Atque hæc Inductionis forma (si verum omnino dicendum sit) tam pinguis est et crassa, ut incredibile videatur tam acuta et subtilia ingenia (qualia in his rebus meditationes suas exercuerunt) potuisse eam mundo obtrudere, nisi illud in causa fuisset, quod opera festinata ad theorias et dogmata contendissent, particularia autem (præsertim moram in iis longiorem) ex fastu quodam et elatione animi despexissent. Illi enim exempla, sive instantias particulares, vice lictorum aut viatorum adhibuerunt ad summovendam turbam, ut dogmatibus suis viam aperirent; neutiquam autem ea inde ab initio in consilium advocarunt, ut legitima fieret et matura de rerum veritate deliberatio. Certe perculserit animos pia et religiosa quædam admiratio, cum videamus eadem calcata vestigia, ad errorem ducentia, in divinis et humanis. Quemadmodum enim in Divina Veritate percipienda ægre quis in animum inducat ut fiat tanquam parvulus; ita in humana perdiscenda, provectos utique, puerorum more, prima Inductionum elementa adhuc legere et retractare, res humilis existimatur et quasi contemnenda. 11 Sam. xvi. We see from this very strong condemnation of the ordinary mode of induction, how much Bacon must have conceived his own method to differ from it. It is in fact impossible to apprehend Bacon's idea of his own process of induction, if we assume that it was to differ from that in common use only by being more systematic and more accurate. See the General Preface, vol. i. p. 63. Tertio, si concedatur principia scientiarum ex Inductione qua utuntur, vel sensu et experientia, recte posse constitui, certissimum est tamen axiomata inferiora ab iis per syllogismum non posse (in rebus naturalibus, quæ participant ex materia) recte et tuto deduci. In Syllogismo enim fit reductio propositionum ad principia per propositiones medias. Hæc autem sive Inveniendi sive Probandi forma, in Scientiis Popularibus (veluti Ethicis, Politicis, Legibus, et hujusmodi) locum habet; imo et in Theologicis; quandoquidem Deo pro bonitate sua placuerit captui humano se accommodare; at in Physicis, ubi Natura opere, non adversarius argumento constringendus est, elabitur plane veritas ex manibus, propter longe majorem naturalium operationum quam verborum subtilitatem; adeo ut succumbente Syllogismo, Inductionis (veræ scilicet et emendatæ) officio ubique opus sit, tam ad principia magis generalia quam ad propositiones inferiores. Nam syllogismi ex propositionibus consistunt; propositiones ex verbis; verba notionum tesseræ sunt; quare si notiones ipsæ (quæ verborum animæ sunt) male et varie a rebus abstrahantur, tota fabrica corruit. Neque laboriosa vel consequentiarum argumentorum vel veritatis propositionum examinatio rem in integrum unquam restituet; cum error sit (ut loquuntur medici) in digestione prima; quæ a functionibus sequentibus non rectificatur. Non igitur absque magna et evi 1 Compare Novum Organum, i. 13. and 14. The formation of abstract conceptions is one of the objects of Bacon's inductive method, as well as the establishment of axioms. See Gen. Pref. vol. i. p. 84. It is difficult to understand how the subtlety of language and the subtlety of natural operations can be compared. Bacon must be understood to mean that scientific terms and the conceptions which they express are not an adequate representation of the natural phenomena which have led to their formation. denti causa evenit, ut complures ex philosophis (aliqui autem eorum maxime insignes) Academici fuerint et Sceptici, qui scientiæ humanæ et syllepsium certitudinem sustulerunt; ultra verisimilitudinem aut probabilitatem negantes eam pertingere. Inficias non iverim, visum esse nonnullis Socratem, cum scientiæ certitudinem a se amoveret, per ironiam tantum hoc fecisse, et scientiam dissimulando simulasse; renunciando scilicet iis quæ manifesto sciebat, ut eo modo etiam quæ nesciebat scire putaretur. Neque etiam in recentiore Academia (quam amplexus est Cicero) illa opinio Acatalepsiæ admodum sincere culta fuit. Etenim qui eloquentia floruerunt hanc fere sectam sibi desumpserunt, ut in utramque partem copiose disserendi gloriam assequerentur; unde a via illa recta, per quam ad veritatem pergere debuissent, tanquam ad deambulationes quasdam amœnas, animi causa institutas, deflexum est. Constat tamen nonnullos sparsim in utraque Academia (veteri et nova), multo magis inter Scepticos, Acatalepsiam istam simpliciter et integre tenuisse.2 Verum in hoc maxime ab illis peccatum est, quod sensuum perceptiones calumniabantur ; unde Scientias radicitus evellebant. Sensus vero, licet sæpenumero homines aut fallant aut destituant, possint 1 "Socrates autem, de se ipso detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis quos volebat refellere. Ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione quam Græci ɛipwveíav vocant." Cic Ac. Qu. ii. 5. 15. — J. S. 2 There is something very striking in one of the earliest expressions of this way of thinking: Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται VOL. II. 24 XENOPHANES, apud Sextum Empiricum. tamen multa adjuti industria ad scientias sufficere ; idque non tam ope instrumentorum (licet et hæc quoque aliqua ex parte prosint) quam experimentorum ejus generis, quæ objecta subtiliora quam pro sensus facultate ad objecta sensu comprehensibilia producere queant. Debuerant autem potius defectum hac in parte imputasse mentis tum erroribus tum contumaciæ (quæ rebus ipsis morigera esse recusat), et pravis demonstrationibus, et modis ratiocinandi et concludendi ex perceptione sensuum perperam institutis. Hæc autem lo quimur, non quo intellectui detrahatur, aut negotium totum deseratur; sed quo intellectui auxilia commoda comparentur et subministrentur, quibus rerum ardua. et naturæ obscuritatem vincere possunt. Nemo enim tanta pollet manus constantia, aut etiam habitu, ut rectam lineam ducere aut perfectum circulum circumscribere manu libera possit; quod tamen ope regulæ, aut circini, facere in promptu est. Hæc igitur res ipsa est quam paramus, et ingenti conatu molimur ; ut scilicet mens per artem fiat rebus par, utque inveniatur Ars quædam Indicii et Directionis, quæ cæteras artes earumque axiomata atque opera detegat et in conspectum det. Hanc enim merito desiderari posuimus. Ars ista Indicii (ita enim eam appellabimus) duas habet partes. Aut enim defertur Indicium ab experimentis ad experimenta; aut ab experimentis ad axiomata, quæ et ipsa nova experimenta designent. Priorem harum Experientiam Literatam1 nominabimus, posteri 1 With reference to the question how far Bacon thought it possible for observation to be carried on apart from theory (see General Preface, vol. i. p. 119.), it is, I think, important to remark that this notion of an Experientia Literata, as an intermediate step between simple experimentation obsque ullâ serie aut methodo and the Interpretation of Nature, was not an after orem vero Interpretationem Naturæ, sive Novum Organum. Prior quidem (ut alibi attigimus 1) vix pro Arte habenda est aut parte Philosophiæ, sed pro Sagacitate quadam; unde etiam eam Venationem Panis (hoc nomen ex fabula mutuati) quandoque appellamus. Attamen quemadmodum possit quis in via sua triplici modo progredi; aut cum palpat ipse in tenebris; aut thought, but formed part of his original design in the earliest shape in which it is known to us. "This part of Invention (he says in the Advancement of Learning) concerning the Invention of Sciences, I purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to propound: having digested it into two parts: whereof the one I term Experientia literata, and the other Interpretatio naturæ ; the former being but a degree or rudiment of the latter." Now if he meant by "Experientia literata the same thing which he describes here, or anything like it, which I see no reason to doubt he must have seen even then the impossibility of making a collection of facts sufficient for the purposes of Interpretation without the help of some principle of arrangement, some "series et methodus," some "sagacitas" in seeking and selecting; which necessarily implied some amount of theory. Such theory was indeed to be provisional only, and subject at all times to revision. It was not to be allowed as an axiom. But it does not appear that he would have put any other restriction upon the exercise of human sagacity in this way. The process might have been carried therefore to an indefinite length, and the further the better. And though it may be true that no amount of diligence and sagacity could ever have made a collection of facts complete enough to lead to the discovery of Forms by the method of the Novum Organum, it seems impossible to fix a point beyond which, through successive reductions of particular phenomena and groups of phenomena under laws more and more general, further progress could not have been made towards the highest law which includes them all. And such progress men have in fact been making ever since Bacon's time; the whole of our experimental philosophy being what he, I think, would have described as Experientia literata, and allowed as legitimate and successful so far as it goes. Whether, if he could see the results which it has produced during the last two hundred years, he would still believe in the possibility of arriving ultimately at what he would have called "the Interpretation of Nature" may be doubted; but that if this "hunt of Pan" were conducted as skilfully and assiduously by the whole body of inquirers through the entire field of nature as it has been by particular inquirers in particular fields, we should be able to approach much nearer to such a consummation than anybody now imagines this I cannot doubt that he would still believe. — J. S. 1 See Nov. Org. i. 100. |