pose the whole, but rather the idea of the whole explains the form of the whole and the connection of the parts. Now, such a whole is an effect or product, the idea of which is treated as the cause that makes it possible, and such a product is called an end. It therefore arises from the peculiar character of our intelligence that we regard certain natural products as due to a different sort of causality from that of material laws of nature, namely, that of ends and final causes. This principle, therefore, does not determine the manner in which things themselves, even when they are regarded as phenomena, are capable of being produced, but merely the manner in which our intelligence can alone judge them to be produced. If we make a distinction between phenomena and noumena, the principle of the mechanical derivation of natural products exhibiting adaptation is quite consistent with the teleological, but by no means enables us to dispense with it. "In the investigation of a thing which we are forced to regard as a natural end (an organized being), we may try all the known and yet to be discovered laws of mechanical production, and may even hope to make good progress in that direction, but we need never hope to get rid of the quite different principle of causation by ends in our explanation of natural products. No human intelligence, and indeed no finite intelligence, however it surpass ours in degree, need expect to comprehend the production of even a blade of grass by purely mechanical causes. The teleological connection of causes and effects is absolutely indispensable in judging of the possibility of such an object. There is no adequate reason for regarding external phenomena as such from a teleological point of view; the reason for it must be sought in the supersensible substrate of phenomena. But as we are shut out from any possible view of that substrate, it is impossible to find in nature grounds for an explanation of nature, and we are compelled by the constitution of our intellectual faculty to seek for the supreme ground of teleological connection in an original Intelligence as cause of the world."

Appendix on Method: Moral Proof of the Existence of God. "Moral teleology has to do with the relation of our own causality to ends, and even to an ultimate end necessarily set by us as our own goal in the world, as well as with the possibility of realizing that end, the external world being what it is. The question necessarily arises whether reason compels us to seek in a supreme intelligence outside of the world for a principle which shall explain to us even the adaptation of nature to an end relatively to the law of morality within us. There is, therefore, a moral teleology which is concerned on the one hand with the nomothetic of freedom, and on the other with that of nature. . . . From the teleological point of view, it is a primary proposition admitted by every one that there can be no ultimate end at all presupposed by reason a priori, unless that end be man under moral laws. A world consisting of mere lifeless beings, or even living but unintelligent beings, would have no meaning or value, because there would be in it no intelligent being to appreciate its value. Again, suppose that in the world there are intelligent beings whose reason enables them to value existing things for the pleasure they bring, but who have not themselves any power of imparting a value to things originally by means of freedom: then, there will indeed be relative ends, but no absolute or ultimate end, for the existence in the world of such intelligent beings can never have an end. Moral laws, however, are of this peculiar character that they prescribe for reason something as an end without any condition, and therefore exactly as the notion of an ultimate end requires. The existence of a reason which may be for itself the supreme law in the relation of ends, in other words, the existence of rational beings under moral laws, can alone be conceived as the ultimate end of the existence of the world. On any other supposition its existence does not imply a cause acting from any end, or it implies ends but no ultimate end." Moral law prescribes as goal of our efforts the highest good possible in the world through freedom. The highest good possible in the world

is happiness, and this end we must seek to advance as far as in us lies, but always under the objective condition of the harmony of man with the law of morality as worthiness to be happy. "But it is impossible, in consistency with all the faculties of our intelligence, to regard the two requisites of the ultimate end presented to us through the moral laws as connected by merely natural causes, and yet as conforming to the idea of that ultimate end. We must therefore suppose a moral cause or author of the world in order to set before ourselves an ultimate end conformable to the moral law; and in so far as the latter is necessary, so far, i. e., in the same degree and on the same ground, the former also must necessarily be admitted; it must, in other words, be admitted that there is a God. . . . The ultimate end, as merely a notion of our practical reason, is not an inference from the data of experience for the theoretical explanation of nature, nor can it be applied in the knowledge of nature. Its only possible use is for practical reason in relation to moral laws." We have a moral ground for representing in the world an ultimate end of creation, but we cannot " assume that in an ultimate end we have a reason for admitting not merely a moral ground or ultimate end of creation (as effect), but also a moral being as original ground of creation. But we may certainly say that according to the constitution of our reason we cannot make intelligible to ourselves the possibility of an adaptation relative to the moral law, and to its object as it is in this ultimate end, apart from an author and ruler of the world, who is also a moral lawgiver... . To prevent a very natural misunderstanding, these two points should be carefully borne in mind. In the first place, we can think the attributes of the Supreme Being only by analogy. How, indeed, should we attempt to investigate directly the nature of a Being to whom nothing similar is given in experience? Secondly, in thinking the Supreme Being through these attributes, we do not thereby know him, nor can we theoretically predicate them of him; for to contemplate that Being as he is in himself, reason as speculative must take the form of determining judgment."

Metaphysics. We pass now to Metaphysics,' (1) of Nature, (2) of Morals.

The Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science.2 troduction. The science of nature, or the sum total of phenomena, has two main divisions corresponding to the divisions of sensibility (i. e., outer and inner sense); namely, the doctrine of body and the doctrine of soul. It is either empirical (dealing with mere facts) or rational (dealing with laws), the latter alone being science in the proper sense of the term. Rational science, again, has two parts corresponding to a purely a priori method of treating its subject and to a treatment of it according to empirical laws. Rational science in the former sense is the metaphysics of nature. The metaphysics of nature, again, has two branches, one of which (the transcendental branch) treats of the laws rendering possible the conception of nature in general, the other of some particular empirical conception, e. g., the empirical conception of matter. In every special natural doctrine only so much science proper is contained as there is mathematics. Chemistry and psychology are, for this reason, not properly natural sciences. A pure (transcendental) philosophy of nature in general is possible without mathematics. That there may be a real (i. e., mathematical) science of body there must be certain "principles of the construction of conceptions belonging to the possibility of matter in general." These are furnished by a pure philosophy, a metaphysics of corporeal nature. The fundamental attribute of a thing that is to be an object of external sense must be motion, for only by motion can this sense be affected, and natural science is (therefore) throughout either a pure or an applied doctrine of motion. The Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science may therefore be brought under four main divisions, of which the first, "treating of motion considered as pure quantum according to its composition, without any

1 See above, p. 317.

2 See the translation of Kant's "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft," by Belfort Bax.

quality of the movable," may be termed Phoronomy; the second, "regarding motion as belonging to the quality of the matter under the name of an original moving force," may be called Dynamics; the third, treating of "matter endowed with force, conceived as, by its own reciprocal motion, in relation," is Mechanics; and the fourth, treating of motion (or rest) merely in reference to the mode of presentation or modality, or, in other words, as determined as phenomenon of the external sense, is Phenomenology.

Phoronomy. Matter is the movable in space. Space which is movable is relative; space which is immovable and a condition of all motion is absolute. All motion that is an object of experience is relative. Motion is change of external relations to space; rest is permanent presence in the same place. Rest cannot be regarded as motion, which is zero in value, as zero does not admit of being constructed. Rest may be constructed as motion of infinitely small velocity throughout a finite time. Every motion as an object of possible experience may be viewed at pleasure as motion of a body in a space that is at rest, or as rest of the body and motion of the space in the opposite direction, with equal velocity, etc. Dynamics. Matter fills a space, not by its mere existence, but by a special moving force. This is demonstrated as follows: The penetration into a space is a motion. The resistance to motion is the cause of its diminution, and also its change into rest. Now, nothing can be connected with any motion as lessening or destroying it but another motion of the same movable in the opposite direction. Thus the resistance offered by matter in the space which it fills to all impressions of another matter is a cause of the motion of the latter in the opposite direction; but the cause of a motion is called moving force. Thus matter fills space by moving force, and not by its mere existence. Matter can be compressed to infinity, but can never be penetrated (or deprived of its extension) by matter; since for the penetration of matter a compression into an infinitely small