the Natural Theology Paley "proves" the existence of God from the appearances of design and contrivance in nature. Among the instances he notes of apparent design are the following: the "pivot upon which the head turns, the ligament within the socket of the hip-joint, the pulley, or trochlean muscles, of the eye, the course of the chyle into the blood, . . . the constitution of the sexes as extended throughout the whole animal creation." Moral philosophy is directly connected with theology; through the assumption, that is to say, that the promise of future rewards and punishments is a necessary sanction of duty. The end and criterion of virtue is happiness: "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." The will of God is the "rule," as happiness is the end, of action. Paley, of course, denies the existence of a "moral sense" and of eternal, intuitively perceived principles of right. "Obligation," he says, "is a violent motive resulting from the command of another." - Paley is to be regarded as a forerunner of the Nineteenth Century Utilitarians.

§ 71.

David Hume1 (1711-1776). David Hume was born in Edinburgh. By the anxious care of his mother, — his father having died when Hume was an infant, he was given a good education, which included a partial course in the University of Edinburgh. He left the university with strong literary tastes and inclinations; and when afterwards he was supposed by his friends to be digging into books of law, he was, as he says, "secretly devouring Cicero and Virgil!" Though his mother thought "Davie a fine, good-natured creatur, but uncommon wake-minded," his mind seems to have been sufficiently active in its

1 Hume's "Treatise of Human Nature;" Green's "Introductions" to Hume; Hume," by Professor Knight ("Blackwood's Philosophical Classics "); Huxley's "Hume," etc.

own way.

An interval of several years spent at home, after a practical failure at "law," was followed by another practical failure at "business." In 1734, for economy's sake, he went to France to live, resolved on pursuing a literary career and winning a real literary fame. During the following ten years, only three of which were spent abroad, he finished a philosophical treatise (his masterpiece), which had been begun before he left Scotland, and wrote a volume of essays. In 1746 he accepted the position of secretary to General St. Clair, who was sent out on an expedition; and in 1748, a similar position with General St. Clair, when he went as ambassador to Turin and Vienna. Between the years 1751 and 1763 Hume was at Edinburgh, courting (successfully) fame as a historian, want of acknowledged success in philosophy having put a damper on his ambition as a philosophical writer. He held at the same time the position of librarian to the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh. For three years (1763-1766) he was secretary to an embassy to France, and for two Under-Secretary of State. He had in the mean time acquired a good property, bearing (together with a pension) an income of £1,000 a year, and he determined to spend the remainder of his life (after 1769) in leisure and ease. He died in 1776. A certain gayety of disposition characteristic of him seems to have been even more marked than ever before, when, for some time previous to his death, he was perfectly aware of his approaching dissolution.

Works. Hume's chief philosophical works are: “A Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects (three Books: I. Of the Understanding; II. Of the Passions; III. Of Morals) " (1739-1740); "Essays, Moral, Political, Literary" (1742); "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" (Book I. of the "Treatise" revised for literary purposes, 1748); "Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" (a revision of Book III. of

the "

Treatise," and regarded by Hume as his best work, 1751); "Political Discourses (1752); "The Natural History of Religion" (1757); "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" (1779). Hume's philosophical masterpiece is the "Treatise of Human Nature," his earliest work. Perhaps next to this in value are the “Dialogues on Natural Religion" and the "Natural History of Religion."

Philosophy: The Importance and the Method of the Science of Human Nature. The only hope, says Hume, by way of introduction to his system, for success in philosophical investigation is to take as the beginning and basis of all knowledge the knowledge of human nature: “There is no question of importance whose decision is not comprised in the science of man, and there is none which can be decided with any certainty before we become acquainted with that science." And as this science is the only solid foundation for other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid in experience and observation. The method of experience, or experiment and observation, as applied to human nature, has indeed its limitations, since reflection and premeditation must so disturb the operations of nature in the mind as to render it impossible to "form any just conclusion from the phenomena;" but by a cautious observation of human life we may learn experiments enough and of the proper sort to establish a science of human nature.

I. The Understanding: Origin of our Ideas. All perceptions of the human mind may be resolved into two kinds, differing merely in degree of "force and liveliness." The more forcible and lively may be termed " 'impressions;" the less, "ideas." The latter are simply "faint images" of the former. Our perceptions may also be divided into simple and complex. All simple ideas are derived from simple impressions, which they exactly represent. Impressions are of two sorts: impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. The origin of the

first-named sort is unknown. The second sort originate largely from our "ideas (or copies of first impressions) returning upon the soul." The theory of impressions of sensation is a part of anatomy and natural philosophy, rather than of a philosophy of mind, which begins, properly, with the theory of ideas. Now, "ideas," or "impressions returning upon the soul," are by the degree of their vivacity either perfect ideas, or are intermediate in character between a pure impression and a pure idea. In the latter case they are an idea of memory; in the former, are ideas of imagination. By the faculty of imagination, but not by memory, ideas are given a different order and combination from that which impressions have. The principles of "union and cohesion" among simple ideas in the imagination are resemblance, contiguity in time and place, cause and effect. From the union of simple ideas result complex ideas, which may be classed as relations, modes, and substances. Ideas of substances are and can be only ideas of collections of particular qualities. If substance were not merely a collection of qualities, the idea of it must be derived from an impression of sensation or an impression of reflection. In the former case, it must be a color, sound, taste, smell, etc., which certainly it is not; in the latter, it must be a passion or emotion, which also it is not. What is true of substance in these respects is true also of modes, which are merely groups of qualities "dispersed among different subjects." To Hume's account of the idea of substance we may append his doctrine of abstract ideas (which is substantially the same as that of Berkeley). The abstract or general idea, says Hume, is "merely the particular annexed to a certain term," ," "which gives it more extensive signification." This must be so; for it is "utterly impossible to conceive any quality or quantity without forming any precise notion of its degrees," since "abstract ideas must be copies of impressions, which are always definite, both in quantity and in quality." The general term always suggests the ideas

of certain individuals, together with less definite ideas of others. The mind really adds nothing to what is impressed upon it. Relations are philosophical or natural: philosophical when the results of voluntary comparison, otherwise natural. The philosophical relations are resemblance, proportion in quantity and number, degrees in quality, contrariety, identity, relations of time and place, causation. These may be divided into two different classes, according as they either depend merely on the ideas compared (as do the first four mentioned), or do not so depend (as do the last three). Only relations of the former sort are selfevident objects of "certainty and knowledge." The other relations require further attention.

The Ideas of Space and Time, Number, Existence, and External Existence. The idea of space can originate only in an external impression, since it cannot be identified in any manner with passions, emotions, desires, or aversions. The only external impressions from which the idea of space or extension can possibly arise are "impressions of colored points disposed in a certain manner;" the _ "idea of extension is nothing but a copy of those colored points and the manner of their appearance." The pure idea of extension depends upon an act of comparison and abstraction; but this adds nothing to what is given in the impression as such. The idea of time comes to us from the succession of our ideas and impressions. And "time cannot make its appearance to the mind either alone or attended with a steady, unchangeable object; " it is not distinguishable, and hence not separable from particular impressions, arising altogether from the manner in which impressions appear to the mind. That the ideas of space and time originate in the senses is absolutely proved by the fact that space and time become contradictions if not conceived as merely made up of indivisible and in themselves perceivable parts; for how should extension or duration be composed of merely mathematical points so called? It follows from the sensible character of our