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which is the less; and though in tenura Guilielmi, which is See 3 Co. 10. true, had been first placed, yet it had been all one, the notes being of unequal dignity.

But if I grant tenementum meum quod perquisivi de R. C. in Dale, where the truth was T. C., and I have no other tenement in Dale but one; this grant is good, because that which soundeth in name, namely, in Dale, is true, and that which sounded in addition, viz. quod perquisivi, &c., is only false.

So if I grant prata mea in Sale continentia 10 acras, and they contain indeed 20 acres, the whole twenty pass.

So if I grant all my lands, being parcels manerii de D. in prædictis literis patentibus specificat', and there be no letters patent; yet the grant is good enough.

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The like reason holds in demonstration of persons that hath been declared in demonstration of lands and places: the proper name of every one is in certainty worthiest; next are such appellations as are fixed to his person, or at least of continuance, as son of such a man," ," "wife of such a husband," or additions of office, as "clerk of such a court," &c.; and the third are particular actions or accidents, which sound no way in appellation or name but only in circumstance, which are less worthy, although they may have a more particular reference to the intention of the grant.

And therefore if an obligation be made to I. S. filio et hæredi G. S. where indeed he is a bastard; yet the obligation is good.

So if I grant land Episcopo nunc Londinensi qui me erudivit in pueritia; this is a good grant, although he never instructed


But è converso, if I grant land to I. S. filio et hæredi G. S. and it be true that he is son and heir unto G. S. but his name is Thomas; this is a void grant.

Or if in the former grant it was the Bishop of Canterbury who taught me in my childhood, yet shall it be good, as was said, to the Bishop of London, and not to the Bishop of Canterbury.

The same rule holdeth in denomination of times; which are, such a day of the month, such a day of the week, such a Saint's day or eve, to-day, to-morrow: these are names of times: but the day that I was born, the day that I was married; these are but circumstances and additions of times.

And therefore if I bind myself to do some personal attend

ance upon you upon Innocents' day, being the day of your birth, and you were not born that day; yet shall I attend.

There rest yet two questions of difficulty upon this rule: First, of such things whereof men take not so much note, as that they fall into this distinction of name and of addition: as, 66 my box of ivory lying in my study, sealed up with my seal of arms;" "my suit of arras with the story of the nativity and passion:" of such things there can be no name, but all is of description and circumstance; and of these I hold the law to be, that precise truth of all recited circumstances is not required, but in such things, ex multitudine signorum colligitur identitas.

Therefore though my box were not sealed, and although the arras had the story of the nativity, and not of the passion, if I had no other box, nor no other suit, the gifts are good; and there is certainty sufficient: for the law doth not expect a precise description of such things as have no certain denomination.

Secondly, Of such things as do admit the distinction of name and of addition, but the notes fall out to be of equal dignity, all of name, or all of addition: as, prata mea juxta communem fossam in D. whereof the one is true, the other false; or tenementum meum in tenura Guilielmi quod perquisivi de R. C. in prædict indent' specificat', whereof one is true, and two are false, or two are true, and one false: so ad curiam quam tenebat die Mercurii tertio die Martii, whereof the one is true, the other false.

In these cases the former rule, ex multitudine signorum, &c. holdeth not; neither is the placing of the falsity or verity first or last material; but all must be true, or else the grant is void: always understood, that if you can reconcile all the words, and make no falsity, that is a case quite out of this rule, which hath place only where there is a direct contrariety or falsity not to be reconciled to this rule.

As if I grant all my land in D. in tenura I. S. which I purchased of I. N. specified in a demise to I. D. and I have lands in D. whereof in part of them all these circumstances are true, but I have other lands in D. wherein some of them fail; this grant will not pass all my land in D.: for here these are references, and no words of falsity or error, but of limitation and restraint.


Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur.

THERE be two sorts of ambiguities of words; the one is ambiguitas patens and the other is ambiguitas latens. Patens is that which appears to be ambiguous upon the deed or instrument: latens is that which seemeth certain and without ambiguity for any thing that appeareth upon the deed or instrument, but there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth the ambiguity.

Ambiguitas patens is never holpen by averment: and the reason is, because the law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment, which is of inferior account in law; for that were to make all deeds hollow and subject to averments, and so, in effect, that to pass without deed, which the law appointeth shall not pass but by deed.

Therefore if a man give land to I. D. et I. S. et hæredibus, and do not limit to whether of their heirs; it shall not be supplied by averment to whether of them the intention was the inheritance should be limited.

case, 5 Co.

So if a man give land in tail, though it be by will, the Cheyney's remainder in tail, and add a proviso in this manner," Provided 68. that if he, or they, or any of them do any act, &c.," according to the usual clauses of perpetuities; it cannot be averred, upon the ambiguity of the reference of this clause, that the intent of the devisor was, that the restraint should go only to him in the remainder and the heirs of his body, and that the tenant in tail in possession was meant to be at large.

Of these infinite cases might be put: for it holdeth generally that all ambiguity of words by matter within the deed, and not out of the deed, shall be holpen by construction, or in some case by election; but never by averment, but rather shall make the deed void for uncertainty.

But if it be ambiguitas latens, then otherwise it is. As if I grant my manor of S. to I. F. and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all upon the deed; but if the truth be that I have the manors both of South S. and North S. this ambiguity

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is matter in fact; and therefore it shall be holpen by averment, whether of them it was that the parties intended should pass. So if I grant my tenement in the parish of St. Dunstan's, and I have two tenements there; this uncertainty shall be supplied by averment of intention.

But if I set forth my grant by quantity; then it shall be supplied by election, and not by averment.

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As if I grant ten acres of wood in Sale, where I have a hundred acres; whether I say it in my deed or no that I grant my hundred acres, yet here there shall be an election in the grantee, which ten he will take. And the reason is plain for the presumption of law is, where the thing is only nominated by quantity, that the parties had an indifferent intention which should be taken; and there being no cause to help the uncertainty by intention, it shall be holpen by election.

But in the former cases the difference holdeth, where it is expressed, and where not. For if I recite, Whereas I am seised of the manor of North S. and South S. I lease unto you unum manerium de S. there it is clearly an election: and so if I recite, Whereas I have two tenements in St. Dunstan's, I lease unto you unum tenementum, there it is an election. Contrary law it. is in the cases before, where I take no knowledge of the uncertainty; for there it is never an election, but an averment of intention: except the intent were of an election, which may also be specially averred.

Another sort of ambiguitas latens is correlative unto this: for this ambiguity spoken of before is, when one name and appellation doth denominate divers things; and the second is, when the same thing is called by divers names.

As if I give lands to Christ-Church in Oxford, and the name of the corporation is Ecclesia Christi in Universitate Oxford; this shall be holpen by averment, because there appears no ambiguity in the words: for the variance is matter in fact.

But the averment shall not be of the intention, because it doth not stand with the words. For in the case of equivocation the general intent includes both the special, and therefore stands with the words: but so it is not in variance; and therefore the averment must be of matter that doth induce a cer

tainty', and not of intention: As to say, that the precinct of "Oxford," and of "the University of Oxford," is one and the same; and not to say, that the intention of the parties was, that the grant should be to Christ-Church in the University of Oxford.

1 I have conjecturally substituted "certainty" for "quantity." One MS. has a


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