we need not state. We contend that there is something in a name, and believe that those who will ignore the name or the nationality of a great kingdom will not scruple to go a step farther. As a proof of this, we have only to turn to the preliminary remarks of an article on the Penrhyn slate quarries, which appeared lately in a popular London periodical. The writer of the article in question says, that "Wales, after the Norman invasion, was the first portion of the island that was brought into subjection to England; Ireland was the second, and Scotland the last." How any person with the slightest regard for historical truth could pen such an untruth, we are at a loss to conceive, unless it be that habit, which is said to become a second nature, has so blinded him to the truth that he could not perceive it. But, as we may have read history in vain, we would request him to inform us when that remarkable event took place, as we have got a notion here that Scotland was never subdued by England or any other power, and that she still is, what she has ever been, unconquered Caledonia.

We will now proceed to have a word with T. U. That gentleman commences by vilifying the persons, and misrepresenting the motives, of the leaders of the Scottish Rights movement in the following manner:-" A few individuals have united in Scotland, to stir up the embers of national animosity, in imitation of the repeal agitation in Ireland. Their language is more extravagant, bombastic, and inflammatory than is usual even at the commencement of a revolutionary campaign." We must in charity suppose that he has not either read or heard the addresses delivered at Edinburgh and Glasgow, or he would never have made such an assertion. If he has, will he be kind enough to point out one sentence in these addresses that is “extravagant, bombastic, and inflammatory?" But the following extract from the chairman's speech at the great meeting at Glasgow will best answer his tirade:"I did not expect that the chairman should again require to explain or vindicate the objects of this Association; but, gentlemen, during the interval which has elapsed since last meeting, our opponents have not been idle; and, failing to establish any progress in shaking our real position, they have in some quarters insinuated, if not asserted,

that other motives actuate us besides those which we ostensibly put forth. Gentlemen, it is fitting that this first public opportunity should be seized of giving to this charge a public and emphatic contradiction. I deny it in my own name; I deny it in the name of this great meeting. We are no fomenters of sedition, no traffickers in political agitation; we are straightforward men, demanding the honest fulfilment of a solemn and intelligible contract; and beyond that we put forth no demand, excepting the most reasonable one, that, as an integral portion of a great empire, we shall have conceded to us the principle, followed by the practice, that equal claims and equal contributions shall entitle us to equal privileges. And I here distinctly and emphatically proclaim, that if any member of this Association were, as an associate, to suggest, or promote, or encourage, any ulterior political action whatever, beyond, or at variance with, the statement in our public declarations, that I should repudiate that man, and we should repudiate the Association itself if it recognised that

man."

At the same meeting Lord Eglinton said: "If there is one thing on which I, individually, have endeavoured to be explicit,-if there is one thing in which I believe every one with whom I am associated has been decided,—it is in expressing our determination to preserve, in all its integrity, the union between Scotland and England: it is not to be parties to the sowing of dissension between the two countries. But our opponents will not take us at our word; they either will not read what we say, or they choose wilfully to disbelieve what we assert. We mean what we declare; we mean nothing more, and we mean nothing less."

T. U. then gloomily forebodes the direst evils from such an agitation, which, happily, exists only in his imagination, and goes on reiterating what no one attempts to deny, namely, the great benefits Scotland had received from the union; but that because, in spite of all our disadvantages, we are comparatively prosperous and happy, is a reason why we should not have justice, is about as reasonable as to tell a man who has been defrauded of a large property, that, because he is well-to-do in the world, he has no right to it. We will pass over his remarks on the Heraldic Grievance with merely stating that

we are not aware of its being settled, conse- | quently no decision could be kept back from the public; and though the question, to the great majority, is an unimportant one, we think that, if there is a right and a wrong in it, we should have the right method in preference to the wrong. As to the Free Libraries' Act, we sincerely congratulate him upon the promptitude with which the Government granted his Society's request. We only wish they were less tardy with other things, the Glasgow Post Office, for instance.

He next informs us Edinburgh abounds with hospitals, which are made an improper use of; and that, because Government grants are given to London and Dublin, it is no reason why they should be extended to Edinburgh. Hear ye that, citizens of "Edina, Scotia's darling seat!" Your town abounds with hospitals, which are made an improper use of; so you cannot expect Government grants; and, though the other two capitals of the kingdom get them, yours must depend on private subscription!

He next falls foul of Sir Archibald Alison for asking more troops for Scotland. Now, we do not share the baronet's fears of a Russian invasion; but that is no reason why we should not have more troops near our large commercial cities. It is not so very long since Glasgow was for two hours at the mercy of a lawless mob, who disappeared on the appearance of the military; but should the same thing happen again-and who can say it will not?-we have not a single troop of horse within several miles of us; and before they could arrive much damage might be done to both life and property. And if it is so easy to concentrate the troops at any part of the kingdom on the appearance of invasion, why not let the provincial cities have a share of their protection?

T. U. then gives us a reason why Holyrood should not be repaired, that it is now scarcely used. This, from an Edinburgh man, either displays great ignorance or duplicity. It is only recently it was used for the election of a Scottish representative peer, and the floors were so insecure that the public could not be admitted to the ceremony. And if we have no evidence that the Queen would

reside at Holyrood if it was repaired, we have as little to show that she would not. But if it was in a state fit for her reception, she would, doubtless, occupy it, and not require to reside at a private hotel when she visits her northern capital. Merely noticing the absurdity of supposing the Lord Advocate able properly to attend to his multifarious duties, we find that T. U. is in great fear lest any additional members of parliament that Scotland may get will go to swell the ranks of that defunct body, the Tories. We would simply ask him if the Liberals would not have the same chance of electing men holding their views as the Tories? We think they would have the best chance of the two, as the large cities, the strongholds of Liberalism, would certainly get the lion's share; so that, if the Tories are obstructive, they will be in a very small minority, unable to do mischief; and if the Liberals are incapable, the fault is our own for not electing better men.

In conclusion, T. U. speaks, "in these friendly pages, to many Englishmen, and we feel assured that they mean to inflict no injustice upon us: hence agitation is a crime." So are we as fully assured that Englishmen mean to inflict no injustice. But how does T. U. make "agitation" a crime? We thought everything was now done by agitation. It is not long since we had a great free-trade agitation; and who would call it a crime? But, in the eyes of T. U., the agitation for seeking justice to Scotland is a crime not to be overlooked.

In conclusion:-Cordially agreeing with T. U. that every faith should be placed "in that great rational, liberal party, whose principle and desire it is to remove every political abuse," we think that, while we give all the aid in our power to that party, we should not forget the special claims upon us by that portion of our beloved isle with which we are more immediately connected. We now leave the case in the hands of our English brethren, confident that, with their characteristic love of fair play, they will at once admit that Scotland has great reason to complain of injustice, not from them, but from the partial government of the country. Glasgow.

DOUGLAS.

In our search after truth it is important that we should be more intent upon essences than forms, things than words; otherwise we may chance to find that practical expediency will force us to the adoption of measures totally inconsistent with theoretical principles to which we may have committed our judgments. It is in virtue of this attention to things rather than words that we find ourselves bound to maintain the affirmative of the present question; and if we can succeed in showing our readers the identity between two things, which, nevertheless, exist under different names, we think we shall have no difficulty in obtaining their concurrence in the opinion that slavery is justifiable under some circumstances. We may here observe that slavery does not necessarily mean the "slave trade," nor the "domestic institution" of our transatlantic relatives; so that by arguing in justification of slavery under certain circumstances, we are not necessarily committed to a favourable opinion of it as it exists under those aspects. The position of the brute creation in regard to man aptly illustrates the condition of slavery; and it will be conceded on all hands that man is perfectly justified in appropriating to his use the services of this department of animated nature wherever it is available for his purposes. We draw attention to this because it exemplifies the sentiment with which we regard the infliction of slavery on certain individuals of the human species. It has been justly observed, that "the man who employs his rationality for evil is viler than the brutes in proportion as he does so." Now, it is a lamentable fact that some men do so employ this main characteristic of their manhood, and thereby acquire to themselves a nature more detestable and more to be dreaded than even that of wild beasts. In degrading such individuals to the position of the brute creation, we maintain that we violate no sound moral principle.

We now beg to submit that there is an

identity of nature between penal servitude and slavery; and none, surely, will dispute that it is both right and expedient on the part of the community to inflict, through its executive government, the punishment of involuntary servitude, or slavery, upon notable offenders against its laws. Here we think we have made out a plain case on the behalf of the affirmative of the question before us, a case which cannot fail to come home to the convictions of our readers, provided the premise upon which it rests be admitted, viz., the identity between penal service and slavery. We should have thought that "a moment's reflection" would have been sufficient to convince any one of so palpable a similitude. "L'Ouvrier," however, appears to dispute it; with what kind of consistency we will proceed to point out. He asserts, that "to punish some infractions of the criminal and commercial law by deprivation of personal liberty and forced labour has nothing at all to do with the question of slavery." "It is (he says) a punishment for wrong done." Well; and is not the "wrong done' a circumstance, "L'Ouvrier?" And is not the punishment-" deprivation of personal liberty and forced labour"-slavery, according to that identical "maxim of mathematical science"- equals to the same thing are equals to each other"-which you yourself adopted in connexion with this discussion? How, then, can you consistently assert that penal servitude "has nothing at all to do with the question of slavery?" But if penal servitude is slavery, and, moreover, is justly inflicted as a punishment (and this is not disputed), then, clearly, "circumstances" do justify slavery.

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Our friend, however, has been arguing in connexion with a crotchet-"natural right," by which he means the abstract right of the individual, one of the postulates of an exploded system. "The theory of natural rights is closely connected with the fiction of a social compact made between persons living in a so-called state of nature,—a