Considering the immense advantages which France reaped, and is still reaping from the splendid abilities and unwearied industry of Bonaparte, how can an article on this question be considered at all consistent with justice, which silently passes over this most important feature, which ought in common fairness to be the most prominent part of the argument? when he attributes to the personal ambition | his talents for administration, or his civil of Napoleon the peculiar motive and plan of achievements. the Italian campaigns. He was but the servant and tool of the Directory, who were ever urging him to renewed efforts in the path of conquest. It is a well-established fact, that he was continually moderating, by his counsels, the ambitious designs of that power. His leading aim at this period was to free the Italians from their German oppressors, and to encourage the growth of liberal institutions. The Directory continually frustrated him in the scheme, by insisting upon too much French influence. We should recommend our friend to carefully read Scott's Life of Napoleon; it may induce him to change his opinions. "Walter" does faint justice to Napoleon's military genius, but never once alludes to If the French nation were benefitted, both in the past, present, and probably, future, by him, could we, as Frenchmen, refrain from offering him our sincere and uncompromising admiration? Upon this ground we take our stand; as we conceive it to be the only one that is consistent with the real question under discussion. J. B. 0. Social Economy. IS SLAVERY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIABLE? NEVER did we resume the discussion of any question with more feelings of satisfaction than we do the present; and this satisfaction arises not merely from the character of the conclusion at which we feel sure most of our readers will arrive, but from the success of the means which have been employed to lead to that conclusion. It is pleasing to find, after the violent execrations which have been hurled at all—especially Americanslaveowners, that reason is likely to weaken hatred and "all uncharitableness," while it develops and defends truth. It will be remembered that we opened this debate, not by maintaining that slavery under all circumstances was desirable, but that under some circumstances it was justifiable. In support of this position we, and the friends who followed us, sought to prove that there was not necessarily any crime or moral evil involved in supporting a system of slavery; that the principle of slavery or forced labour-was found in the gradations of the natural world, in the institutions of society, and the penalties inflicted by our own laws. Against these arguments our opponents have urged the natural equality and consequent rights of man, and the benevolent spirit of the New Testament. The absurd figments of men's equality and natural rights have been so ably and thoroughly exposed by "Benjamin" and H. B., that we need not offer a single word upon them; and with respect to the benevolent spirit of Christianity, while we rejoice in it, we may observe, that from a careful perusal of the Pauline epistles, we are convinced that that spirit was designed to manifest itself in the amelioration of all social evils, and not in the immediate removal of any. This branch of the subject we need not pursue, but we must hasten to notice the adverse criticism of our opponents. Of G. F. we shall not have much to say. We were certainly astonished at the inconsistency of his opening remarks, in which he tells us that he "had entertained the idea of slavery being so directly opposed to the teachings of Christianity. as to be void of all support from any authority," and then directly adds that he "had, however, anticipated a course of argument, not only entirely new, but clearly supporting this monstrous evil!" We need not be surprised at our ... friend so ill-manneredly contradicting us | Elisha that, being unable to pay the debts of when he is found thus peremptorily contra- her deceased husband, the creditor threatened dicting himself! The rhapsodical strain in to take her two sons for bondmen (2 Kings which he subsequently indulges is certainly iv. 1). Will "Onward," after consulting worthy of his commencement, while the these passages, maintain that, "in the earnestness with which he calls for a war Jewish system of servitude the service was for "freeing the unhappy black" is amusing, voluntary on the part of the servant." We though not in accordance with "the teach do him the honour to think he will not. ings of Christianity." Our friend-or rather We need say very little on the verse which our foe-"Onward" next comes forward, our opponent brought forward to substantiate and presents a bold front as he draws our his now demolished position. He says,— attention to the "Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin," "The stealing and selling men were forbidwhich he kindly informs us has lately been den, as well as the holding of them after published by Mrs. Stowe. We beg to tell they had been stolen, as the following pas'Onward" that we examined the "Key" sage will show:-'He that stealeth a man several months ago, and that it was after and selleth him, or if he be found in his doing so that we pronounced the "Cabin" hands, he shall surely be put to death.' an untruthful book-untruthful, because it Some of our American slaveholders have takes a number of the most extraordinary quite an honest horror of the practice of instances of cruelty amongst millions of men, man-stealing; but still the middle clause of grafts them on two or three individual cha- the verse before quoted condemns them,-'Or racters, and then presents them as specimens if he be found in his hands . . . he shall of ordinary life in America! The dullest surely be put to death."" Need we remind reader will at once perceive what distorted "Onward" that neither he nor ourselves and frightful pictures might be drawn of have any right to take any "middle clause any class amongst us, if a similar course of a verse" from its connexion, and that the were pursued. But it is against our Bible preceding part of this verse determines the references that " Onward" directs his main sense of the clause in question. The crime force. He describes us as hiding "amongst here denounced is "stealing a man and selthe dark shadows of the Mosaic dispensa- ling him," or stealing him and holding him in tion," and there generously follows us to possession, not selling nor holding him only. give us light. Let it be remembered that Equally unfortunate is "Onward" in his our object in referring to the Scriptures was positive denial of the perpetuity of the serto prove that slavery existed at the time vitude of alien slaves amongst the Jews. when they were written, and that, seeing it Taking as his oracle a "Rev. J. Symington," was recognised as an existing social arrange- he sets at nought the opinion of all Bible ment by the law and the prophets, and was critics, and the evident meaning of the not condemned by our Lord or his apostles, divinely-given law of the Jubilee. we had a right to conclude that there was opening declaration is, "Ye shall hallow the no necessary moral sin connexed with it. fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout Now "Onward" commences by at once all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof; affirming that in the servitude referred to in it shall be a jubilee unto you, and ye shall the Bible, there was nothing of slavery or return every man unto his possession, involuntary labour. Against this bold and and ye shall return every man unto his bald assertion we will place a few opposing family" (Leviticus xxv. 10). Now, it is facts:-Joseph was sold by his brethren as worthy of notice that " Onward," in his quoa slave; Abraham had many slaves, some of tation of this verse, unscrupulously omits which were "bought with his money" (Gen. the clause that we have given in italics, and xvii. 12). Creditors had the right of seizing which evidently limits the freedom decreed the children of a debtor, and himself also, to the Hebrew people—the chosen inhabiand of selling them in payment of his debts tants of the land! How could alien slaves (Matt. xviii. 25). The children were liable return to their possessions when they had to be sold for the debts of the parent even none to return to; and how could they return after his death;—we see this illustrated in to their families, when their families, if they the case of the widow who complained to had any, were with them in servitude? This P The interpretation of the verse is plainly borne out by the context, for after referring to the sale and redemption of land, and the relief of the destitute, the divine Law-giver goes on to say, "If thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee, thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bondservant, but as an hired servant, and as a sojourner he shall be with thee, and shall serve thee unto the year of jubilee," and then it is immediately added, "Eoth thy bondmen, and thy bondmaids which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you; and of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids. They shall be your bondmen for ever." We cannot but remark on the torturous treatment to which Mr. Symington subjects this portion of scripture. It reminds us of the application of the rack and wheel to criminals in olden times for the purpose of drawing from them confessions of the truth; and though these attempts might sometimes be successful, we feel sure that similar ones never will be when applied to the Word of God. That the present attempt has proved futile, we think we have already said enough to prove; but in conclusion will fortify our position by a brief reference to the opinions of others. Dr. Kitto says, "The mass of the servants mentioned in the scripture history were absolute and perpetual slaves." The Rev. Thomas Hartwell Horne, in his celebrated "Introduction to the Study of the Scriptures," says, "Hebrew slaves," in distinction from alien slaves, were to continue in slavery only to 66 * Pictorial Bible, Gen. xiv. 14. the year of jubilee." ."* While the Rev. Samuel Green, in his "Biblical and Theological Dictionary," thus plainly speaks," Hebrew slaves continued in slavery only for a time, whereas other slaves among the Israelites, generally strangers who had been bought, or captives who had been taken in war, were perpetually subject to the will of their masters, and at their disposal." We have gone into this subject more fully than absolutely necessary, as we were anxious to protect our readers against a bold attempt to misinterpret scripture, and to expose the fallacious arguments deduced therefrom. But we are challenged to go to the New Testament, and this we willingly do. And what is the result? Simply this: that we find frequent allusion to the existence of slavery as a social institution, and an entire absence of any prohibitory precepts against it, which would certainly not have been the case had it been sinful in itself. We believe, then, that "whatever be the magnitude of the evil of slavery, it is a political, not a moral evil, and as such, we may as well expect to find arguments in the New Testament against the Christian character of absolute monarchy or republicanism, as against slavery."† With this conclusion, we may lay down our pen, having, as we think, satisfactorily established the position which at the onset we took, that slavery under some circumstances may be justifiable. * Vol. III. p. 423. +Encyclopædia Metropolitana. NEGATIVE REPLY. "I would not have a slave to till my ground, To carry me, to fan me while I sleep, And tremble when I wake, for all the wealth of slavery from the sameness of origin and the natural equality of men, from the essen That sinews bought and sold have ever earned. tial difference between slavery and punish No! dear as freedom is, and in my heart's ་་ ment, and from the incompatibility of slavery with the belligerent rights of nations,—that it is a moral wrong, and a social or political injustice. Objections having been made by our opponents to these positions, it is our duty, on the present occasion, to examine these objections, and by testing their validity to vindicate the right of the slave to an equality of social status, political liberty, and moral freedom, with the most favoured denizen of this terrestrial sphere. "While others fish with craft for great opinion, | We are careful to bear in mind that our We with great truth catch mere simplicity." We seek not the applause of a party; we court not the notoriety of singularity; our desire is to speak forth the honest convictions of our own mind with prudence and care, regardless of who may approve or who condemn, our reward being the satisfaction arising from a sense of duty discharged. With such feelings, we can have no sympathy with those who declaim against an opponent instead of meeting his arguments; at the same time, we consider all are equally entitled with ourselves to the prudent and careful expression of their thoughts; aye, and to differ from us, too, as we differ from them; for 66 "Tis with our judgments as our watches; none Are just alike, yet each believes his own." "Benjamin" and H. B. speak of natural rights and personal equality as "that old absurdity," as "a theory which has now been abandoned by all just-thinkers," as a remnant of the subtle cobwebs of the scholastic age." We must understand them as speaking of those things we have designated natural rights in pp. 25, 26, because they introduce these remarks to overthrow the arguments deduced from the universality and alienability of those natural rights. We are quite willing they should continue to attach the same names to the same things; and we particularly desire their attention to the absurd position in which they have placed themselves by neglecting the true import of the terms they have themselves used, and copying rather the mere words employed, instead of thoroughly understanding the things signified by the authority from whom they copy. It is, then, according to our worthy friends, "an old absurdity" for man to have a right to the use of his faculties and powers? That man has a right to the light of the sun and to the air he breathes is "a theory which has long been abandoned by all just thinkers;" and it is "a remnant of the subtle cobwebs of the scholastic age" to claim for man a right to the use of his property and the fruits of his labour! Such arguments are self-condemnatory; and it would be derogatory to the common sense of the most unlettered wight to ask his disapprobation of such reasoning, or to solicit his dissent from such conclusions as they have made necessary. present question is one of abstract principle, entirely disconnected with every political or social system actual or possible; it is, therefore, not a question whether in this state or in that nation slavery may be justified; but whether one man can justly subject to slavery his fellow-man. In all abstract questions of moral science, the danger of reasoning upon an implied understanding of some peculiar state of society is always very great; and all our opponents, without exception, have fallen deeply into this error, suiting their arguments to that particular social state which their own prejudice would lead them to form; they have, consequently, made the question they have discussed, Is slavery justifiable in our form of Utopia? We desire their return to the question really before us, while we interrogate them upon their own principles. Previously, however, as they were either unable or unwilling to find a definition of slavery expressed or implied in our former observations, we will, to meet their wishes, give them a formal statement of what we suppose to be meant by that term. Slavery we consider to be the state of a man whose faculties and powers, both in possession and exercise, are forcibly made the personal property of another man. Has A any power or right to exact from B the surrender of all his (i. e., B's) faculties and powers? Can he deprive him of the light of the sun, or of the air he breathesof the use of his property or the fruits of his labour? We put this question of right respecting any one man and any other man possessing the common privileges of humanity, without reference to any particular social state or political condition; and we hesitate not to affirm that no sane man will reply in the affirmative. But supposing it were admitted that A has this right over B, this gives to all others the same right; thus, what right A has over B, B has over C; and so on to Z, who, again, has the same right over A. Thus, to admit or to prove that slavery is at all justifiable, is to admit or to prove too much, even for our pro-slavery friends; for it proves that all men may be slaves to all men, which is a palpable absurdity. We had intended a somewhat severe castigation for our friend H. B., as a punishment for the dogmatic arrogance with which he has tortured his little knowledge of logic, and less acquaintance with his mother tongue, on pp. 111 and 112; but a second reading of his article has convinced us he is a young and inexperienced writer, and we therefore only impose upon him, as a task in logic, to expunge all the redundant expressions and rhetorical language from his paper; and, having thus obtained a logical skeleton, he will find it a very profitable exercise to test every proposition and argument by the rules laid down in the leading articles of Vols. I. and II. of the British Controversialist, he will then be likely to know what estimate others may form of his reasoning, and learn, may be for the first time, the true value of his own logic; for we are compelled to affirm that it is a logic peculiar to himself, and the first specimen of the kind with which we have ever met. The reasoning of our opponents proceeds upon the assumption that utility may justify slavery; i. e., that usefulness to an individual, or to a number of individuals aggregated into a society, may render slavery expedient, and if expedient then of course justifiable (?) Now, however much we may object to expediency, or demur to the propriety of calling that just which derives its validity only from its expediency, we will accord the honour of substituting expediency for duty to these admirable moral philosophers, and, taking one step nearer to the source of their errors, offer a few remarks upon their favourite "utility," the keystone by which the whole fabric of their utilitarianism is held together in the semblance of a system, and compare it with the term "right." A celebrated writer, otherwise commendable for the profundity, the justice, and the novelty of his thoughts-Jeremy Bentham, the parent of utilitarianism-has raised his voice against the idea of right, and especially against the idea of unalterable and imprescriptable natural right; he has pretended that this notion is not proper-that it misleads us, and that it is necessary to substitute for it that of utility, which appears to him more simple and more intelligible. But the principle of utility such as Bentham has presented appears to have the inconveniences of all vague locutions, besides its own particular danger. No doubt, in defining properly the term "utility," it is impossible to deduce from it the same consequences as those which flow from natural right or from justice; but, on examining all the questions which appear to put utility and justice in opposition to each other, it will be found that that which is not just can never be useful, or become matter of utility. Besides, it is not less true that the word "utility," in its popu lar acceptation, recalls to the mind an idea different from that of justice or of right. Now, when usage and reason have attached to a term a determinate signification, it is dangerous to change this signification; for it is in vain that the word in its new sense is once explained; the word remains, and the new sense is forgotten. "We cannot reason (says Bentham) with armed fanatics respecting natural right, when each understands it as he pleases, and applies it as he thinks suitable to himself." But from his own words the principle of utility is susceptible of as many contradictory interpretations and applications. Utility (he says) has oftentimes been wrongly applied: in a strict sense it has lent its name to crime; but we ought not to cast upon the principle the faults which are contrary to it, and which it alone can rectify." How can this apology be applied to utility, and not to natural right? The principle of utility has this danger beyond that of natural right, that it awakens in the heart of man the hope of profit, and not the sense of duty. Now, the valuation of a profit is arbitrary; it is the imagination which decides; but neither the errors nor the caprices of the imagination alter the abstract notion of duty. Actions cannot be more or less just; but they can be more or less useful or profitable. By inflicting injury upon our fellows we violate their rights. This is an incontrovertible verity. But if we only judge this violation by its utility, we may deceive ourselves in the calculation, and find that there is profit or utility in the violation. The principle of utility is then, by consequence, much more vague than that of natural right. Correctly speaking, right is a principle, utility is only a result. Right is a cause, utility an effect. Were we to subject right to utility, our folly would be equally great as of that man who would subject the eternal and immutable laws of mathematical science to the changing interests of each fleeting hour. Without doubt, among masses of aggregated individuals numbers of relations become immutable, and by their immutability |