European Philosophy. 66 BY THE AUTHOR OF THE ART OF REASONING," "RHETORIC," &c. In the immediately preceding paper we endeavoured, briefly, to explain the process of development through which Religion passed before it became fitted to excite philosophic thought; and we then promised to show our readers that a similar transitionary epoch arose in Legislation; and that that also resulted in the eventuation of reflective speculation, i. e., Philosophy: this liability we now proceed to discharge. Human life is threefoldly conditionated. 1st. Existence is not an accident. A divine intention presided over its initiation, and still conserves and regulates its continuance. That purpose is the ultimate rule and measure of duty, and gives the law of human happiness; that hems in and limits human life and all its acts, feelings, thoughts, and qualities; that determines the relation between man and his Creator, and conditionates life by the requirements and ordinances of Religion. 2nd. Existence is an endowment to which certain duties are annexed and certain responsibilities attached. As every human being must perform these duties to a certain extent, and is unjustifiable in exact proportion to his neglect of them, it seems apparent that the duties and responsibilities of each one must circumscribe and limit the actions of each other. The correlation of duties and rights, responsibilities and privileges, determines the relations between man and man, and conditionates life by the maxims and enactments of Legislation. 3rd. Existence is contingent upon the operations, connexions, successions, qualities, &c., of those material things among which it is passed, and the knowledge which is attained and attainable regarding them. To the laws and regulations under which the universe exists man must submit and adapt himself, or else he must by some means constrain these laws to work his ends and purposes. Antagonism or hostility to these laws produces physical evil; obedience, physical wellbeing and happiness. This co-linking of man and nature conditionates life by Physical Law. Reflective Speculation on any one or all of these conditionating circumstances which encircle humanity and limit its activities and ambitions constitutes Philosophy-the intentional forth-sending of the thinking nature of man to discover rationally, amid the varied forms of aggregated facts, the unitive realities of truth. This is the period at which men, stirred by the deep necessities of thought, set the problem of Life before them, and, yearning for its solution, cannot rest satisfied with the knowledge derived from the outward phenomena of creation, but seek to find therein a sublatent unity of truths, i. e., to reduce all things to the region of pure ideas, and then trace their connexion and unity—to elaborate a science of realities in opposition to that of mere appearances-to know things as they are rather than as they seem to gain wisdom in contradistinction to knowledge. Let Law in its most extensive signification be defined, in the words of Montesquieu, to mean "les rapports necessaires qui derivent de la nature des choses,”* or let it be regarded 'Esprit des Lois," Liv. I., chap. i.:-"The necessary relations which result from the nature of things." L as an established order of sequence, so that from the existence and activity of a certain definite given quality, &c., a given certain definite result will follow; and let Legislation be understood to signify the authoritative specification and enactment of these relations, or of that sequency, and their results: then those laws, so far as human beings are concerned, which have as their chief object the augmentation, to the greatest possible extent, of the sum total of happiness enjoyable by the whole community, and each of its individual members, are the best; and that legislation which most readily and skilfully enacts, and most efficiently secures the observance of such laws, is the most excellent. The Legislative Powers existent in ancient times appear, for the most part, to have been autocratic, arbitrary, and either traditionally respected, or submitted to in consequence of conquest, and hence to have had no hold on the Reason. The democratic or semi-democratic constitutions of the Greek cities or states necessitated the showing that obedience was a "reasonable service." So soon, then, as this impress was given to Legislation, it also had become an element of philosophic thought, and must be wrought out into a philosophical development. And thus two of the previously-mentioned conditionating environments of human life, viz., Religion and Legislation, furnish Philosophy with certain of its most intricate questions. It is not till a slightly subsequent era that Physics can require or receive a philosophic methodization. Shortly, however, it appears that the physical environments of man are stern facts. Not only must man eat his bread in the sweat of his face; his health, happiness, and wealth depend upon his knowledge of the qualities of external nature, the laws by which the operations of the universe are regulated, and his prescience of those changes which these laws necessarily effect. Hence it happened that the properties of soil, climate, and the vegetable and mineral products of the earth, became important subjects of speculationthat the changes in the air and the alternations of the ocean, the processions of the stars and the influence of the larger heavenly bodies, were topics which excited intense curiosity. The immensity of creation, its exquisite fitness, its harmonious adaptation, and its admirable completeness, were all calculated to excite astonishment and impressive thought. The variety of characteristics nature presented, the multitudinous vitality with which it teemed, the continuous production, decay, and reproduction observable within its limits, the periodic libration coexistent with cyclic permanence, the seeming irregularities of things, and their real adhesion to the primal conditions of order and perpetuity, the constant mutation, progression and change, combined with uniformity, which the eye beheld, could not but attract attention and educe reflection. How is this unity in variety attainable or attained?—what are the maxima and minima of vicissitude to which nature is subject or subjectible?-what are the laws of change and causation under which the universe must be contemplated?-what is the definite and unchangeable design which regulates all?-who and what is the designer? and in what relation does man-an ever-changing being-stand to the changelessness of nature and its Maker?—are but a few of the suggestions which the Reason presents to itself as worthy of speculative investigation. Experience ever remounts to philosophic thought for an interpretation of the mysteries which the multiform phenomena of nature present to it. This is the normal impulse of humanity. The thinker is not he who laboriously collects, registrates, and catalogues individual phenomena— is lated facts-but he who, by unwearied toil and the diligent exertion of high mental acumen, looks beneath the surface of appearances for the unity in which they cohere, in the concrete and particular perceives the abstract and universal, and by a profound conception colligates phenomena into scientific truth. This is Philosophy. Whensoever from any given series of experiences such reflective exertions of Reason are called forth, Philosophy is initiated. The intimate connexion in the ancient world of Religion with Legislation, and of Legislation with the physical condition of nations,* clearly shows that Reflection, once educed, must exert its powers in regular succession upon each, and thus be led to include in its sphere of thought the three conditions of human life. It is true, as Morrell remarks, that "the primary efforts of Reason to get at the ground principles of human knowledge were naturally weak and imperfect; but as reflection progressed the path became clearer, until some one individual of more than ordinary reflective power arrived, as he considered, at a solution of the main problems of human life, and sent it forth as such into the world." This individual was THALES, the chief of "the seven sages;" of him, however, we shall speak more at large in a different connexion; and we shall, therefore, in the mean time, bestow our attention upon the other members of the Philosophic Heptad-those in whose lives are exhibited "the primary efforts of Reason to get at the ground principles of human knowledge" in Legislation. THE PHILOSOPHIC HEPTAD (615-558 B.C.).-At the period of which we are now about to treat, the transition process from Legislation to Philosophy was just attaining completion. There was, in the cities of Greece and Ionia, a great fermentation of thought; men sought to free themselves from the yoke of ancient forms of government, and exhibited a general inclination towards liberal or democratic institutions; a certain unanimity of idea regarding the popularization of power; a desire for the amelioration of the condition and circumstances of the people. Greece was at this time divided into many minor states; each had its own manners, privileges, laws, renown, and form of government. Although they fraternized when necessary against any common enemy, each jealously regarded its own specific rights and independency, and looked upon the others with suspicion. In these circumstances it seems evident, that if certain concisely-expressed, energetic, and wisdompregnant rules for the guidance of practice, whether at home or abroad, could be attained, they must be regarded as acquisitions, and their originators as benefactors of no mean order. Such, it appears to us, were the maxims of "the seven sages;" such were seven sages" themselves. "the Of each of these men we shall successively offer a slight notice, signalizing the most important of the several maxims generally attributed to each, and conclude by a general appreciation of the merits of their contributions to the thought-treasures of humanity, at that time so scantily supplied. Although universal tradition agrees regarding the fact of a philosophic heptad, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty entertainable concerning the individual members who composed it. We shall adhere to the most general opinion regarding the parties who ought to be so cataloguized, giving such biographical parti * See this point treated of in Montesquieu's "Esprit des Lois," Liv. XIV.-XIX. + See Diogenes Laertius, "De vitis, dogmatibus, et apophthegmatibus clarorum Philosophorum," Book I., chap. i., a translation of which is published in Bohn's Classical Library; Plato's" Protagoras," trans. Bohn's Clas. Lib.; Jo. Fr. Buddei, "Sapientia Veterum." culars about them as we have been able to glean from such sources as our library affords, and shall merely advert to the others in our concluding remarks. SOLON, the Legislator, was born at Salamis, in the third year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad (638 B.C.), of an illustrious family, his father, Excestides, being descended from Codrus, the last king of Athens. In him the legislator, philosopher, and poet were admirably blended. In his youth he spent many years in travelling, for the purpose of extending his information The state of Athens as a political community was in his age deplorable: the rich were tyrants, the poor slaves. Change seemed imminent. The unanimous voice of all classes called Solon to the archonate (595 B.C.). At this time he introduced his celebrated code of laws, and governed Athens with care, impartiality, and dignity. For the convenience of the people, he wrote his laws on revolving wooden tablets, and bound them by oath to observe them for a hundred years. These laws may be regarded as an embodiment of the philosophy of morals, not in the abstract only, but in the sense in which he gave them out, viz., as the best the Athenians appeared to him to be able to receive. In his old age he travelled to increase his knowledge, and to communicate that which he already possessed, as well as to allow time for his laws to take root and to acquire consolidation by custom. During this time he visited Egypt, Cyprus, and Lydia, where he was received at the court of Croesus. In his absence Pisistratus usurped the archonate, and became the tyrant of Athens. On Solon's return he strove to induce Pisistratus to give up his illegal authority; but not succeeding in that, he pined in dejection, and died in the second year of the fiftyfifth Olympiad (558 B.C.), eighty years of age. Some of his sayings are very remarkable, e. g., "To make laws against, and ordain punishments for, a supposable crime, was the way to introduce, not to prevent it." "If we suffer and approve of lying for the sake of amusement, it will soon find its way into serious things, our business, and other transactions." "The fate of man is constantly changing; the Deity, who rules all, is envious of too much prosperity; and all men are liable, if not to calamity, at least to accident. A man who has been uninterruptedly prosperous may be called fortunate: no man should be called happy till he is dead." "Never speak falsely." "Make reason your guide." "Associate not with the wicked." "Rule after you have learnt to obey." His "Laws" are wise, considerate, comprehensive, and equitable. They relate not only to rules of morals, but maxims of justice; not only to the regulation, but the promotion of commerce; and include their provisions rules referring to marriage, succession, property, wills, inheritances, &c., which have been in substance adopted into all the codes of modern Europe. BIAS, the son of Tuetamus, born B.C. 570, in Priené, one of the chief cities of Ionia, was a moralist and politician. The possessor of an immense fortune, he consecrated his talents to noble uses-the defence of right, the maintenance of justice, the service of his country and his friends. He was frequently employed as umpire in the disputes which arose among his fellow-citizens, who were in the habit of using his name as the synonym of justice. * A full account of the state of Athens in the time of Solon, and the laws which he instituted, may be found in Rollin's "Ancient History," Book V.; Gilles' "Greece," chap. xiii.; Thirlwall's " Greece," Vol. II.; Mitford's "Greece," chap. v., sect. 4; Brucker's "Hist. Crit. Phil.," Book I., chap. ii.; Plutarch, in "Vita Solonis;" D. Laertius, Book I.; Heeren's "Handbuck der Geschuchte der Staaten des Alterthunus," part iii., par. 14; Aristotle's "Politics," Books II., IV., and VI., &c. + Herodotus, Book I., chap. xxvii. and clxx. Several stories are recorded of him, e. g., Alyattes, King of Lydia, having besieged Priené, Bias contrived to fatten two mules, and send them out of the city in view of the camp of Alyattes, who, seeing the animals so well fed, supposed the people must have plenty of food, and proposed to send an ambassador to treat with them. On hearing this Bias ordered several mounds of sand to be raised; these he covered with corn, and thus the ambassador was led to report plenty, and, consequently, the likelihood of withstanding besiegement. He is also reported to have persuaded Croesus to forbear from invading Greece. The manner of his death is related with unaffected simplicity by Diogenes Laertius. Having pled a cause for a friend when exceedingly old, after he had ended his speech, he leaned back, placing his head on the bosom of his daughter's son. The advocate for the opposing party having spoken, the judges then gave their decision in favour of the client of Bias. When the court broke up, Bias was found dead on his grandson's bosom. So gently had his spirit fled, none had perceived it. "He pleaded his friend's cause, and then, reclined On his child's bosom, slept his last long sleep." These are some of his chief sayings:-" Haughty manners often produce destruction;" "Live as circumspectly with your friends as if they might one day be your enemies;" "Choose deliberately, then act firmly;" "Do not speak fast, that shows folly;" "Cherish wisdom, as a means of travelling from youth to old age, for it is more durable than any other possession;" "Speak of the gods as they are;" "Hope." CHEILON, the son of Damagetus, was born at Sparta. He was elected as one of the Ephori, or magisterial inspectors of that state, in the first year of the fifty-sixth Olympiad (B.c. 556), and was reputed to have executed the duties of that office in a just, honourable, and praiseworthy manner. We know very little about the events of his life,-though he has left behind him the credit of having been "The wisest man of all the seven sages," except that he died exhausted by old age and joy while embracing his son, who had been crowned victor in the Olympic games. His maxims were conformable to his peaceful and virtuous life, e. g., 66 Never become surety for another, it is a source of continual regret;" "Do not let your tongue run faster than your thoughts;" ""Honour the aged;" "Speak. no evil of the dead;" "Do not laugh at the unfortunate;" "If strong, be merciful, that ye be respected rather than feared." "Gold is best tested by a whetstone hard, Which gives a certain proof of purity; By which we know the temper of their minds." PITTACUS, the Lawgiver of Mitylené, a city of Lesbos, born the first year of the thirtyfifth Olympiad (B.C. 639), was the son of Hyrradius. Although royal power had been abrogated in Lesbos, and a republican government proclaimed, Sedition often triumphed over order, and Usurpation acquired monarchical dominion. Melanchrus had seized the sceptre of Lesbos. Pittacus leagued himself with the brothers of Alcæus, the famous * See an excellent biography of BIAS, by M. Clavier, in "Biographie Universelle," Vol. IV. |