A second reason is (and it is the principal) that if we truly consider the greatness of Spain it consisteth chiefly in their treasure, and their treasure in their Indies and their Indies (both of them) is but an accession to such as are masters by sea. So as this axle-tree whereupon their greatness turns is soon cut a-two by any that shall be stronger than they at sea. So then you report yourself to their opinions, and the opinions of all men, enemies or whosoever; whether that the maritime forces of Britain and the Low Countries are not able to beat them at sea. For if that be, you see the chain is broken, from shipping to Indies, from Indies to treasure, and from treasure to great

ness.

The third reason (which hath some affinity with this second) is a point comfortable to hear in the state that we now are. Wars are generally causes of poverty and consumption. The nature of this war, you are persuaded, will be matter of restorative and enriching. So that, if we go roundly on with supplies and provisions at the first, the war in continuance will find itself. That you do but point at this and will not enlarge it.

Lastly, That it is not a little to be considered that the greatness of Spain is not only distracted extremely and therefore of less force; but built upon no very sound foundations; and therefore they can have the less strength by any assured and confident confederates. With France they are in competition for Navarre, Milan, Naples, and the Franche County of Burgundy. With the see of Rome, for Naples also. For Portugal, with the right heirs of that line. For that they have in their Low Countries, with the United Provinces. For Ormus (now) with Persia. For Valencia with the Moors expulsed and their confederates. For the East and West Indies with all the world. his feather Spain would be left wonderful naked. is a greater confederation against them than by means of any of these quarrels or titles; and that is contracted by the fear that almost all nations have of their ambition, whereof men see no end. And thus much for the balancing of their Forces.

So that if

every bird had But yet there

For the last point, which is the choice of the Designs and Enterprises, in which to conduct the war, you will not now speak. Because you should be forced to descend to divers particulars whereof some are of a more open and some of a more secret nature. But that you would move the House to make a selected

1623-4.]

ADVICE AND VOTE OF THE COMMONS.

465

committee for that purpose. Not to estrange the House in any sort but to prepare things for them, giving them power and commission to call before them and to confer with any martial men or others that are not of the House that they shall think fit, for their advice and information. And so to give an account of the business to a general committee of the whole House.

These notes are described by Robert Stephens, who first printed them, as "heads for a speech in Parliament to be made by Sir Edward Sackville, afterwards Earl of Dorset."! If so, they cannot have been used: for his name is nowhere mentioned either in the list of members of this Parliament or in the journals. It may be however that he had intended to stand, and been prevented by the state of his brother's health, who died on the 28th of March, leaving him heir to the Earldom; and so the notes may have been drawn up as a memorial of what Bacon wished him to say, though he had not the opportunity of saying it.2

The issue of the debate for which the speech was intended-a debate corresponding to what we should now call the debate on the address was satisfactory enough. The Commons were all eager to advise the King to proceed no further with either treaty. And though the King-partly from the irresolution of age and growing infirmity, partly from unreadiness to embrace an action so foreign to all his tastes and habits and for which he had no heart, and partly from a not unreasonable caution which former trials had taught him—was shy of committing himself to a war without being sure of means to carry it on, and stood upon conditions to which the Commons on their part were shy of yielding; he was induced at last, upon a vote of three subsidies and three fifteenths payable within one year from the day when the treaties should be declared at an end, to make the requisite declaration. The announcement of which was followed by bonfires and rejoicings, which the King disapproved, as

1 Second collection, p. xxviii. In Stephens's catalogue I find an entry of a letter from Bacon to the Earl of Dorset, dated 15 Feb. 1623, beginning, "I understand; and containing "Thanks for some favours received." This letter may have had some reference to these heads for a speech, and Tenison, or Sancroft, or whoever saw it, may have left a note of the fact.

Two other entries in the same catalogue, also representing letters which have disappeared, belong to this period: both addressed to the Lord Treasurer: one dated 9 Feb. 1623, beginning, "A long and wasting;" contents, "Touching a suit to the King:" the other dated 25 Feb. 1623, beginning, “I humbly thank your Lordship; " contents, "About a certificate."

2 I am informed by Mr. Gardiner that Sackville was in Italy at the time of the meeting of this Parliament, and returned through France at the end of May, 1624; see Hacket, ii. 104, and Cotton's Peerage, ii. 158.

VOL. VII.

2 H

being a triumph before a victory, but with which Bacon sympathised so heartily that he is said to have contributed on his own account four dozen faggots and twelve gallons of wine.1

6.

Bacon's personal opinion as to the policy of the Spanish alliance may be best inferred from his 'Short view to be taken of Great Britain and Spain,' printed in the second chapter of this volume. It was an opinion upon which he had never till now been able to urge action, even as a Councillor; for since he was in a position to offer advice there had never till now been a time when existing engagements did not interfere, and make such action impracticable or unjustifiable. The declaration that the treaties were at an end cleared the field at last, and left the course open for a more popular policy and hence no doubt his sympathy with the manifestations of public satisfaction.

But this was only the clearing of the board for a new game. The debates in the Commons which showed so much eagerness to begin it, contained no evidence of a knowledge of the conditions, or how it was to be played. A war of some kind it was to be: but of what kind, and for what object, and on what ground, were questions on which opinions differed. If it was to be an offensive war for the recovery of the Palatinate, as was generally supposed 2-(the only offensive war for which there was any colour)—they knew how many subsidies it would require. In February, 1620-1, the last House had been officially informed by the Secretary of State that an army sufficient for the recovery of the Palatinate could not be sent out and kept in a state of efficiency for less than 500,000l. a year: and in the following November, when upon the failure of the negotiations the state of things was explained to them by Digby, they were told that the force required for the work they wanted would cost 900,0007.:3 an estimate agreeing much more nearly with the detailed calculations of the Council of War, and therefore presumably much nearer the truth. But however that might be, it was the last official information upon the subject which they had received from those who had the means of knowing. Now 900,000l. was more than seven subsidies and fourteen fifteenths would yield. And yet now, when in answer to their request for the dissolution of the treaties 1 S. P. vol. 161, no. 30. "For which," adds the writer," he went on the score, some say."

2 "The people are overjoyed at a war to recover the Queen [of Bohemia's] patrimony and are prepared to sacrifice life and fortune in it." Sir Rich. Harrison to Lady Carleton, 27 March, 1624. (S. P. vol. clxi. no. 47. 3 Gardiner, vol. i. p. 400.

Calendar).

1

1623-4.1

AMENDMENT MADE IN COMMITTEE.

467

and their promise of support "in a Parliamentary way," the King told them that the support of a war with Spain would require a grant of six subsidies and twelve fifteenths, they were quite unprepared for such a demand: and towards the close of a long debate upon the answer to be given, Coke himself,-after remarking that this would "come to 900,000l." (the exact figure, by the way, at which Digby had set it in November, 1621), which was more, he said, than all England could supply-proposed to bring the cost within the limits of "conveniency," not by reducing the scale or altering the plan and aim of the expected war (for the recovery of the Palatinate was, by him at least, expressly included in the work to be done), but simply by postponing the provision for two-thirds of it.

"Divide this sum into three parts. 300,000l. for the present. . . So many subsidies as shall amount to 300,0007. By this means we shall get enough to serve for the present." 2

He meant, I presume, that they would provide for the other twothirds when they were wanted. But who could say what, or on what conditions, they would be disposed to provide when they next met? For the recovery of the Palatinate does not appear to have been thought an object of such prime importance by the members of the House as it was in the country and by the Government. There were those among them who did not consider it either as the special aim or as a necessary part of the proposed war.3 With some of them the breach with Spain and alliance with the United Provinces was enough in itself: and as in that case it would only be necessary to put England into a state of defence, the 300,000l. might be thought by them to be sufficient not only for the present, but altogether. Of general promises that they would on some future occasion place all they had at the disposal of the Government, the Government had had enough from the last House. And in this case there were particular indications to suggest caution. We do not know what was said in the committee of the whole House to which the question was referred. But we know the result of the debate, and that the motion came out with a significant amendment. Coke's proposition was to give 300,000l. "for the present," specifying that it was for

1 "All England not so much as to give 6 subsidies and 12 fifteens, come to 900,000l., almost a million." C. J. 19 March, 1623-4, p. 743.

2 Id. ibid.

3 "Sir Fra. Seymour: Hears wars spoken on and an army, but would be glad to hear where. The Palatinate the place intended by his Majesty. This we never thought of, nor fit for the consideration of this House, in regard of the infinite charge." Id. p. 741.

five things-1. The securing of Ireland. 2. The defence of our own coasts. 3. Preparation of our navy. 4. To join with the Low Countries and assist them. 5. The recovery of the Palatinate. "These things the work: to specify our gifts to be for these." The resolution of the Committee was to grant "for the present, towards the support of the war which was likely to ensue, and more particularly those four points proposed by his Majesty, namely the defence of this realm, the securing of Ireland, the assistance of our neighbours the States of the United Provinces and other his Majesty's friends and allies, and the setting out of his Majesty's royal navy" (the fifth point-the recovery of the Palatinate-being entirely omitted), "three subsidies and three fifteens, to be levied in such manner," etc. Nor was the omission undesigned. How far it expressed the sense of a majority of the House we cannot tell. It may have been suggested by some more acute member, who perceiving the incongruity of providing 300,000l. for a service which they were told would require 900,000l., moved the omission of the words which made it conspicuous; and the House may have agreed, without meaning to abandon the Palatinate. But it had its effect: and it was appealed to the next year as a proof that the House was not bound to contribute anything more on that account, In a debate in the Oxford Parliament (5 August, 1625), Mr. Alford gave it as his opinion" that they were not engaged to give for the recovery of the Palatinate: for when it was in the Act of Parliament, as it was first framed, it was strucken out by order of the House, as a thing unfit to engage the House for the recovery of the Palatinate; and if possible, yet not without great charge and difficulty." 1

However that may have been, one thing is evident: that there was no clear general understanding as to the nature and objects of the war on which they were entering; and that however the Government conducted it, they would be in danger of meeting with contrary currents of opinion which might leave them short of supplies in some critical conjuncture. The Prince said that "the King's sword was a long one: when it was once out it would not easily go in again.” But he could not have said that his purse was a long one, or that when war was once declared the sinews of it might not easily fail. The danger was that-the practical control of affairs being now in the hands of young and inexperienced men who were eager to begin and saw no difficulties (for the King though retaining his judgment had lost his authority)-they would rush blindly into the enterprise without pausing to consider what was to be done, or what conditions

1 Commons' Debates in 1625. Camden Society. Append. p. 135.