Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

he had made sure of a decree in his own favour) was greatly disappointed; and (being one of many who have no respect for arbitration. when the decision goes against them) refused to obey. Whereupon a new bill was exhibited in Chancery, and Bacon ordered the bond of 10,000 marks to be assigned to the other party," and he to put the same in suit in his Lordship's name." His decision, being again in accordance with the award which he had made as arbitrator, was again, of course, unwelcome to the recusant party; who, finding no justice in Chancery, was now fain to try the King's Bench, and found means to bring his claim in another form before that Court; but still with no better success, for judgment went against him again. This was in 1620: and there the matter rested till the meeting of Parliament.

Whether this old client and aggrieved suitor was himself the mover in the next stage, I cannot clearly make out from the fragmentary notes and imperfect reports of the proceedings which have come down to us. It seems a strange disclosure for a man to make of his own accord-but whether it were that his sense of wrong was too lively to be silent, or that it was some consolation to bring the author of it to grief, or that he hoped by joining in the attack upon Bacon's judicial character to get a rehearing of his cause before another-he betrayed the fact that between the time when the first decree in the cause was pronounced (which was in May or June 1617, and was intended and expected to have the effect of removing it out of the Court altogether) and the time when the parties agreed to refer it to him as arbitrator and bound themselves to abide by his award, shortly after the one, and a few months before the other -he made him a present of a large sum of money. And though it appeared by the witnesses that it was offered only as a thankful acknowledgment of former services as counsel, and meant to buy a suit of hangings for York House to which Bacon was then on the point of removing, he seems to have felt that it entitled him also to a favourable judgment from him as arbitrator-making the adverse decision a breach of faith as well as a denial of justice. For unless he meant it for a bribe, what had it to do with his grievance ? His story (whoever brought it out and from whatever motive) came before the Committee for Courts of Justice, was inquired into, and found to be true. The justice of the judgment-which was not disputed either in this case or in Awbry's, except by those who had failed in the attempt to purchase a more favourable one for themselves-was not the question. It was enough to know that the money had been re

1 Gardiner, vol. i. p. 431.

1620-1.]

CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE HOUSES.

215

ceived from suitors whose causes were still pending; and armed with these two cases the Committee reported to the House that they had found matter for a charge of corruption against the Lord Chancellor. The 15th and 17th of March were occupied in hearing the particulars, and debating what should be done. The 18th was a Sunday. But on the 19th they sent word to the other House, that having "found abuses in certain eminent persons," they desired another conference; which was immediately appointed for the same afternoon.

4.

With a constitution so delicate and a mind so sensitive, it is not surprising that the shock produced by this new and unexpected situation proved too much for Bacon, and that his health gave way. On that day it was found necessary to appoint a substitute to supply his place in the House of Lords when he was too ill to attend ; and he wrote the following letter to them in explanation and excuse of his absence.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

HIS VERY GOOD LORDS, THE

LORDS SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL IN THE UPPER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED.1

My very good Lords,

I humbly pray your Lordships all to make a favourable and true construction of my absence. It is no feigning nor fainting, but sickness both of my heart and of my back, though joined with that comfort of mind, that perswadeth me that I am not far from heaven, whereof I feel the first fruits. And because, whether I live or die, I would be glad to preserve my honour and fame, as far as I am worthy; hearing that some complaints of base bribery are come before your Lordships, my requests unto your Lordships are: first, that you will maintain me in your good opinion, without prejudice, until my cause be heard; secondly, that, in regard I have sequestred my mind at this time in great part from worldly matters, thinking of my account and answer in a higher court, your Lordships would give me some convenient time, according to the course of other courts, to advise with my counsel, and to make my answer; wherein nevertheless my counsel's part will be the least; for I shall not, by the grace of God, trick up an innocency with cavillations; but

1 Journal of the House of Lords, p. 54.

plainly and ingenuously (as your Lordships know my manner is) declare what I know or remember; thirdly, that, according to the course of justice, I may be allowed to except to the witnesses brought against me, and to move questions to your Lordships for their cross-examination, and likewise to produce my own witnesses for discovery of the truth: and lastly, if there come any more petitions of like nature, that your Lordships would be pleased not to take any prejudice or apprehension of any number or muster of them, especially against a Judge that makes two thousand decrees and orders in a year (not to speak of the courses that have been taken for hunting out complaints against me); but that I may answer them, according to the rules of justice, severally and respectively. These requests I hope appear to your Lordships no other than just. And so, thinking myself happy to have so noble Peers and reverend Prelates to discern of my cause, and desiring no privilege of greatness for subterfuge of guiltiness, but meaning (as I said) to deal fairly and plainly with your Lordships, and to put myself upon your honours and favours, I pray God to bless your counsels and your persons; and rest

19th March, 1620.

Your Lordships' humble servant,

FR. ST. ALBAN, Canc.

[ocr errors]

This letter was delivered to the Lords the next day by Buckingham, immediately after they had heard the report of what passed at the conference with the Commons the day before. He had visited the Lord Chancellor twice (he told them in presenting it) by the King's direction, had found him the first time" very sick and heavy;" the second time better, and much comforted by hearing that the complaints against him had been referred to that House, where he assured himself to find honourable justice: in confidence whereof he had written this letter to them. It was read twice, first by the Clerk and then again by the Lord Chief Justice-who was now Bacon's locum tenens. After which it was agreed, upon the motion of Lord Southampton, to send a verbal answer to this effect :

:

"That the Lords received his Lordship's letter delivered unto them by the Lord Admiral: they intend to proceed in his cause (now before their Lordships) according to the right rule of justice: and they shall be glad if his Lordship shall clear his honour therein: to which end they pray his Lordship to provide for his defence."1

1 L. J. p. 55.

1620-1.] STATE OF THE LAW CONCERNING CORRUPTION. 217

It would have been more to Bacon's purpose to know what facilities for defence would be allowed him. The charges were accumulating and the witnesses giving their evidence in his absence, and with no one to watch the proceedings on his behalf. If he did not know what he was charged with, or what the witnessss had deposed, how was he to provide for his defence? What he wanted to be assured of was that he would be allowed "to except to witnesses brought against him," to "move questions for their cross-examination," to "produce his own witnesses for discovery of the truth," and to have "convenient time to advise with his counsel and make his answer." In a judicial proceeding so new and rare, to be conducted by a body altogether unpractised in judicial investigation and for the most part very ill-qualified for it, it was far from certain that such things as these would be thought of or admitted; and the terms of their answer did not give any assurance that they could be trusted to see the reason of them, and remember them in time.

They were the more important in this case because the difference between a gratuity which a Chancellor might and one which he might not lawfully accept, was in those days a very nice one-not only in common opinion but in law. If the Lord Chancellor had been required to take the same oath which was required of the Justices (that is, the Judges of the King's Bench and Common Pleas, and the Barons of the Exchequer), it would have been comparatively simple and broad. For a Justice was required to swear that he would not "take by himself or by other, privily or apertly, gift nor reward of gold nor silver, nor of any other thing that might turn to his profit (unless it were meat or drink, and that of small value), of any man that should have any plea or process hanging before him, as long as the same process should be so hanging, nor after for the same cause.”l So that, in the case of a Justice, the acceptance of any gratuity from any man who was or had been a suitor was a violation of his oath, as required by the statute. The statute had been suggested no doubt by the abuse of the practice in the ordinary courts of justice. To forbid the practice altogether was the best way to prevent the abuse of it; and it would have been wise and just to forbid it in the same way to everybody who had to exercise judicial functions of any kind. But had it been so forbidden? Though the practice would probably lead to the abuse, it did not necessarily imply it; and in order to prove it an act of corruption it would be necessary, I should suppose, (in the absence of an express law, making it so) to show that it was connected in some

1 The oath of the Justices, 20 Edw. III. c. 6.

way with an unjust judgment: necessary in reason at least, however it may have been in law. A judge who decides a case unjustly, knowing his decision to be unjust, in favour of a suitor from whom he has received or has reason to expect a gratuity, is guilty of corruption by the unwritten law of nature, whether he has offended against the letter of any statute or not. But if he decides it (whether for or against such suitor) according to the best of his belief justly, the law of nature sanctions no such inference. If his judgment is not affected by the gratuity, he is a just judge notwithstanding; and if the taking of gratuities has not been made by statute an offence in itself, without reference to the justice or injustice of the judgment following or preceding, he has not offended.1 Now when I enquire by what statute, known to lawyers in the early part of the 17th century, the taking of gratuities by a Lord Chan

1 A learned friend to whom I submitted this passage that he might tell me whether there was any objection to it in point of law, advised me to withdraw it; for though there might be no positive enactment prohibiting the Lord Chancellor from taking gifts, yet as all immoral acts are forbidden by the Common Law to everybody, and as the taking of gifts by a judge was an act recognized as immoral not only by the common conscience of mankind but by the particular statute of Ed. III., which imposed the oath, it was an offence against the Common Law by whomsoever committed: and as the offence consisted simply in taking the gift, the question whether the judgment had or had not been affected by it is irrelevant. "It is impossible (in law)," he says, "to go into that question." If this be all, the point of law resolves itself into a point of morals, upon which an unprofessional opinion may be as good as a professional. The act offends against the Common Law because it is immoral, and it is assumed to be immoral partly because everybody feels that it is, and partly because in the 20th year of Edward III. it was forbidden by law to the Judges. Now that every act which it has been found expedient to prohibit under penalties is in itself an immoral act, I cannot admit ; for if I do I must admit that it is in itself immoral for a candidate at an election to give a dinner and a day's wages to a poor constituent who has sacrificed his day's work and made half-a-day's journey to vote for him: for that is an act which it has been found expedient to prohibit under penalty and declare to be corrupt. Is it true then that the act of taking a gift, whether allowed to influence the judgment or not, was always felt to be an act immoral in itself? If history could be cross-examined, it would appear, I suspect, that until it was found by experience that corruption of judgment followed the practice, everybody thought it natural, and nobody thought it wrong. And speaking for myself, I say now that apart from its effect on the judgment—were it not that the offer or expectation of the gift tends to distort the judgment-there would be no immorality in the transaction at all; nor would there be more reason why a judge should not take a gift from a suitor than why a counsel should not take his fee from a client. Leave the matter to conscience and natural feeling, and the man who has received a benefit will desire to express gratitude in some form to the party at whose hands he has received it. That he has received no more than his due, and that his benefactor has done no more than his duty, will not seem a reason for refusing it and it will be found that through all the social relations of mankind the expression of such gratitude, wherever it is not expressly forbidden, is thought right. Where it has been forbidden, as in the case of the Judges,-where the law has made it a crime for a man to do that which may tempt him to betray his duty-he incurs the penalty by committing the act, and it is not necessary to enquire further. But where the act is alleged to be against law, not as having been expressly forbidden by law, but as being in its nature immoral, I must know whether he did betray his duty before I can say whether the act was against law or not.

« AnteriorContinuar »