words in the hearing of persons who are unacquainted with them, without explaining what ideas they are intended to express. If it is discovered by such persons, that they are significant of these ideas, the opinion is correct: if not, it is a mere prejudice, the effect of association, which leads those who employ them to connect with them a meaning, which they have no power of imparting or suggesting to the minds of others, in whose minds such an association does not exist. Certain modes of pronunciation, too, are deemed elegant or inelegant, merely on account of the individuals to whom they are peculiar. With high rank and elevated situation, we are accustomed to connect ideas of elegance and refinement, and consequently regard as elegant and proper that pronunciation which obtains with such persons, though perhaps it is contrary to every principle of analogy, by which the pronunciation of a language ought to be regulated.

The Greeks, particularly the Athenians, were a refined people. Poetry, oratory, grammar, and the fine arts, had been cultivated among them with care and success. The Romans, too, in the time of Augustus, were highly civilized. The language of a people partakes of their general progress, and consequently the languages of Greece and Rome were highly polished. When, after the period emphatically styled "the dark ages," men began to emerge from ignorance and barbarism, they became ac

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quainted with the writings of these ancient nations, and found in them such stores of wisdom and knowledge, the study of them was thought the principal, and almost the only object of a good education. Associating with these languages every idea of excellence, and studying them almost exclusively, the inhabitants of modern Europe in general, and especially of this island, have been led unduly to neglect the study of their own language, as an object unworthy of their regard.

In judging of the works of art, the effect of association is equally striking. About the time of the revival of learning in Europe, some men of superior genius devoted their attention to the fine arts. Uninfluenced by the works of others, they studied nature, and therefore excelled. Their excellence procured them admiration. It became fashionable to admire them; and the consequence is, that the name of an artist of that period, is sufficient to give value to an indifferent picture; whilst the name of a modern artist, is only the signal for discovering imperfections of every description.

It has perhaps been discovered that in a country, a city, or some part of a city, several individuals have acted improperly. This principle leads men in consequence to form an opinion, that every individual of such a place must necessarily have the same character. The sentiment expressed in the question, "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?"

was not peculiar to the Jews, in the days of the Messiah.

In politics, in morals, in religion, the influence of association is equally perceptible. To approve of, or condemn a man's character, we frequently require nothing more than to know the party to which he belongs. There can be no accurate reasoning, or correct judgment, where such associations are allowed to predominate. The man whose object is truth, will studiously avoid such conclusions as those, to which such associations naturally lead. His conduct will be different from that of persons,

"Who, pleased at heart, because on holy ground
Sometimes a canting hypocrite is found,

Reproach a people with his single fall,

And cast his filthy raiment at them all."

Of Conception.

SOME philosophers consider conception and imagination as only different names for the same faculty; but if by the term faculty we understand a different mode of operation, in what we denominate the mind, a slight attention to the subject will suffice to shew, that there is a difference. Imagination cannot be exercised without conception, but conception may, without imagination. These words, both in speech and in writing, are often used synonymously; this however is rather to be attributed to a want of pre

cision in those who use them, than to a want of difference in the things to which they are applied. Besides, if two words signify exactly the same thing, no good reason can be assigned for using, on any occasion, one in preference to another; but men do use these words differently; and in some of the common applications of them, to employ the one instead of the other, would not only be unintelligible, but absurd. Thus we sometimes speak of a literary performance, as a work of imagination; what idea would it convey, were we to speak of it as a work of conception? In a work which is purely philosophical, we are accustomed to say, there is little or no occasion for the exercise of imagination; how would it sound to say there is no occasion for the exercise of conception?

Custom only determines the propriety of language; and though I do not mean to affirm, that in their use of words men in general are philosophically correct, but on the contrary, often employ them in a manner almost mechanical, without attaching to them precise ideas, yet it must be admitted, that the persons who first used the words conception and imagination did not intend to express by them the same idea. What then is the operation of the mind to which these terms respectively apply?

Conception, I understand to be that power which the mind possesses, of presenting to itself the idea of any person, place, circumstance, thought, or train

of thought, which constitutes part of its knowledge, with nearly the same clearness as when the object was originally present. It implies memory; but is in some respects different, chiefly in the degree of accuracy and vividness with which original ideas are again presented to the mind; for a thing may be distinctly remembered or recollected, without our thinking of, or having present in the mind every idea necessary to constitute the whole of the original : but in conception the mind makes an effort to view every part, and does it in such a manner, that if the original object is an object of sight, the person making this effort, if a painter, can delineate, or if a poet, can describe it, so that his painting or description will resemble the original. This, and similar views, may, by metaphysical writers, not be deemed strictly consonant with a philosophical analysis of the mental powers; but should such an objection be made, let it be remembered that I have no higher pretension than to lead the young, who are ignorant of themselves and of the art of thinking, to some acquaintance with both; and that I believe, that this can best be accomplished by appealing to their experience and by using common words in a common manner.

When in speech or writing, any thing is described with which we are previously unacquainted, and we find ourselves capable of thinking what is the precise nature of the thing described, then too we are with propriety, said to exercise conception.