What order, beauty, motion, distance, size!
Concertion of design, how exquisite !

How complicate in their divine police!

Apt means, great ends, consent to general good!"

From the preceding observations, however, it must appear, that by the mind of a man is to be understood that in him which thinks, wills, remembers, &c. and which is, in its nature, totally distinct from every species of matter. An examination of this nobler part of our nature is interesting in itself, and will be found the best source from which to draw the principles of reasoning; but previously to an analysis of what are generally termed the intellectual powers, it will prove highly useful briefly to consider those inlets of a great part of our knowledge, the senses; and also the nature of those stimulators to action, or, more properly, states of mind, denominated the passions.

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OF THE SENSES.

It is necessary to our comfortable existence, that we should be acquainted with the objects around us; and, for this purpose, the Author of our being has furnished us with what we term the senses. These are five in number; and, in the few observations that are to be made on them, will be noticed in the following order; smelling, tasting, hearing, touching, and seeing. This division is not founded on the diversity of notions, or sensations received by the senses, but on the number of the organs. The organs of smelling are the nostrils; the organ of tasting is the palate; the organs of hearing are the ears; and those of seeing, the eyes; but the sense of touching is not confined to any particular part of the body; with the exception of the hair and nails, it may be considered as extending over the whole.

It is, as already mentioned, through the medium of the senses, that all our knowledge of the material world is obtained; but, though the organ of sense is in some way affected by external objects, yet the pleasure or pain accompanying the acquisition of our knowledge, is not in the organ of sense, but in the mind. The impressions made on the senses by external objects, are the cause of our sensations and per

ceptions;. but the powers of feeling and of perceiving are wholly intellectual.

That these impressions are conveyed by the senses to the mind, will readily be admitted by every one who consults his own experience; but in what manner the communication is carried on has never yet been, and probably never will be, discovered. Various accounts of so remarkable a phenomenon have indeed been given, but all of them hypothetical, and therefore all nearly alike unworthy of regard. Anatomists have demonstrated that there are nerves extending through every part of the body, all of which terminate in the brain, and that the impressions made on the various parts of the body, are, by these nerves, communicated to the brain; but this brings us only one step nearer the object of our pursuit, for though we should admit it in its fullest extent, still we are ignorant of the manner in which the brain and the mind, substances entirely different in their nature, act upon each other. True philosophy, instead of making men proud that they know so much, will only make them humble that they know so little. We know that the body affects the mind, and the mind the body; but the cause is, in both cases, unknown. A few facts constitute the sum of our knowledge, and are ever found to be the most useful part of it. "Conjectures and theories," says Dr. Reid, are the creatures of men, and will always be found unlike the creatures of God. If we would know

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the works of God, we must consult them with attention and humility, without daring to add any thing of ours to what they declare."

"Wonderful indeed are all his works,

Pleasant to know, and worthiest to be all
Had in remembrance always with delight;
But what created mind can comprehend
Their number, or the wisdom infinite

That brought them forth, but hid their causes deep?"

Of Smelling.

Of all the senses, that of smell seems to be the most simple, and it furnishes the mind with the fewest ideas. Some other animals enjoy this sense in greater excellence than man, and to them it is more useful. It enables them to find their prey, or to discover what is proper for their food. To man it is more pleasing than advantageous, and may be regarded as a proof of the bounty of Providence in affording him a double gratification, for in most of his viands, particularly those of a vegetable kind, whilst his palate is regaled by their flavour, his nostrils are delighted by their fragrance. In many instances the utility of things would be equal to what they are now, though incapable of affording pleasure to the sense of smell. The bean would be equally useful as an article of food, and its blossom, as well as the rose, the carnation, and the jasmine, would be equally

pleasing to the eye, though all were divested of their odour. Of the first, which is too common to be generally noticed, Thomson speaks with his usual discrimination in the following lines:

"Long let us walk,

Where the breeze blows from yon extended field

Of blossom'd beans, Arabia cannot boast

A fuller gale of joy, than liberal, thence

Breathes through the sense, and takes the ravished soul."

Smell, like most of the terms expressive of sensation, has a double meaning. It is sometimes used to denote the power, that odoriferous bodies possess of producing an effect on the olfactory nerves, and sometimes to denote the effect produced. Want of attention to this distinction, has occasioned much unnecessary discussion among philosophers, and led them to attempt a proof of what no person acquainted with the operations of his own mind, and with the meaning of words, denies. They have affirmed, that in bodies usually termed odoriferous, there is no smell, because when smell is spoken of as being agreeable or disagreeable, it must be merely a sensation in our minds. It is true that smell, considered as a sensation, is not perceived as in any respect external, and of itself could never give us any information of external objects, because, in every instance of sensation, nothing more is necessarily implied, than that the mind is affected in a certain manner.

But as