of opening thereof (sitting under his cloth of estate) spake himself unto his Lords and Commons in this manner. benevolence were issued more than three months before the Parliament met; and that the supplies which were voted by the Parliament when it did meet were not in the form of a benevolence, but an ordinary tax of two fifteenths and tenths. We have here therefore a substantial inaccuracy of some kind, which cannot be set right by shifting a date or correcting a careless expression. The revival of this exaction was an important matter. Polydore's next words show that he knew what it meant; and he could not have overlooked the importance of the question whether it was done before or after a Parliament, with or without a Parliamentary sanction. - I am persuaded that the error lies deeper; that, as the case was nearly the same as that of 1488, so the error is exactly the same as that which I have pointed out in note 3, p. 114. I am persuaded that Polydore, on this as on that occasion, mistook a Great Council for a Parliament; that Henry, on this occasion as on that, before he called a regular Parliament took the precaution of calling one of these quasi-parliaments; with a view partly to ascertain the sense of the people and partly to engage them in the cause before he engaged himself: and that it was to a Great Council held in June, 1491, or thereabouts, that he now declared his intention to invade France, at the same time asking their advice as to the raising of supplies. For the grounds of this conclusion and for an answer to objections, I must again refer to the appendix. If I am right, the fact and the date will be found to be of some value, both as clearing the narrative and as illustrating Henry's character and policy. It will be seen that when the French King took possession of Nantes and was obviously proceeding to absorb Brittany either by arms or by marriage or by arbitration; and when Maximilian was about to raise a force of 12,000 men to oppose him, and called upon Henry to join; which was as I suppose in April or May, 1491; Henry had a good case to go to his people with. Having first therefore spread an alarm of French invasion (Cal. Pat. Rolls, 5 May, p. 71.), and made some stir of warlike preparation to warm the blood and feel the pulse of the people, he proceeded in the same course which had succeeded so well in 1488; and immediately summoned — not his Parliament, which could not perhaps have been assembled so expeditiously as the time required - but a Great Council, which he could make as fair a representative of a Parliament as he pleased, and which, though it had no power to inake laws or impose taxes, yet served very well both to express and react upon the public opinion of the time. Finding them in an apt humour, and having all his precautions ready taken, he boldly announced his inten tion of making an invasive war upon France, and thereupon (pretending probably the urgency of the occasion, which could not wait for the ordi "My Lords and you the Commons; when I purposed to make a war in Brittaine by my lieutenant, I nary course,) obtained their advice and consent (which though it carried no legal authority would in a popular cause carry authority enough for the purpose) to send out commissioners to levy a "benevolence." A commission "de subsidio requirendo pro vingio Franciæ" was accordingly issued (7th July, 1491); by which, after a preamble declaring the grounds of the intended war, which it represents as undertaken, not “de advisamento concilii nostri," but "ad instantiam et specialem requisitionem tam dominorum spiritualium et temporalium quam aliorum nobilium," the requisite authority was conveyed to a number of persons, each to act within a specified county. But as these Great Councils could only give advice and such authority as the opinion and personal influence of the members carried with it, Henry seems to have used them only as preparatory to regular Parliaments. A regular Parliament was accordingly summoned shortly after, which (in consideration probably of the succours to Brittany, upon which the benevolence money must have been partly consumed, and also of its more distressed state and more imminent danger), voted fresh supplies, but to be raised by ordinary taxation; and passed the laws which were convenient for a state of war. If we suppose therefore the speech which follows to have been addressed to a Great Council in June, 1491; the benevolence to have been levied, with their advice, in July and August; some succours to have been sent to Brittany about the same time; and the Parliament to have met on the 17th of October; we shall have supplied all the correction which (so far as I know) Bacon's narrative requires; and we shall find that his interpretation of Henry's views and policy and character is illustrated and confirmed by the change. It may be worth mentioning, as a confirmation of this conjecture, that whereas Bacon expressly represents the King as making the declaration in person, it does not appear from the Parliament Rolls that he did open in person the session of October, 1491. Bacon is not likely, I think, to have stated it so expressly, if it were only an inference from Polydore's expression "exponit causas," &c. It is more likely that he had some fuller account of the speech itself. And it need not be thought that the same account would have enabled him to correct the error. It may on the contrary have authorised and established it. Of such a declaration as this there would no doubt at the time be many copies or abstracts circulated. At the time," His Majesty's Speech" would be description quite sufficient. One of these happened perhaps to be preserved. A collector coming into possession of it, and wanting to know in what department of his collection it should be put, fixed the year at once from the circumstances. It was plainly a declaration of war with France, about the time when Brittany was absorbed into the French monarchy. Then he turned to his Poly made declaration thereof to you by my Chancellor. But now that I mean to make a war upon France in person, I will declare it to you myself. That war was to defend another man's right, but this is to recover our own; and that ended by accident, but we hope this shall end in victory. "The French King troubles the Christian world. That which he hath is not his own, and yet he seeketh more. He hath invested himself of Brittaine.1 He maintaineth the rebels in Flanders: and he threateneth Italy. For ourselves, he hath proceeded from dissimulation to neglect, and from neglect to contumely. He hath assailed our confederates: he denieth our tribute: in a word, he seeks war. So did not his father; but sought peace at our hands; and so perhaps will he, when good counsel or time shall make him see as much as his father did. "Meanwhile, let us make his ambition our advantage, and let us not stand upon a few crowns of tribute or acknowledgement, but by the favour of Almighty God try our right for the crown of France itself; remembering that there hath been a French King prisoner in England, and a King of England crowned in France. Our confederates are not diminished. Burgundy is in a mightier hand than ever, and never more provoked. Brittaine cannot help us, but it may hurt them. New acquests are more burden than strength. The malcontents of his own king dore, or Hall, or Holinshed, or Stowe, found this passage, and wrote on the back "The Speech of K. Henry 7, at the opening of the Parliament in 1491;" which would seem to be authority sufficient for stating that Henry opened the session in person. 1 So Ed. 1622. The MS. has "he hath invested Brittaine." 1 dom have not been base populace nor titulary impostors; but of an higher nature. The King of Spain (doubt ye not) will join with us, not knowing where the French King's ambition will stay. Our holy father (the Pope) likes no Tramontanes in Italy. But howsoever it be, this matter of confederates is rather to be thought on than reckoned on; for God forbid but England should be able to get reason ɔf France without a second. "At the battles of Cressy, Poictiers, Agent-Court, we were of ourselves. France hath much people, and few soldiers they have no stable bands of foot. Some good horse they have, but those are forces which are least fit for a defensive war, where the actions are in the assailant's choice. It was our discords only that lost France; and (by the power of God) it is the good peace which we now enjoy that will recover it. God hath hitherto blessed my sword. I have in this time that I have reigned, weeded out my bad subjects, and tried my good. My people and I know one another; which breeds confidence. And if there should be any bad blood left in the kingdom, an honourable foreign war will vent it or purify it. In this great business let me have your advice and aid. If any of you were to make his son knight, you might have aid of your tenants by law. This concerns the knighthood and spurs of the kingdom, whereof I am father ; and bound not only to seek to maintain it, but to advance it. But for matter of treasure let it not be taken from the poorest sort, but from those to whom 1 The Ed. of 1622 has "base, popular." In the MS. it seems tc have been first written "populare," but the r has plainly been corrected into a c. the benefit of the war may redound. France is no wilderness, and I that profess good husbandry hope to make the war (after the beginnings) to pay itself. Go together in God's name, and lose no time, for I have called this Parliament wholly for this cause.' Thus spake the King. But for all this, though he showed great forwardness for a war, not only to his Parliament and court, but to his privy counsel likewise (except the two bishops and a few more), yet nevertheless in his secret intentions he had no purpose to go through with any war upon France. But the truth was, that he did but traffic with that war, to make his return in money. He knew well that France was now entire and at unity with itself, and never so mighty many years before. He saw by the taste he had of his forces sent into Brittaine that the French knew well enough how to make war with the English; by not putting things to the hazard of a battle, but wearying them by long sieges of towns, and strong fortified encampings. James the Third of Scotland, his true friend and confederate, gone; and James the Fourth (that had succeeded) wholly at the devotion of France, and ill-affected towards him. As for the conjunctions of Ferdinando of Spain and Maximilian, he could make no foundation upon them. For the one had power and not will; and the other had will and not power. Besides that Ferdinando had but newly taken breath from the war with the Moors; and merchanded at this time with France for the restoring of the counties of Russignon and Perpignian, oppignorated to the French. Neither was he out of fear of the discontents 1 So MS. Ed. 1622 has "that he." |