said, and as Smith himself always declared, that he owed more to the "Political discourses" of Mr. Hume, in the "Wealth of Nations," than to any other work which had appeared prior to his time, it cannot be doubted that in the work before us he was as much indebted to the principles unfolded in Mr. Hume's "Inquiry." In their results, the difference seems only to be this; that, whereas Hume had resolved our moral perceptions into a general and social affection, Smith had taken pains to trace them, in all cases, to an immediate sympathy with the individual acting or acted upon. Upon nearly all collateral and fundamental points they were perfectly agreed. They were equally decided in considering the question in the outset as one of fact, to be determined by the invariable nature and recorded sentiments of mankind in all ages-not as one in which it is competent to philosophers to establish a standard of virtue, as was attempted by Cudworth and Clarke, without reference to those sentiments, upon some preconceived dogma of immutable right, and the eternal fitness of things; or upon any deduction of a remote and contingent utility, according to the system of Paley and Godwin, and others of the same school. Mr. Hume had dismissed, with the contempt it deserved, the doctrine of those who had denied the reality of any distinction in morals. He had shewn by the most unanswerable reasoning that their origin was to be found in senti-, ment, not in the subtleties of abstract ratiocination; and has overthrown for ever, in the opinion of all who are capable of reasoning on such subjects, the selfish system of ethics, revived by Hobbes in the seventeenth century, who had borrowed it from the school of Epicurus, and who bequeathed it as a theme of everlasting cavil and epigrammatic paradox to that of Helvetius and Rochefoucauld, and their followers, in later days. Dr. Smith, though he makes little direct reference to this system founded on the absolute selfishness of man, may be considered as having stated and pronounced upon the question in the opening passage of his work:-" How selfish soever man may be supposed," says he, "there are evidently some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it; of this kind is pity or

compassion, words appropriated to sig nify our fellow feeling with the sorrow of others." "Sympathy," he adds, though its meaning was originally the same, may now, however, be made use of to denote our fellow feeling with any passion whatever." And upon this principle he erects his system.

It is not our intention, nor is it, indeed, within the limits of the present memoir, to attempt an analysis of this very beautiful production. A brief outline of the leading principles on which it rests may be stated as follows:

Upon our disposition to sympathize with the passions and actions of other men, is founded our sense of propriety or impropriety-upon that of sympa thizing with the motives which excite or produce those actions and passions, is founded our sense of merit or demerit; the disposition which prompts us to gra titude or resentment, to reward or to punish the agent. An application of the sentiments thus acquired by observation of the actions and character of others, to the affections and conduct of ourselves in the various relations of life in which we are called upon to act, to judge, or to suffer, gives rise to a new perception; namely, the sense of duty, the natural and final result of the joint operation of those faculties of the heart and the understanding, with which man was endowed by his Maker, and not a factitious principle of expediency, which it was left for him to deduce from the remote and contingent consequences of the actions themselves.

In

Of the questions which are discussed in the science of morals, the two principal are these:-What is the characteristic property of virtue or merit? And by what faculty or power are we made cognizant of its existence? Hume's Inquiry upon this interesting subject, he involved the solution of the second question in investigating the first. Smith seems to have pursued a different course, and to have blended the first question in his discussion of the second. We have always consi dered that the scope of Mr. Hume's reasoning upon this point has been strangely misconceived. In shewing, as he did conclusively to our minds, that utility was an invariable attribute of all virtue, his argument was limited, and he obviously meant it to be limited to the simple establishment of the fact; to proving, that by the constitution of man, and the natural economy of his

moral sentiments, there was no disposition of the mind, no action attended with the general approbation of mankind, which would not be found in its results beneficial to the species. He proved that nature had so constituted us, that by an involuntary sympathy we are formed to approve of these qualities even when we can have no personal interest in the case-nay, even when our personal interest may be opposed to the exercise of them. The sentiment or emotion thus excited, is the effect of a beneficent wisdom in the moral economy of man; an economy which proves the divine origin and government of the world even more cogently than the most exquisite of the merely physical arrangements so often adduced for the purpose. But having shewn this to be the fact, it never could be intended, by that accurate and profound thinker, to draw or to suggest the inference, that in pursuit of any imagined utility, any distant and general advantage which might present itself to his narrow capacity, it was competent for man to tamper with the order of God, and in neglect of the active impulses, the affections, and even the prejudices of his nature, which, by the direction of his wisdom, were made subservient to the most admirable endsto erect a new standard of morals, and pretend to shew that that mode of action might be expedient, which his heart told him could never be right. But whatever doubts may exist as to the meaning of Hume, there can be none with regard to that of Dr. Smith upon this vital question; and it is in the admirable and really philosophical spirit which pervades and animates every part of his system, and this more especially, that we conceive the great excellence of his work to consist; for it may assuredly be said of it, that if it does not furnish the true "Theory of Moral Sentiments," there can be no hesitation in admitting that its author has, at least, pointed out the way in which that theory must be sought. Smith saw, and strictly adhered to the distinction, as Mr. Stewart has well remarked*, which has been too little adverted to by ethical inquirers-the distinction betwixt the final and the efficient cause in all our moral determinations. The chapter in which this fundamental point is more directly enforced must be

Philos. Hum. Mind, vol. ii.

considered as one of the finest portions of his book, exhibiting a specimen, perhaps, of the most refined and philosophical disquisition which human language has ever embodied. It lies so directly in our way, in the few observations we think it necessary to make upon this production of Dr. Smith;-it lies so much at the root of the main difficulty involved in the inquiry concerning the foundation of morals; the most interesting problem, perhaps, in metaphysics; it comes so strongly recommended in consequence to all who can take any interest in such discussions,-that we shall cite a part of it in this place, happy if, by accident, we should be the means in this way of introducing one of our readers to an acquaintance with the work in which it is to be found.

After having traced the growth of the emotions which arise from the spectacle of vice as well as of virtue, and having shewn that the resentment which we feel in the one case is the counterpart of the gratitude we feel in the other; and that it is this emotion which, constituting our immediate sense of demerit, prompts us to inflict the punishment which the well-being of society requires should be inflicted; and that the Author of Nature did not leave it to the slow and uncertain deductions of our reason to find out the means of attaining this end, but endowed us with an instinctive feeling of approbation of the very application most proper to attain it, he proceeds to consider the

I utility of this constitution of nature." "In every part of the universe," he says*, "we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to the end which they are intended to produce; and in the mechanism of a plant or animal body, admire how everything is contrived for advancing the two great purposes of nature, the support of the individual, and the propagation of the species. But in these, and in all such objects, we still distinguish the efficient from the final cause of their several motions and organizations. The digestion of the food, the circulation of the blood, and the secretion of the several juices which are drawn from it, are operations all of them necessary for the great purposes of animal life; yet we never endeavour to account for them from those purposes as from their efficient causes, nor imagine that the blood circulates, or that the food

Theory of Moral Sent, vol. i. part ii. sect. 2.

digests of its own accord, and with a view or intention to the purposes of circulation or digestion. The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for which it was made-the pointing of the hour: all their various motions conspire, in the nicest manner, to produce this effect. If they were endowed with a desire and intention to produce it, they could not do it better: yet we never ascribe any such desire or intention to them, but to the watchmaker; and we know that they are put into motion by a spring which intends the effect it produces as little as they do. But though, in accounting for the operation of bodies, we never fail to distinguish in this manner the efficient from the final cause,-in accounting for those of the mind, we are very apt to confound these two different things with one another. When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends which a refined and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which is in reality the wisdom of God. Upon a superficial view, this cause seems sufficient to produce the effects which are ascribed to it, and the system of human nature seems to be more simple and agreeable when all its different operations are in this manner deduced from a single principle." After distinguishing in this way the efficient from the final cause of our moral impressions, our first perceptions of right and wrong,-after shewing that though it is absolutely necessary for the subsistence of society that the laws of justice should be observed, yet that it is not from a consideration of this necessity that we originally approve of their enforcement (though he admits that our regard for them may often be confirmed, and may sometimes require to be confirmed by such consideration), -he proceeds, "We frequently hear the young and the licentious ridiculing the most sacred rules of morality, and professing, sometimes from the corruption, but more frequently from the vanity of their hearts, the most abominable maxims of conduct. Our indignation rouses, and we are eager to refute and expose such detestable principles. But, though it is their intrinsic hatefulness and detestableness which originally inflame us against them, we are unwilling to assign

this as the sole reason why we condemn them, or to pretend that it is merely because we ourselves hate and detest them. The reason, we think, would not appear to be conclusive. Yet why should it not; if we hate and detest them, because they are the natural and proper objects of hatred and detestation? But when we are asked, why we should not act in such or such a manner, the very question seems to suppose, that to those who ask it this manner of acting does not appear to be for its own sake the natural and proper object of these sentiments. We must shew therefore, that it ought to be so for the sake of something else; and the consideration which first occurs to us is the disorder and confusion of society which would result from the universal prevalence of such practices. We seldom fail therefore to insist upon this topic. That it is not a regard, however, to the preservation of society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against individuals, may be demonstrated by many obvious considerations. All men, even the most stupid and unthinking, abhor perfidy and injustice, and delight to see them punished. But few men have reflected upon the necessity of justice to the existence of society, however obvious that necessity may appear. The concern which we take in the fortune and happiness of individuals does not, in common cases, arise from that which we take in the fortune and happiness of society. We are no more concerned for the destruction or loss of a single man, because the man is a member or part of society, and because we should be concerned for the destruction of society,than we are concerned for the loss of a single guinea, because this guinea is part of a thousand guineas, and because we should be concerned for the loss of the whole sum. In neither case does our regard for the individuals arise from our regard for the multitude; but in both cases our regard for the multitude is compounded, and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different individuals of which it is composed. As when a small sum is unjustly taken from us, we do not so much prosecute the injury from a regard to the preservation of our whole fortune as from a regard to that particular sum which we have lost; so when a single man is injured or destroyed, we demand the punishment of the wrong that has been done to him, not so much from a

concern for the general interest of society, as from a concern for that very individual who has been injured."

In a subsequent part of his work, wherein he treats of the " Influence of fortune upon our Moral Sentiments," and shews that, though it is the intention or affection of the heart, the propriety or impropriety, the beneficence or hurtfulness of the design that all praise or blame which can be bestowed upon an action must ultimately belong; yet, nevertheless, the result of those actions, the actual consequences which often proceed from them, do materially affect our sentiments:-He traces, in the same admirable spirit, the final cause of this inconsistency in our judgments; and remarks that "that necessary rule of justice, that men in this life are accountable for their actions only, not for their designs or intentions, is founded upon this salutary and useful irregularity in human sentiments concerning merit and demerit, which appears at first sight so absurd and unaccountable. But," he concludes, " every part of nature, when attentively surveyed, equally demonstrates the providential care of its Author; and we may admire the wisdom and the goodness of God even in the weakness and the folly of men."

We have the greater pleasure in citing these passages, because we think that we may read in them the best refutation of that theory of expediency, which nothing but the reputation of Dr. Paley could ever have recommended to the world*-a theory which Mr. Stewart has characterised in a strain of indignant eloquence, that well became him on such a topic, as one which, "absolving men from the obligations imposed upon them by the moral constitution of human nature, abandons every individual to the guidance of his own narrow views concerning the complicated interests of society."

It may not perhaps be unworthy of observation, before we close these few remarks upon the " Theory of Moral Sen

Hume

It may be allowed us to state in a few words what we have always considered to be the wide difference upon this great point, betwixt the doctrine of Mr. Hume and that of Dr. Paley, which it is surprising to see so often confounded. proved from the phenomena of human nature as a fact, that whatever in moral conduct was intrinsically right, was useful. Paley laid it down as a rule, that whatever was expedient, was right; and thus converted a position of undeniable truth and beauty into an hypothesis full of fallacy, as the solution of a problem pregnant with evil in its consequences, when considered as a precept.

Philos. Hum. Mind, vol. ii. Ch. 4, Sect. 6.

timents," that the same principle of sympathy as a source of morals, from which Smith has deduced his system, appears to have been referred to by Polybius, in a remarkable passage of his history, for the same purpose. It is rather long for a quotation; but as it is curious in itself, and as Polybius is not a writer in every one's hands, we shall transcribe part of it in a note below; when possibly it may appear, after all, that the coincidence is rather in expression than in substance, and that it applies rather more strikingly to the doctrine of sympathy with utility, (the theory of Hume) than to that of sympathy as unfolded by Smith*.

SECTION 4.-From the publication of the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" to that of the "Wealth of Nations.” WE have seen, from the letter which Mr.

Hume addressed to our author, something of the impression which was produced by the publication of his first great work. We shall shortly perceive that the hope therein expressed, that it might lead to an interesting connexion with the Duke of Buccleugh was not idly formed. In the meantime, however, it made no change in the life and habits of Dr. Smith. He continued his professorship in the University of Glasgow for a period of four years after this, directing his attention, and that of his ment of ethics, of which he had prestudents, somewhat less to that departsented to the world his views, and treating more particularly of the subjects which come within the range of Of the long and profound attention he jurisprudence, and political philosophy. had devoted to this latter branch of moral science, he has bequeathed an imperishable monument to the world in

"For man, who among all the various kinds of animals is alone endowed with the faculty of reason, cannot, like the rest, pass over such actions (ingra

titude and injustice) with indifference; but reflecting on what he sees, and comparing the future with the present, will not fail to express his indignation at this injurious treatment, to which, as he foresees, he may at some time be exposed. Thus it is cer tain that all men must be shocked by such ingratitude through sympathy with the resentment of their neighbour, and from an apprehension also that the case may be their own. And from hence arises in the mind of man, a certain sense of the nature, and force of duty, in which consists both the beginning and the end of justice; and thus it is that the people begin to discern the nature of things, honourable or base, and in what consists the difference between them; and to perceive that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are fit to be admired and imitated, and the latter to be detested and avoided."-Polybius, Hist., Book vi. Ex. 1, Ch. i. Hampton's Translation.

his "Wealth of Nations." His views upon the theory of jurisprudence, except inasmuch as he has embodied some of its important principles in that work, were confined to his lectures; though it is clear from an intimation conveyed in the closing paragraph of the " Moral Sentiments," and still more so from the advertisement he prefixed to the last edition of that work, written only a few months before his death, that it was a subject which, during the whole of his life, he had deeply meditated, and upon which he had always designed to communicate his labours to the public, if the engagements with which he was occupied during the latter period of it had not interfered to prevent him.

For himself, Dr. Smith has undoubtedly done enough, and so far as regards his own interest and his fame, it would be idle to indulge in regrets. For the world however, and for the interests of science, perhaps a greater loss has been rarely sustained than in the unfortunate circumstances, whatever they were, which concurred to deprive it of this most valuable portion of his labours. The enlarged views he had evidently formed of the objects and principles of legislation; the glimpses which we occasionally catch in his other writings of the spirit in which he was accustomed to contemplate such subjects; the pure and lofty sources to which he was accustomed to refer for those principles; all assure us of the invaluable addition which would have been made to this department of philosophy, had it been illustrated by his pen.

From this, however, and from his academical labours generally, he was withdrawn in the year 1763, by an invitation to accompany the Duke of Buccleugh on his travels; an appointment which was principally recommended to him at the time, by the desire which he had conceived of visiting the continent. The proposal, which was made to him through Mr. Charles Townsend, was liberal in the extreme; as might be expected to be made to such a man, to induce him to quit the scene of his honourable and useful labours, the society of his friends, and those studious delights, known only to the pure and devoted lovers of truth, which constitute the highest charm of human existence.

It is well known that, whatever pleasure Smith might derive from his tour, or whatever advantage from his connexion with the noble family of Buc

cleugh, the separation from the university of Glasgow was a source to him of very heartfelt regret. An interesting and characteristic anecdote has been recorded of him, relative to his resignation of his duty as professor there, which is well worth preserving.

It was at the latter end of his course of lectures, that it became necessary for him to take his departure, and it was well ascertained that he had been at exceeding pains to provide, in a friend, a very competent successor for that part of the course which yet remained unfinished. He had suffered the greatest possible anxiety upon this point, and had done everything that might satisfy the most scrupulous of his friends and his pupils. This, however, did not satisfy the conscientious delicacy of Dr. Smith. He was of course aware of the high estimation in which he was held in the university, and the just value which was put upon his lectures. The day at length arrived when he was to address the students of his class for the last time, and it was a moment deeply affecting to both parties. He took leave of them in a tone of affection and regret, which enlivened their mutual sorrow; and when they were about to depart, he called them severally to his chair, and tendered to each of them, carefully folded in paper, the amount of the fee which he had received for the whole course of his lectures, notwithstanding so small a portion of it only remained unfinished. This was of course refused resolutely, as by acclamation; the professor, however, persisted in his endeavour, assuring them that he should not be satisfied otherwise, and that he should quit them under the impression of having failed in his duty, and of having wronged them, if they did not take back the fee for the entire course of lectures, which circumstances prevented him from completing. It was in vain that they assured him how far they were overpaid by the smallest portion of his labour bestowed upon them for the trifling emolument he derived; how real a wrong they should be committing to consent to such a proposal, and, in short, their firm determination by no means to listen to it. The professor was sensibly touched by their generous avowal, but he was not to be moved from his purpose. When they were at last on the point of quitting the lecture room, he seized hold of the foremost of the students, and