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Serpferit, agnofco acceffum: mihi frigidus horror
Torpida membra quatit, veluti Jovis arbore ramus
Intremit ad gelidum, præludia fulminis, Auftrum.
Non jubar æftivum vitalem in corda calorem
Diffundat, rursus licet alto è fornice cæli
Japetionides furtivum deferat ignem,

Mox tamen incerti crudelior orbita fati

Vertitur, & querimur, modo quem fperavimus, æftum.
Tum vini oceanus, qui totam extingueret Heclam,
Non relevare fitim poffit: non aura Favonî
Mitigat infanos, fed flamine fufcitat, ignes. !.
Febris at infeftis cruciatibus intermiffam
Dat requiem, rabiemque ultro fedata reponit
Paulatim ; at qualis, fanie dapibufque cruentis,
Jam fatur, exfangui parcit Polyphemus Ulyffi;
Ut fpatio exiguo, fimul ac prior ardor edendi
Creverit, ipfe alvum guftu meliore capacem
Farciat. Haud tali certam fpondere falutem
Succeffu poffis: morbus folet ifte reverti,
Ceu Danai a Tenedo. Non hic, ceu fubdolus hoftiss
Per cæcos calles et amica filentia fertur ;

At petit oppofitos, & aperto marte fatigat
Præminitans, certam veniendique indicat horam.
Nec fi crudelem fati inclementia - febrim
Mifit, falfam etiam mendacemque improba mifit.
Wallifi illa ftylos folido ductofve cerebro
Euclidis culpat, metitamque arguit umbram
Gnomonis, & feros in pacta accufat amantes,
Si, charam accedens ardenti pectore Thisfben,
Tam bene compofitam fervaffet Pyramus horam,
Sola Cupidinei gratiffima vulnera teli

Noffent, proque uno ftratum geniale fepulchro.

END of the third Number:

THE

STUDENT,

OR THE

OXFORD

MONTHLY MISCELLANY,

NUMBER IV. April 30, 1750.

LETTER I. in Defence of RELIGION.

The BELIEF of a GOD and PROVIDENCE indispensably rem quifite to MAN's fafe and peaceable continuance in BEING.

A

Greeably to the method which I proposed to observe in the following letters, I fhall first endeavour to prove, that the belief of a God and Providence is indifpenfibly requifite to man's fafe and peaceable continuance in being; or, in other words, that he could neither live securely nor happily without such an affecting fenfe having place in the world.

To make out this, it will be proper to fhew, that as every effect must have a cause, so every action as necessarily supposes fome motive; which can be nothing but the expectation of procuring pleasure or of avoiding pain; as I fhall now demonftrate.

Numb. IV.

In

4

every

In action, that it becomes a rational creature to pur→ te or to avoid, fome end must be intended; or, there are certain reafons determining it to the one or the other: becaufe from not-acting to acting, or converfely, there is a change; and wherever this happens, fome caufe of it is previously neceffary. The caufe of change in the present case can only be a defire of change; and the fource of that defire, a view of obtaining happiness or preventing misery of fome fort or other. For whilft man neither receives, nor is likely to receive, good or ill, from any particular action, he cannot but be indifferent about it; and fo long as he continues indifferent, no change will follow. Because, as we obferved, there can be no change without defire; and no change will be defited, because all defire is towards fome attainable good or avoidable evil: defire being an affection of the mind refulting from an apprehenfion of poffeffing means of pleasure or avoiding one of pain. Hence, as there cannot be action without a change, nor change without a caufe, that is, defire; and no defire without fome imagin'd acquireable good, in which it terminates, and from thence iflues; fo when the mind feels no prefent, and has not the prospect of obtaining a future happiness, no things, or the confideration of them, can in the leaft affect her, or fhe be one way or the other mov'd therewith. Confequently, nothing but pleafure and pain, or the probable means of thein, can be any exciting reafon to action.

Having fhewn private perfonal happiness to be the fole end of action in general, as alfo of every particular mode of it, taking the nature of mankind to be what we have fuppofed it, we fhall juft obferve, that as by the make and ftructure of the organs of his body, and his fituation and converfe with material objects, man stands in such a relation to them, that the ufe of fome will neceffarily give him pleafure, the application of others neceffarily give him pain; fo the former, if ufed in a certain manner, is found to make for his preservation; the latter, when exceeding a certain

degree,

degree, tends to his deftruction. Now, as we have already remark'd, he is obliged to choose and pursue the former, and to refuse and fly from the latter. If we confider therefore a number of fuch Beings, all in fearch of happiness under one form or other, and confequently each having a distinct end in view, it is plain, those ends will neceffarily interfere; fince, on fuppofition that they partake of the same common nature, as they actually do, and have fimilar avenues and capacities, which they really have, it would frequently happen, that an object or event making a part of A's happiness shall also make one of B's, at leaft is fo prefum'd to do; which, with men's fuppos'd natural right to whatever they can make themselves mafters of, will unavoidably produce a general struggle amongst them; and this conteft will neceffarily draw after it as general a confusion, "From mankind having "the like wants, and for the moft part the fame appetites, "arifes the expediency, and confequently reasonableness of "thwarting, croffing, and oppofing one another in the "gratification of them; on which account it may properly ❝ be said, that their differences frequently refult from a fimi❝litude of painful internal feelings; and confequently that agreement in one fenfe becomes the foundation of difagreement in another."

66

Again; A is in purfuit of a certain end which he cannot come at for B standing betwixt him and it. But reafon fhews him how, and felf-love will put him upon making all the efforts in his power, to remove this obstacle to the point he fteers to; that is, the one directs, and the other moves him to deftroy B, if he cannot otherwife compass his defigns for reafon is of no other or higher value to its poffeffor, than as it leads him the shortest way to the object of all his thoughts, happiness. And if man has no concern with an hereafter, how can he make a better use of it than in procuring all the conveniences and pleafures of this world, whatever the means be, and however they may operate in the acquifition? To fay, as fome have, and perhaps others

Q2

others will again, this is naturally evil, unfit, unjuft, &c. is a mere playing with words without diving into their fenfe and importance. Good and evil, fit and unfit, are relative terms, as is evident from the question, (why, wherefore, for what) which may be ever afk'd when they are us'd on any occafion. Good; for what? Good in itself, or without reference to fomething further, is nonfenfe. The like is applicable to fit, unfit, evil, &c. that is, they are means to an end, (from a congruity or incongruity with which they come to be thus denominated) and what this end is, and only can be, hath been already declared. Confequently, fhould we allow the prefent mode of exiftence the only one in which man is to bear a part, that conduct would be termed the most reasonable, which provided for him here in the best manner poffible. In fhort, if a Being infinite in knowledge and power superintends human affairs, discriminating actions on purpose to reward fome and punish others, reason tells us, that, if we would be finally happy, we muft endeavour to conform ourselves in all inftances to his will. If there be no fuch principle, then man, acknowledging not a fuperior from whom he has the least to hope or to fear, can know no other rule, or be engag'd in any other pursuits, but what will either fupply his wants, or yield him pleasure in the indulgences they procure him.

Further, fhould we fuppofe (and multitudes of cases, in which this might happen, would continually occur) A has it in his power to obtain all or most of the comforts of life by diftreffing B his fellow-creature, which he fees may be done with impunity; under fuch a prospect, and in those alluring circumftances, what is there in nature to prevent him? As felf-love is the grand predominating principle, it must and will be gratify'd previously and preferably to all others; is not only the higheft, but moft probably the fole appetite woven into his frame. And to affert, a man ought not (if this life was the whole of his continuance) to deprive another of his happiness, tho' to increase his own, is abfolutely false : fince

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