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Atque de Extensionibus Legum in Casibus Omissis hae dicta sint: nunc de usu Exemplorum dicendum.

De Exemplis, et usu eorum.1

APHORISMUS 21.

De Exemplis jam dicendum est, ex quibus Jus hauriendum sit, ubi Lex deficit. Atque de Consuetudine, quæ Legis species est, deque Exemplis quæ per frequentem usum in consuetudinem transierunt, tanquam Legem Tacitam, suo loco dicemus. Nunc autem de exemplis loquimur quæ raro et sparsim interveniunt, nec in legis vim coäluerunt; quando et qua cautione norma Juris ab ipsis petenda sit, cum Lex deficiat.

APHORISMUS 22.

Exempla a temporibus bonis et moderatis petenda

1 It is to be observed, that the principle on which the English courts have proceeded, — namely, that a decision on a point not previously decided on is to be accepted merely as a declaration of an already existing law virtually contained in the unwritten corpus juris entitled the Common Law, has had the effect of giving nearly equal weight to all cases decided by a competent tribunal. On the other hand, we find in the history of French jurisprudence that great uncertainty has existed as to the degree of authority to which a "res judicatą" was entitled; the principle that "res judicata pro veritate accipitur" extending only to the parties between whom the actual decision was had. Thus it is related that De Thou was in the habit of saying, when it was mentioned that in a case similar to the one before him a decree had been given in favour of the plaintiff or defendant, "C'est bon pour lui;" implying that it was not of authority in any other case. The Parliament of Paris was for a long time in the habit of distinguishing the decisions to the principle of which it intended to give force of law from other decisions, by a more solemn form of delivering judgment; thereby in effect claiming what our courts have never claimed, namely, a power of making new law. A collection has been published of these quasi-legislative decisions, with the title of "Arrêts rendus en robe rouge." It is evident that the practice of the Parliament of Paris, which was probably followed by other of the French Parliaments, escapes from some of the inconveniences of the English theory.

sunt; non tyrannicis, aut factiosis, aut dissolutis. Hujusmodi exempla temporis partus spurii sunt, et magis nocent quam docent.

APHORISMUS 23.

In exemplis, recentiora habenda sunt pro tutioribus. Quod enim paulo ante factum est, unde nullum sit secutum incommodum, quidni iterum repetatur? Sed tamen minus habent authoritatis recentia; et si forte res in melius restitui opus sit, recentia exempla magis sæculum suum sapiunt quam rectam ratio

nem.

APHORISMUS 24.

At vetustiora exempla caute, et cum delectu, recipienda. Decursus siquidem ætatis multa mutat; ut quod tempore videatur antiquum, id perturbatione et inconformitate ad præsentia sit plane novum. Medii itaque temporis exempla sunt optima, vel etiam talis temporis quod cum tempore currente plurimum conveniat; quod aliquando præstat tempus remotius magis quam in proximo.

APHORISMUS 25.

Intra fines exempli, vel citra potius, se cohibeto, nec illos ullo modo excedito. Ubi enim non adest Norma Legis, omnia quasi pro suspectis habenda sunt. Itaque, ut in obscuris, minimum sequitor.

APHORISMUS 26.

Cavendum ad exemplorum Fragmentis et Compendiis; atque integrum exemplum et universus ejus processus introspiciendus. Si enim incivile sit, nisi tota

lege perspecta, de parte ejus judicare, multo magis hoc valere debet in exemplis ; quæ ancipitis sunt usus, nisi valde quadrent.

APHORISMUS 27.

In exemplis plurimum interest, per quas manus transierint et transacta sint. Si enim apud scribas tantum et ministros justitiæ, ex cursu curiæ, absque notitia manifesta superiorum, obtinuerint; aut etiam apud errorum magistrum populum; conculcanda sunt et parvi facienda. Sin apud senatores aut judices aut curias principales ita sub oculis posita fuerint, ut necesse fuerit illa approbatione judicum, saltem tacita, munita fuisse, plus dignationis habent.

APHORISMUS 28.

Exemplis quæ publicata fuerint, utcunque minus fuerint in usu, cum tamen sermonibus et disceptationibus hominum agitata et ventilata extiterint, plus authoritatis tribuendum. Quæ vero in scriniis et archivis manserunt tanquam sepulta, et palam in oblivionem transierunt, minus. Exempla enim, sicut aquæ, in profluente sanissima.

APHORISMUS 29.

Exempla quæ ad leges spectant, non placet ab historicis peti; sed ab actis publicis et traditionibus diligentioribus. Versatur enim infelicitas quædam inter historicos vel optimos, ut legibus et actis judicialibus non satis immorentur; aut si forte diligentiam quandam adhibuerint, tamen ab authenticis longe varient.

1 "Incivile est, nisi totâ lege perspectâ, unâ aliquâ particulâ ejus propositâ judicare vel respondere."- Celsus, D. i. 3. 24.

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APHORISMUS 30.

Exemplum quod ætas contemporanea aut proxima respuit cum casus subinde recurreret, non facile admittendum est. Neque enim tantum pro illo facit quod homines illud quandoque usurparunt, quam contra, quod experti reliquerunt.

APHORISMUS 31.

Exempla in consilium adhibentur, non utique jubent aut imperant. Igitur ita regantur, ut authoritas præteriti temporis flectatur ad usum præsentis.

Atque de Informatione ab Exemplis, ubi Lex deficit, hæc dicta sint. Jam dicendum de Curiis Prætoriis et Censoriis.

De Curiis Prætoriis et Censoriis.1

APHORISMUS 32.

Curiæ sunto et jurisdictiones, quæ statuant ex ar

1 M. Bouillet remarks that every one who has commented on this tract of Bacon's has condemned the institution of these Courts. M. Dupin is evidently much perplexed by them. "Hic mera utopia proponitur " is the commencement of his note on the thirty-second aphorism. Doubtless it is odd that in inquiring how the law may be made certain Bacon should have introduced two Courts, of which the distinguishing character is the absence of any kind of certainty. But to every one who is acquainted with the history of English law, it is manifest that Bacon's intention was to give an idealised description of the Court of Star-Chamber, and of the equity jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Of the two institutions which he thus indirectly praises it is not necessary to say much. The Court of StarChamber, though of use in particular cases was unquestionably on the whole, an instrument of injustice and oppression; while, on the other hand, if equity had continued to be as indefinite as the jurisdiction of the "curiæ prætoriæ," it would soon have become a more intolerable evil than any which it could have been applied to relieve.

[The apparent inconsistency of introducing these discretionary tribunals

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bio boni viri et discretione sana, ubi legis norma &fcit. Lex enim (ut antea dictum est) non sufficit casibus; sed ad ea quæ plerunque accidunt aptatur.

ate a scheme specially designed to make the operation of the law certain, admits in my opinion, of a satisfactory explanation. The uncertainty of the law is injurious in two ways. On the one hand, it may lead me to expect that if I observe certain prescribed conditions, my liberty will not be interfered with; and when I think I have observed them, it may, by some arbitrary or unexpected interpretation, take me up and send me to prison. On the other hand, it may lead me to expect protection against particular kinds of injury, or (failing protection) redress; and, from some defect in its provisions, it may fail to prevent the injury or to afford the redress. The first kind of uncertainty resides in the interpretation, the second in the framing, of the law; and against both it is necessary, as far as may be, to provide. The perfect remedy is a code of laws so framed as to provide expressly for every possible case, coupled with a rule of interpretation which leaves no discretion whatever to the judge. But this is for Utopia. No lawgiver can perfectly foresee either the conditions of cases or the effect of words. Laws will therefore pass occasionally, which, if strictly construed, will punish the man whom they were intended to protect, and protect the man whom they were intended to punish. To correct such errors, a discretion must be allowed somewhere in the administration of the law; and the question is, where? According to Bacon's scheme, the necessary discretion is to be confided, not to the ordinary tribunals, but to others specially constituted for the purpose, and acting under restrictions and regulations specially framed to prevent them from abusing it; lest, in correcting one kind of uncertainty, uncertainties of another kind be introduced. What these restrictions and regulations should be, the rest of the section is occupied in explaining.

Now, to supply the defects of the law by the exercise of this kind of discretion was the proper function of the Star-Chamber and the Court of Chancery; and I see no occasion to seek further for Bacon's motive in introducing “an idealised description" of those Courts, — or, I should rather say, a description of two Courts constituted as, in a perfect administrative system, the Star-Chamber and the Court of Chancery ought to be.

With regard to the character of the actual Star-Chamber, we are not to forget that Bacon was not the only eminent jurist who approved of it. Sir Edward Coke, in the fourth book of his Institutes, which was written in his old age, when he was regarded as the great champion of the people against the Crown, speaks of it in terms as favourable as ever Bacon did. "It is the most honorable Court" (he says)—"our parliament excepted — that is in the Christian world, both in respect of the Judges of the Court, and of their honourable proceeding according to their just jurisdiction, and the ancient and just orders of the Court." And I cannot help thinking that modern constitutional writers have judged of it too hastily from the acci

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