of perception which renders us susceptible of pleasure or of pain from the view of virtue or of vice, he gave the name of the Moral Sense. His reasonings upon this subject are in the main acquiesced in, both by Mr. Hume and Mr. Smith; but they differ from him in one important particular, Dr. Hutcheson plainly supposing, that the moral sense is a simple principle of our constitution, of which no account can be given; whereas the other two philosophers have both attempted to analyze it into other principles more general. Their systems, however, with respect to it are very different from each other. According to Mr. Hume, all the qualities which are denominated virtuous, are useful either to ourselves or to others, and the pleasure which we derive from the view of them is the pleasure of utility. Mr. Smith, without rejecting entirely Mr. Hume's doctrine, proposes another of his own, far more comprehensive; a doctrine with which he thinks all the most celebrated theories of morality invented by his predecessors coincide in part, and from some partial view of which he apprehends that they have all proceeded.

Of this very ingenious and original theory, I shall endeavour to give a short abstract. To those who are familiarly acquainted with it as it is stated by its author, I am aware that the attempt may appear superfluous; but I flatter myself that it will not be wholly useless to such as have not been much conversant in these abstract disquisitions, by presenting to them the leading principles of the system in one connected view, without those interruptions of the attention which necessarily arise from the author's various and happy illustrations, and from the many eloquent digressions which animate and adorn his composition.

The fundamental principle of Mr. Smith's theory is, that the primary objects of our moral perceptions are the actions of other men; and that our moral judgments with respect to our own conduct are only applications to ourselves of decisions which we have already passed on the conduct of our neighbour. His work accordingly includes two distinct inquiries, which, although sometimes blended together in the execution of his general design, it is necessary for the reader to discriminate carefully from each other, in order to comprehend all the different bearings of the argument. The aim of the former inquiry is, to explain in what manner we learn to judge of the conduct of our neighbour; that of the latter, to show how, by applying these judgments to ourselves, we acquire a sense of duty, and a feeling of its paramount authority over all our other principles of action.

Our moral judgments, both with respect to our own conduct and that of others, include two distinct perceptions: first, A perception of conduct as right or wrong; and, secondly, A perception of the merit or demerit of the agent. To that quality of conduct

which moralists, in general, express by the word Recti Smith gives the name of Propriety; and he begins h with inquiring in what it consists, and how we are led the idea of it. The leading principles of his doctrine on ject are comprehended in the following propositions:

1. It is from our own experience alone, that we can f idea of what passes in the mind of another person on a cular occasion; and the only way in which we can f idea, is by supposing ourselves in the same circumstan him, and conceiving how we should be affected if we situated. It is impossible for us, however, to conceive o placed in any situation, whether agreeable or otherwise, feeling an effect of the same kind with what would be p by the situation itself; and consequently the attention at any time to the circumstances of our neighbour, musta somewhat in the same manner, although by no means same degree, as if these circumstances were our own.

That this imaginary change of situation, is the real of the interest we take in their fortunes, Mr. Smith a to prove by various instances. "When we see a stroke and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or of arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, hurt by it as well as the sufferer. The mob, when they are at a dancer on the slack-rope, naturally writhe and tw balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and as th that they themselves must do if in his situation." Th thing takes place, according to Mr. Smith, in every case in our attention is turned to the condition of our neighbour. ever is the passion which arises from any object in the principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spe In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptib emotions of the bystander always correspond to what, by br the case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentim the sufferer.

To this principle of our nature which leads us to enter in situations of other men, and to partake with them in the pa which these situations have a tendency to excite, Mr. Smith the name of sympathy or fellow-feeling, which two wor employs as synonymous. He acknowledges that, upon some sions, sympathy arises merely from the view of a certain emot another person; but that in general it arises, not so much fro view of the emotion, as from that of the situation which exci

2. A sympathy or fellow-feeling between different perso always agreeable to both. When I am in a situation whic

cites any passion, it is pleasant to me to know, that the spectators of my situation enter with me into all its various circumstances, and are affected with them in the same manner as I am myself. On the other hand, it is pleasant to the spectator to observe this correspondence of his emotions with mine.

3. When the spectator of another man's situation, upon bringing home to himself all its various circumstances, feels himself affected in the same manner with the person principally concerned, he approves of the affection or passion of this person as just and proper, and suitable to its object. The exceptions which occur to this observation are, according to Mr. Smith, only apparent. "A stranger, for example, passes by us in the street with all the marks of the deepest affliction: and we are immediately told, that he has just received the news of the death of his father. It is impossible that, in this case, we should not approve of his grief; yet it may often happen, without any defect of humanity on our part, that, so far from entering into the violence of his sorrow, we should scarce conceive the first movements of concern upon his account. We have learned, however, from experience, that such a misfortune naturally excites such a degree of sorrow; and we know, that if we took time to examine his situation fully, and in all its parts, we should, without doubt, most sincerely sympathise with him. It is upon the consciousness of this conditional sympathy that our approbation of his sorrow is founded, even in those cases in which that sympathy does not actually take place; and the general rules derived from our preceding experience of what our sentiments would commonly correspond with, correct upon this, as upon many other occasions, the impropriety of our present emotions."

By the propriety therefore of any affection or passion exhibited by another person, is to be understood its suitableness to the object which excites it. Of this suitableness I can judge only from the coincidence of the affection with that which I feel, when I conceive myself in the same circumstances; and the perception of this coincidence is the foundation of the sentiment of moral approbation.

4. Although, when we attend to the situation of another person, and conceive ourselves to be placed in his circumstances, an emotion of the same kind with that which he feels naturally arises in our own mind, yet this sympathetic emotion bears but a very small proportion, in point of degree, to what is felt by the person principally concerned. In order, therefore, to obtain the pleasure of mutual sympathy, nature teaches the spectator to strive, as much as he can, to raise his emotion to a level with that which the object would really produce: and, on the other hand, she teaches the person whose passion this object has ex

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cited, to bring it down, as much as he can, to a level wi the spectator.

5. Upon these two different efforts are founded two sets of virtues. Upon the effort of the spectator to e the situation of the person principally concerned, and to sympathetic emotions to a level with the emotions of are founded the gentle, the amiable virtues; the virtues condescension and indulgent humanity. Upon the effor person principally concerned to lower his own emotions correspond as nearly as possible with those of the spec founded the great, the awful, and respectable virtues; th of self-denial, of self-government, of that command of sions, which subjects all the movements of our nature our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our duct, require.

As a farther illustration of the foregoing doctrine, M considers particularly the degrees of the different passio are consistent with propriety, and endeavours to sho in every case, it is decent or indecent to express a strongly, according as mankind are disposed, or not dis sympathize with it. It is unbecoming, for example, to strongly any of those passions which arise from a cert dition of the body; because other men, who are not in t condition, cannot be expected to sympathize with then unbecoming to cry out with bodily pain; because the s felt by the spectator bears no proportion to the acuteness is felt by the sufferer. The case is somewhat similar wi passions which take their origin from a particular turn of the imagination.

In the case of the unsocial passions of hatred and rese the sympathy of the spectator is divided between the per feels the passion, and the person who is the object of it are concerned for both, and our fear for what the one ma damps our resentment for what the other has suffered." the imperfect degree in which we sympathise with such p and the propriety, when we are under their influence, o rating their expression to a much greater degree than is in the case of any other emotions.

The reverse of this takes place with respect to all th and benevolent affections. The sympathy of the specta the person who feels them, coincides with his concern person who is the object of them. It is this redoubl pathy which renders these affections so peculiarly becomi agreeable.

The selfish emotions of grief and joy, when they are co on account of our own private good or bad fortune, hold a

middle place between our social and our unsocial passions. They are never so graceful as the one set, nor so odious as the other. Even when excessive, they are never so disagreeable as excessive resentment; because no opposite sympathy can ever interest us against them: and when most suitable to their objects, they are never so agreeable as impartial humanity and just benevolence; because no double sympathy can ever interest us for them.

After these general speculations concerning the propriety of actions, Mr. Smith examines how far the judgments of mankind concerning it are liable to be influenced, in particular cases, by the prosperous or the adverse circumstances of the agent. The scope of his reasoning on this subject is directed to show (in opposition to the common opinion), that when there is no envy in the case, our propensity to sympathise with joy is much stronger than our propensity to sympathise with sorrow; and, of consequence, that it is more easy to obtain the approbation of mankind in prosperity than in adversity. From the same principle he traces the origin of ambition, or of the desire of rank and pre-eminence; the great object of which passion is, to attain that situation which sets a man most in the view of general sympathy and attention, and gives him an easy empire over the affections of others.

Having finished the analysis of our sense of propriety and of impropriety, Mr. Smith proceeds to consider our sense of merit and demerit; which he thinks has also a reference, in the first instance, not to our own characters, but to the characters of our neighbours. In explaining the origin of this part of our moral constitution, he avails himself of the same principle of sympathy, into which he resolves the sentiment of moral approbation.

The words propriety and impropriety, when applied to an affection of the mind, are used in this theory (as has been already observed) to express the suitableness or unsuitableness of the affection to its exciting cause. The words merit and demerit have always a reference (according to Mr. Smith) to the effect which the affection tends to produce. When the tendency of an affection is beneficial, the agent appears to us a proper object of reward; when it is hurtful, he appears the proper object of punishment.

The principles in our nature which most directly prompt us to reward and to punish, are gratitude and resentment. To say of a person, therefore, that he is deserving of reward or of punishment, is to say, in other words, that he is a proper object of gratitude or of resentment; or, which amounts to the same thing, that he is to some person or persons the object of a gratitude or of a resentment, which every reasonable man is ready to adopt and sympathise with.

It is, however, very necessary to observe, that we do not