sorship of Moral Philosophy in the same University, upon of Mr. Thomas Craigie, the immediate successor of Dr. Hu In this situation he remained thirteen years; a period frequently to look back to, as the most useful and happ life. It was indeed a situation in which he was eminent to excel, and in which the daily labours of his professi constantly recalling his attention to his favourite pursu familiarising his mind to those important speculations afterwards to communicate to the world. In this view, it afforded, in the meantime, but a very narrow scene for bition, it was probably instrumental, in no inconsiderable to the future eminence of his literary character.

Of Mr. Smith's lectures while Professor at Glasgow, has been preserved, excepting what he himself published Theory of Moral Sentiments, and in the Wealth of Nation the following short account of them, I am indebted to a man who was formerly one of Mr. Smith's pupils, and w tinued till his death to be one of his most intimate and friends.*

"In the Professorship of Logic, to which Mr. Smith v pointed on his first introduction into this University, h saw the necessity of departing widely from the plan th been followed by his predecessors, and of directing the tion of his pupils to studies of a more interesting and nature than the logic and metaphysics of the schools. A ingly, after exhibiting a general view of the powers of the and explaining so much of the ancient logic as was requi gratify curiosity with respect to an artificial method of reas which had once occupied the universal attention of the le he dedicated all the rest of his time to the delivery of a syst rhetoric and belles lettres. The best method of explaining illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the useful part of metaphysics, arises from an examination several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech, and an attention to the principles of those literary compositions contribute to persuasion or entertainment. By these arts, e thing that we perceive or feel, every operation of our min expressed and delineated in such a manner, that it may be c distinguished and remembered. There is, at the same tim branch of literature more suited to youth at their first ent upon philosophy than this, which lays hold of their taste their feelings.

"It is much to be regretted, that the manuscript conta

*Mr. Millar, the late celebrated Professor of Law in the Univ Glasgow.

Mr. Smith's lectures on this subject was destroyed before his death. The first part, in point of composition, was highly finished; and the whole discovered strong marks of taste and original genius. From the permission given to students of taking notes, many observations and opinions contained in these lectures have either been detailed in separate dissertations, or engrossed in general collections, which have since been given to the public. But these, as might be expected, have lost the air of originality and the distinctive character which they received from their first author, and are often obscured by that multiplicity of commonplace matter in which they are sunk and involved.

"About a year after his appointment to the Professorship of Logic, Mr. Smith was elected to the chair of Moral Philosophy. His course of lectures on this subject was divided into four parts. The first contained Natural Theology; in which he considered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and those principles of the human mind upon which religion is founded. The second comprehended Ethics, strictly so called, and consisted chiefly of the doctrines which he afterwards published in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. In the third part, he treated at more length of that branch of morality which relates to justice, and which, being susceptible of precise and accurate rules, is for that reason capable of a full and particular explanation.

"Upon this subject he followed the plan that seems to be suggested by Montesquieu; endeavouring to trace the gradual progress of jurisprudence, both public and private, from the rudest to the most refined ages, and to point out the effects of those arts which contribute to subsistence, and to the accumulation of property, in producing correspondent improvements or alterations in law and government. This important branch of his labours he also intended to give to the public; but this intention, which is mentioned in the conclusion of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, he did not live to fulfil.

"In the last part of his lectures, he examined those political regulations which are founded, not upon the principle of justice, but that of expediency, and which are calculated to increase the riches, the power, and the prosperity of a State. Under this view, he considered the political institutions relating to commerce, to finances, to ecclesiastical and military establishments. What he delivered on these subjects contained the substance of the work he afterwards published under the title of An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.

"There was no situation in which the abilities of Mr. Smith appeared to greater advantage than as a Professor. In delivering his lectures, he trusted almost entirely to extemporary elocution. His manner, though not graceful, was plain and unaffected; and,

as he seemed to be always interested in the subject, he never failed to interest his hearers. Each discourse consisted commonly of several distinct propositions, which he successively endeavoured to prove and illustrate. These propositions, when announced in general terms, had, from their extent, not unfrequently something of the air of a paradox. In his attempts to explain them, he often appeared, at first, not to be sufficiently possessed of the subject, and spoke with some hesitation. As he advanced, however, the matter seemed to crowd upon him, his manner became warm and animated, and his expression easy and fluent. In points susceptible of controversy, you could easily discern, that he secretly conceived an opposition to his opinions, and that he was led upon this account to support them with greater energy and vehemence. By the fulness and variety of his illustrations, the subject gradually swelled in his hands, and acquired a dimension which, without a tedious repetition of the same views, was calculated to seize the attention of his audience, and to afford them pleasure, as well as instruction, in following the same object, through all the diversity of shades and aspects in which it was presented, and afterwards in tracing it backwards to that original proposition or general truth from which this beautiful train of speculation had proceeded.

"His reputation as a Professor was accordingly raised very high, and a multitude of students from a great distance resorted to the University, merely upon his account. Those branches of science which he taught became fashionable at this place, and his opinions were the chief topics of discussion in clubs and literary societies. Even the small peculiarities in his pronounciation or manner of speaking, became frequently the objects of imitation." While Mr. Smith was thus distinguishing himself by his zeal and ability as a public teacher, he was gradually laying the foundation of a more extensive reputation, by preparing for the press his system of morals. The first edition of this work appeared in 1759, under the title of "The Theory of Moral Sentiments."

Hitherto Mr. Smith had remained unknown to the world as an author; nor have I heard that he had made a trial of his powers in any anonymous publications, excepting in a periodical work called The Edinburgh Review, which was begun in the year 1755, by some gentlemen of distinguished abilities, but which they were prevented by other engagements from carrying further than the two first numbers. To this work Mr. Smith contributed a review of Dr. Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, and also a letter, addressed to the editors, containing some general observations on the state of literature in the different countries of Europe. In the former of these papers he points out some defects in Dr. Johnson's plan, which he censures as not sufficiently gram

matical. "The different significations of a word (he observes) are indeed collected; but they are seldom digested into general classes, or ranged under the meaning which the word principally expresses: And sufficient care is not taken to distinguish the words apparently synonymous." To illustrate this criticism, he copies from Dr. Johnson the articles BUT and HUMOUR, and opposes to them the same articles digested agreeably to his own idea. The various significations of the word BUT are very nicely and happily discriminated. The other article does not seem to have been executed with equal care.

The observations on the state of learning in Europe are written with ingenuity and elegance; but are chiefly interesting, as they show the attention which the Author had given to the philosophy and literature of the Continent, at a period when they were not much studied in this island.

In the same volume with the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Mr. Smith published a Dissertation "On the Origin of Languages, and on the different Genius of those which are original and compounded." The remarks I have to offer on these two discourses, I shall, for the sake of distinctness, make the subject of a separate section.

OF THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, AND THE DISSERTATION ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGES.

THE science of Ethics has been divided by modern writers into two parts; the one comprehending the theory of Morals, and the other its practical doctrines. The questions about which the former is employed, are chiefly the two following: First, By what principle of our constitution are we led to form the notion of moral distinctions ;—whether by that faculty which, in the other branches of human knowledge, perceives the distinction between truth and falsehood; or by a peculiar power of perception (called by some the Moral Sense) which is pleased with one set of qualities, and displeased with another? Secondly, What is the proper object of moral approbation? or, in other words, What is the common quality or qualities belonging to all the different modes of virtue? Is it benevolence; or a rational self-love; or a disposition (resulting from the ascendancy of Reason over Passion) to act suitably to the different relations in which we are placed? These two questions seem to exhaust the whole theory of Morals.

The scope of the one is to ascertain the origin of our ideas; that of the other, to refer the phenomena of mor ception to their most simple and general laws.

The practical doctrines of morality comprehend all thos of conduct which profess to point out the proper ends of pursuit, and the most effectual means of attaining the which we may add all those literary compositions, whate their particular form, which have for their aim to forti animate our good dispositions, by delineations of the bea the dignity, or of the utility of Virtue.

I shall not inquire at present into the justness of this di I shall only observe, that the words Theory and Practice an in this instance, employed in their usual acceptations. theory of Morals does not bear, for example, the same relat the practice of Morals, that the theory of Geometry bears to tical Geometery. In this last science, all the practical rul founded on theoretical principles previously established. But: former science, the practical rules are obvious to the capa of all mankind; the theoretical principles form one of the difficult subjects of discussion that have ever exercised the nuity of metaphysicians.

In illustrating the doctrines of practical morality (if we allowance for some unfortunate prejudices produced or e raged by violent and oppressive systems of policy), the and seem to have availed themselves of every light furnishe nature to human reason; and indeed those writers who, in times, have treated the subject with the greatest success they who have followed most closely the footsteps of the G and the Roman philosophers. The theoretical question, too, cerning the essence of virtue, or the proper object of moral a bation, was a favourite topic of discussion in the ancient sch The question concerning the principle of moral approba though not entirely of modern origin, has been chiefly agit since the writings of Cudworth, in opposition to thos Hobbes; and it is this question accordingly (recommende once by its novelty and difficulty to the curiosity of specula men) that has produced most of the theories which charact and distinguish from each other the later systems of m philosophy.

It was the opinion of Dr. Cudworth, and also of Dr. Cla that moral distinctions are perceived by that power of the m which distinguishes truth from falsehood. This system it was great object of Dr. Hutcheson's philosophy to refute, and in of sition to it, to show that the words Right and Wrong express tain agreeable and disagreeable qualities in actions, which it is the province of reason but of feeling to perceive; and to that po