sully the beauty of those actions which ought to arise a benevolent affection. The cause of this, however, is that self-love can never be the motive of a virtuous ac but that the benevolent principle appears in this partic case to want its due degree of strength, and to be altoge unsuitable to its object. The character, therefore, se evidently imperfect, and, upon the whole, to deserve bl rather than praise. The mixture of a benevolent motiv an action to which self-love alone ought to be sufficien prompt us, is not so apt, indeed, to diminish our sense o propriety, or of the virtue of the person who perform We are not ready to suspect any person of being defec in selfishness. This is by no means the weak side of hu nature, or the failing of which we are apt to be suspici If we could really believe, however, of any man, that, it not from a regard to his family and friends, he would take that proper care of his health, his life, or his fort to which self-preservation alone ought to be sufficient prompt him, it would undoubtedly be a failing, though of those amiable failings which render a person rather object of pity than of contempt or hatred. It would s however, somewhat diminish the dignity and respectal ness of his character. Carelessness and want of econo are universally disapproved of, not, however, as proceed from a want of benevolence, but from a want of the pro attention to the objects of self-interest.

Though the standard by which casuists frequently det mine what is right or wrong in human conduct be its t dency to the welfare or disorder of society, it does not f low that a regard to the welfare of society should be t sole virtuous motive of action, but only that, in any comp tition, it ought to cast the balance against all other motiv

Benevolence may, perhaps, be the sole principle of acti in the Deity, and there are several not improbable arg

hich tend to persuade us that it is so. conceive what other motive an independent and allBeing, who stands in need of nothing external, and appiness is complete in himself, can act from. But r may be the case with the Deity, so imperfect a as man, the support of whose existence requires so ngs external to him, must often act from many tives. The condition of human nature were pecu'd if those affections which, by the very nature of , ought frequently to influence our conduct, could, occasion, appear virtuous, or deserve esteem and ation from any body.

hree systems, that which places virtue in propriety, places it in prudence, and that which makes it benevolence, are the principal accounts which given of the nature of virtue. To one or other all the other descriptions of virtue, how different y may appear, are easily reducible.

stem which places virtue in obedience to the will ty, may be counted either among those which sist in prudence, or among those which make it propriety. When it is asked, why we ought to ill of the Deity, this question, which would be 1 absurd in the highest degree if asked from any ve ought to obey him, can admit but of two difers. It must either be said that we ought to ll of the Deity, because he is a being of infinite will reward us eternally if we do so, and punish if we do otherwise; or it must be said, that, of any regard to our own happiness, or to repunishments of any kind, there is a congruity that a creature should obey its Creator, that a Imperfect being should submit to one of infinite ehensible perfections. Besides one or other of

these two, it is impossible to conceive that any other answer can be given to this question. If the first answer be the

proper one, virtue consists in prudence, or in the proper pursuit of our own final interest and happiness; since it is upon this account that we are obliged to obey the will of the Deity. If the second answer be the proper one, virtue must consist in propriety, since the ground of our obligation to obedience is the suitableness or congruity of the sentiments of humility and submission to the superiority of the object which excites them.

That system which places virtue in utility, coincides too with that which makes it consist in propriety. According to this system, all those qualities of the mind which are agreeable or advantageous, either to the person himself or to others, are approved of as virtuous, and the contrary disapproved of as vicious. But the agreeableness or utility of any affection depends upon the degree which it is allowed to subsist in. Every affection is useful when it is confined to a certain degree of moderation; and every affection is disadvantageous when it exceeds the proper bounds. According to this system, therefore, virtue consists not in any one affection, but in the proper degree of all the affections. The only difference between it and that which I have been endeavouring to establish, is, that it makes utility, and not sympathy, or the correspondent affection of the spectator, the natural and original measure of this proper degree.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Licentious Systems.

ALL those systems which I have hitherto given an account of suppose that there is a real and essential distinction between vice and virtue, whatever these qualities may consist in. There is a real and essential difference between the propriety and impropriety of any affection, between benevolence and any other principle of action, between real prudence and short-sighted folly or precipitate rashness. In the main, too, all of them contribute to encourage the praiseworthy, and to discourage the blameable disposition.

It may be true, perhaps, of some of them, that they tend in some measure to break the balance of the affections, and to give the mind a particular bias to some principles of action beyond the proportion that is due to them. The ancient systems, which place virtue in propriety, seem chiefly to recommend the great, the awful, and the respectable virtues, the virtues of self-government and self-command; fortitude, magnanimity, independency upon fortune, the contempt of all outward accidents, of pain, poverty, exile, and death. It is in these great exertions that the noblest propriety of conduct is displayed. The soft, the amiable, the gentle virtues, all the virtues of indulgent humanity, are, in comparison, but little insisted upon, and seem, on the contrary, by the Stoics in particular, to have been often regarded as mere weaknesses, which it behoved a wise man not to harbour in his breast.

The benevolent system, on the other hand, while it fosters and encourages all those milder virtues in the highest de

gree, seems entirely to neglect the more lawful and res table qualities of the mind. It even denies them the pellation of virtues. It calls them moral abilities, and t them as qualities which do not deserve the same so esteem and approbation that is due to what is properly nominated virtue. All those principles of action, which only at our own interest, it treats, if that be possible, worse. So far from having any merit of their own, diminish, it pretends, the merit of benevolence, when co-operate with it; and prudence, it is asserted, when ployed only in promoting private interest, can never be imagined a virtue.

That system, again, which makes virtue consist in dence only, while it gives the highest encouragement t habits of caution, vigilance, sobriety, and judicious m ation, seems to degrade equally both the amiable and spectable virtues, and to strip the former of all their be and the latter of all their grandeur.

But notwithstanding these defects, the general tend of each of those three systems is to encourage the best most laudable habits of the human mind; and it were for society, if either mankind in general, or even those who pretend to live according to any philosophical were to regulate their conduct by the precepts of any of them. We may learn from each of them something is both valuable and peculiar. If it were possible, by cept and exhortation, to inspire the mind with fortitud magnanimity, the ancient systems of propriety would sufficient to do this. Or if it were possible, by the means, to soften it into humanity, and to awaken th fections of kindness and general love towards those w with, some of the pictures with which the benevolent sy presents us, might seem capable of producing this e We may learn from the system of Epicurus, though