can with the greatest ease; in all these cases, the body blames the conduct, nobody imagines that might have reason, perhaps, to expect more kind any right to extort it by force. The sufferer complain, and the spectator can intermeddle no than by advice and persuasion. Upon all such for equals to use force against one another, would the highest degree of insolence and presumption A superior may, indeed, sometimes, with un probation, oblige those under his jurisdiction to this respect, with a certain degree of propriety to ther. The laws of all civilized nations oblige maintain their children, and children to mai parents, and impose upon men many other dutie cence. The civil magistrate is entrusted with not only of preserving the public peace by restrai tice, but of promoting the prosperity of the com by establishing good discipline, and by discoura sort of vice and impropriety; he may prescribe r fore, which not only prohibit mutual injuries am citizens, but command mutual good offices to degree. When the sovereign commands what indifferent, and what, antecedent to his orders, been omitted without any blame, it becomes not able but punishable to disobey him. When he therefore, what, antecedent to any such order, cou been omitted without the greatest blame, it sure much more punishable to be wanting in obedien the duties of a lawgiver, however, this, perha which it requires the greatest delicacy and reser cute with propriety and judgment. To neglect i exposes the commonwealth to many gross dis shocking enormities, and to push it too far is de all liberty, security, and justice. Though the mere want of beneficence seems to merit no punishment from equals, the greater exertions of that virtue appear to deserve the highest reward. By being productive of the greatest good, they are the natural and approved objects of the liveliest gratitude. Though the breach of justice, on the contrary, exposes to punishment, the observance of the rules of that virtue seems scarce to deserve any reward. There is, no doubt, a propriety in the practice of justice, and it merits, upon that account, all the approbation which is due to propriety. But as it does no real positive good, it is entitled to very little gratitude. Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abstains from violating either the person or the estate, or the reputation, of his neighbours, has surely very little positive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing. As every man doth, so it shall be done to him, and retaliation seems to be the great law which is dictated to us by nature. Beneficence and generosity we think due to the generous and beneficent. Those whose hearts never open to the feelings of humanity, should, we think, be shut out in the same manner, from the affections of all their fellow-creatures, and be allowed to live in the midst of society, as in a great desert, where there is nobody to care for them, or to enquire after them. The violator of the laws of justice ought to be made to feel himself that evil which he has done to another; and since no regard to the sufferings of his brethren is capable of restraining him, he ought to be overawed by the fear of his own. The man who is barely innocent, who only observes the laws of justice with regard to others, and merely abstains from hurting his neighbours, can merit only that his neighbours in their turn should respect his innocence, and that the same laws should be religiously observed with regard to him. CHAPTER II. Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit. THERE can be no proper motive for hurting our neighbour, there can be no incitement to do evil to another which mankind will go along with, except just indignation for evil which that other has done to us. To disturb his happiness merely because it stands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real use to him merely because it may be of equal or of more use to us, or to indulge, in this manner, at the expense of other people, the natural preference which every man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial spectator can go along with. Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself, than of any other person, it is fit and right that it should be so. Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man: and to hear, perhaps, of the death of another person, with whom we have no particular connection, will give us less concern, will spoil our stomach, or break our rest, much less than a very insignificant disaster which has befallen ourselves. But though the ruin of our neighbour may affect us much less. than a very small misfortune of our own, we must not ruin him to prevent that small misfortune, nor even to prevent our own ruin. We must here, as in all other cases, view ourselves not so much according to that light in which we may naturally appear to ourselves, as according to that in which we naturally appear to others. Though every man may, according to the proverb, be the whole world to him self, to the rest of mankind he is a most insigni of it. Though his own happiness may be of more in to him than that of all the world besides, to e person it is of no more consequence than that of man. Though it may be true, therefore, that eve dual, in his own breast, naturally prefers hims mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the avow that he acts according to this principle. that in this preference they can never go along and that how natural soever it may be to hir always appear excessive and extravagant to then he views himself in the light in which he is cons others will view him, he sees that to them he is the multitude, in no respect better than any othe he would act so as that the impartial spectator into the principles of his conduct, which is what of he has the greatest desire to do, he must upon th all other occasions, humble the arrogance of his and bring it down to something which other m along with. They will indulge it so far as to all be more anxious about, and to pursue with mo assiduity, his own happiness than that of any oth Thus far, whenever they place themselves in his they will readily go along with him. In the race f and honours, and preferments, he may run as h can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, i outstrip all his competitors. But if he should throw down any of them, the indulgence of the is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair pl they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in spect, as good as he: they do not enter into that by which he prefers himself so much to this other not go along with the motive from which he They readily, therefore, sympathize with the natu ment of the injured, and the offender becomes the their hatred and indignation. He is sensible th |