pelago on which they live, and that they will not be welcome in the lands of the "white" races. Is it any wonder, then, that the masses of Nippon feel that this war is, as the man in the street would say, "none of their business”—that it is the business of those peoples who have affected an air of superiority in dealing with them, and who have, both by words and by acts, made it plain that they intend to keep aloof from them? Be it far from me to say that this is the right attitude, but we can at least understand and even appreciate the point of view. As long as the development of common feeling and common thinking between East and West is hindered by artificial political devices in time of peace, it seems unreasonable to expect either side to support the other, heart and soul, in time of war.

What the world needs to-day in the interest of peace is the development of the community of feeling by razing artificial barriers. In the specific case of American-Japanese relations, for example, this country might well strengthen Japan's confidence and friendship by the extension of citizenship to the Japanese who are rightfully admitted in small numbers in conformity with the "gentlemen's agreement." If the rights and duties of the Japanese in America are defined on the same general principles governing those of the immigrants from European countries, Japan will exercise her influence to the utmost, as indeed she has done, to restrict the emigration of her subjects of the laboring class to these shores.

Still another case may be cited which has interfered with the community of feeling between Japan and the Western nations—the decision rendered by the Hague Court of Arbitration in 1905 as to the taxation of the property of foreignersin Japan. When Japan opened her doors to international intercourse half a century ago, she agreed to set apart certain sections of open ports for the residential and business purposes of foreigners. In these "settlements" alien residents secured from the Japanese government perpetual leases

of lands. Not only were rents of such lands merely nominal, but they were exempt from all taxation. With the abrogation of the old treaties in 1898, the foreign settlements were also abolished, but Japan had to acquiesce in the insistence of foreign governments that the perpetual leases must remain valid. When the Japanese authorities contracted the treaties exempting the leased lands from taxation, they had no intention of extending this prerogative to the buildings which foreigners should erect thereon; and accordingly when the alien residents built houses amounting in value to many millions of dollars, the Japanese government asked them to pay taxes on these buildings, claiming that the immunity from taxes stipulated in the treaties was meant to apply only to the lands, and not to the buildings. But the British, French, and German governments took a firm stand against this Japanese interpretation of the treaties. So the dispute was submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague in 1904, and the decision rendered under date of May 22, 1905, sustained the contention of the European powers that the treaties exempt not only the land but "buildings of every description constructed or which may hereafter be constructed on such land, from all imposts, taxes, charges, contributions, or conditions whatsoever."

The significance of this decision lies in the moral effect it has produced upon the Japanese mind rather than in its immediate material effect. The Japanese are still firmly convinced of the fairness of their contentions, and were grieved that their first experience in an international court, to which they had looked with profound respect, proved disappointing. They are, indeed, impelled to wonder whether an equitable judgment can ever be meted out to any Asiatic nation by a tribunal in which the majority of judges are men identified with occidental governments. In principle they are ready to welcome any proposition for the creation of a world court to which all international difficulties may be submitted for adjustment; but as a practical

question, they are still at a loss to decide whether such a court, which will undoubtedly be dominated by the representatives of the "white" nations, will be, as long as human nature remains what it has been, capable of doing justice to the claims of Asiatic nations, insignificant both in number and in influence. In plain language, they have not yet learned to rest full confidence in the sense of fair play among the Western nations.

One finds it difficult to place himself in the position of another person whose affairs and activities he proposes to criticise. In discussing the problems of other persons one is inclined to base his judgment, not upon the circumstances in which they find themselves, but upon his own conditions. As with individuals so with nations. To the American people it must be extremely difficult to understand the Japanese point of view, for the simple reason that the two nations are in totally different circumstances. America enjoys unlimited natural resources; her wealth, actual and potential, is enormous. She has vast agricultural lands, wonderfully rich yet untouched by the plough of the farmer. Her geographical position, coupled with the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, renders her virtually immune from foreign encroachment. Any doctrine like that of President Monroe, proclaimed by an insignificant nation, such as Japan, would be of no avail; but backed by the wealth and the potential strength of so great a nation as the United States, it becomes a power which no outside nation can afford to ignore.

And what of Japan? Here we see a nation choked for lack of land; leading, as it were, a hand-to-mouth life, yet forbidden, by an agreement among the Western powers, to alleviate her hard lot by encouraging her sons and daughters to seek fortune where alluring opportunities await them. To add to her anxiety, she lies next door to a decrepit country which promises to become, as it has more than once become, a storm centre of international rivalry. If Japan tries to

bolt the doors of that unhappy neighbor in anticipation of the coming storm, she is accused of self-aggrandizement, of bullying diplomacy, of concocting sinister designs at the expense of other nations. In such circumstances, it is but natural that she should be influenced by a perpetual feeling of insecurity. Indeed, her instinct of self-preservation has been a guiding force in determining her diplomacy and her foreign policy. Never since she opened her doors to the Western powers has she been permitted to enjoy any respite, any relief from the extreme financial strain under which she has had to labor, and she is in no position to be benevolent towards other nations. That is why she has seemed selfseeking.

Once we grasp Japan's military, financial, economic conditions, we shall be able to appreciate why such an intense excitement seized the Japanese upon the first flush of news that the German war prisoners in Siberia had been set free and were working for the advancement of the Kaiser's interests in the direction of Vladivostok. When the Bolsheviki concluded a separate peace with Germany at BrestLitovsk, the Japanese were so alarmed that many newspapers and publicists urged immediate mobilization with a view to sending an expedition into the Siberian littoral. Vladivostok, one of the most formidably fortified ports in the world, lies across the Japan Sea only 480 miles from Japan. If such a port should come under the influence of a hostile pirate power it would be a serious menace to the safety of Japan.

Yet it is not correct to say that Japan was responsible for the proposition of the Siberian expedition. As soon as the Bolshevik-Kaiser treaty of peace became an accomplished fact, Baron Motono, the Japanese Foreign Minister, addressed notes to the governments of France and Great Britain, asking their views on the subject of a possible German advance in Siberia. The notes, as far as we are able to ascertain, said nothing about the sending of Japanese

troops into Siberia, but simply inquired what attitude the Allies thought Japan should assume towards Russia, now that the latter had signed a separate treaty of peace with Berlin. But in the imagination of the uninformed public, these simple notes were soon invested with the nature of a definite proposition to send a military expedition to Siberia. It is true that France, upon receipt of the Japanese note, lost no time in suggesting a Siberian expedition. England, though at first somewhat undecided, soon followed suit.

And now negotiations between the United States and Japan have resulted in a plan for immediate intervention. On the third of August official announcement was made that a joint expeditionary force composed of equal numbers of Japanese and American troops would be sent to co-operate with the valiant Czecho-Slovak army against the Germans in Siberia. Although many advocates of Allied intervention in the Far East are naturally disappointed in the smallness of the force which the present plan contemplates, nevertheless the importance of the project, not merely as a step towards delivering Russia from the Germans but also as a sign of the new community of interest between Japan and the United States, is generally recognized.

Ever since the completion of the trans-Siberian railway, the Russian advance towards the Pacific has been a source of constant worry to Japan. When the flame of the RussoJapanese war had just died, Dr. Sidney L. Gulick, in his striking book, "The White Peril in the Far East," wrote these words: "Why be content with merely driving Russia from Manchuria? That will prove but a temporary expedient. A permanent settlement can only be assured through the expulsion of Russia from the entire Far East."

The downfall last year of the military autocracy of the Romanoff dynasty has radically altered the situation against which Dr. Gulick thus protested. Whether the Russian revolution will put an end to the Russian encroachment in the Far East depends upon what power eventually estab