fome Truths, and you'll find, that instead of overcoming Certainty by Doubt, it will overthrow Doubt by Certainty: Because Certainty proceeds from a perfwafive Evidence, whereas Doubt doth but keep the Mind in fufpence; and a Doubt, fuch as we fuppofe, is an abstracted and remote Conception; but the Certainty we are speaking of, confits in inward Senfe ; befides, a Doubt draws its force from Darknefs and Ignorance as its Original, but the knowledge of first principles is evident by its own light.

There is no lefs Injustice than Error, in making ufe of the Speculations of Scepticifm, with a particular defign against Religion; for if it be true that a Mathematician is not obliged to destroy the Opinion of those who doubt of every thing; if we are perfwaded, that the Rules of Mechanicks may be certain, without fuch a fcrupulous Examination and if it was never heard of, that š this Univerfal Doubt of the Scepticks has ever retarded any Business, or framed a confiderable Obstacle to the Execution of any Design in the common Affairs of Life; is it reasonable that it should become formidable only when it is brought to attack the Foundations of Religion, and that an extravagant Hypothefis fhould lofe that Name, because it countenances Incredulity?

After all, though the Truths of Religion are infinitely more certain in themselves than any other Truths, yet we could be fatisfied, were they received with the fame certainty as those first and common Truths which are the rule of our Actions and Conduct.

We are then no farther concerned than other Men, in the Speculations of thefe Philofophers, which as they make no Man call in question the Principles

of the Art he profeffes, or the Prudence by which he acts; fo we do not believe they ought to ftop us one moment in establishing the Truths of Religion.

From this natural inclination Men have to doubt of every thing, (in order to destroy the Truths of Religion, together with all their other Knowledge, as by a common Shipwrack,) we shall only conclude, that there is no Doubt fo Chimerical, no Opinion fo abfurd, which is not taken up by Incredulity, when it makes for its interest; which gives credit and weight to every thing that favours its Pretences: And fince it generally changes Certainty into Imaginary Doubts, 'tis no wonder if contrariwife upon fome occafions, it changes the leaft Sufpicions into Certainty.

This, I hope, no one will have reason to doubt of, if he does but carefully confider the manner whereby we fhall prove the Existence of God. This being the firft and fundamental Truth that produces all other Truths of Religion, and which all the reft do fuppofe, we must not omit any thing in order to its folid proof: And as there is nothing fo fufpicious as Incredulity, which is the more distrustful, the more effential and important the Truths to be proved are; we'll take all imaginable care to avoid the least fufpicion of Deceit and unfair dealing. And this is the Method we defign to follow.

Firft, We'll endeavour to dive into the Sourfes of our Errors, to know whether this Opinion of ours, That there is a God, be not a Prejudice, or whether we can on the contrary affure our felves that it arifes from the force and inward sense of known Truth. We'll afterwards reflect, by way of Enquiry, upon the Argumente which perfwade

us

us of the Existence of God, and all the Difficulties that are or may be feemingly raised against them. We'll endeavour in the Third Place, to confider apart by themselves, the most probable Objections of Atheists; and lastly, we'll compare the Two Opinions together, by which it will appear, that Atheism is a down-right Extravagance, if there be any fuch thing as a true Atheist, which by way of Conclufion, we shall briefly take into confideration.

CHAP. II.

Wherein 'tis proved by Inquiring into the Principles of our Errors, that the Opinion asserting the Existence of God, is not a falfe Prejudice.

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Hough we ought not with the Scepticks, to doubt of every thing, yet 'tis good however to diftruft our Reason; because though Nature has bountifully given all Men a common Senfe which in its firft Notions, and in thofe Judgments it forms with an entire Liberty, cannot be a principle of Error, yet Experience convinces us, that Man is but too apt to deceive himself in Matters relating to his intereft, or which are capable of being prepoffeffed.

'Tis certain there is within us a natural Light which cannot delude us, and Prejudices likewife which do impofe upon us : Were it not for those Prejudices, we should never fall into Error, and without the help of this natural Light, we should

never be free from it. All the difficulty confifts in exactly diftinguishing between Two fo different Principles, which may certainly be done, by joyning Experience to Reafon.

Twould be very difficult to refer our Prejudices or Errors to any other Causes, than to one of these Three, viz. To the nature of the things falling under our Knowledge, or the manner in which they are propofed to our Understanding, or else the Difpofition of our Mind."

Notwithstanding, thofe things which fall under our Knowledge, may be in themselves fomewhat hard and problematical, and therefore may seem likely to perplex our Understanding, and draw it into fome Error; yet we will not ftick to maintain, that the nature of things alone, is not fufficient to occafion our falfe Prejudices. For Geometrical Demonftrations are very difficult, yet we judge rightly of them. Thofe things we call Indifferent, and of which we judge without either constraint or intereft, are fometimes altogether Problematical; and yet Common Senfe is not prejudiced when it judges of them, because it doubts where it ought to doubt, and affirms where it ought to affirm, conceiving but a fimple Opinion of things that are probable, and judging with certainty of things that are evident. Not but it may, and often enough it does fo happen, that Impatience, Pride, and Precipitation do contract within us an Habit which difpofes us to judge pofitively of all things; which occafions a Thouand falfe Prejudices in our Understanding; but then the diforder proceeds from fomewhat elfe, and we cannot accufe the nature of things for beoccafion of it.

Neither

Neither would it be more reasonable to afscribe it to the natural frame of our Understanding, fince in that cafe it must necessarily be so difpofed, as to judge amifs of things, in what manner foever they were offered to it; and then we could not avoid being Scepticks. Nay, and fomething worse, because we fhould always think our felves in an Error, by the very Difpofition of our Understanding. But as Experience, and the fenfe of almost an infinite number of Truths, (which cannot poffibly be doubted of,) assure us to the contrary, that there is a certain natural Light within us which never deceives us, what remains but that our Errors proceed only from the Object's not being rightly proposed to our Understanding?

Indeed as every thing hath several Faces, fo the fame thing is not always offered to our Underftanding under the fame form; and as it is variously proposed to it by external caufes, it often appears to one Mans Understanding, different from what it appears to that of another, or even from what it had at another time appeared to the fame. But what is conftant and unchangeable, is the uniform Difpofition of the Understanding, to judge of things according as they are reprefented to it.

There are Two forts of things which occasion the misrepresentation of Objects to our UnderStanding, or rather which are productive of all our falfe Prejudices; the one External, the other Internal: Among thofe of the first fort, I rank Example, Education, Falfe Reafoning and Sophistry. Thus Example and Education make Senfuality and Drunkenness (which are Two great Vices in themfelves,) to be look'd upon in fome Countries as

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