other Men, under pretence of not wholly comprehending it, and embrace another that includes a great many more Difficulties, and more incomprehensible Objects; to complain of not being throughly acquainted with the Designs and Perfections of a Being, fuppofed to be infinite in Perfection and Wifdom, and at the fame time to be ignorant of fuch things as are most proportioned to the Capacity of Man, and feem to be of a Nature and Condition inferior to his; to quit an Opinion upon account of those very Difficulties which are the fame, but far greater in the Atheists Hypothefis, and fuch as admitted, change our fureft and leaft fufpected Notions into an inexplicable confufion, and profound Darkness? 'Tis indeed, juft as if one fhould pull out ones Eyes, in order to fee the bet

ter.

Our Reasons are all taken from what we comprehend, whereas the Atheists have theirs from what they do not understand. We have as many proofs of the truth of our Opinion, as there are things which fhew us any Characters of Wifdom. The Atheists on the contrary, have no reasons to alledge for theirs, but what may be reduced to thefe Two general ones, I do not fee, I do not comprehend God: As if this neceffary difproportion which there is between their Soul and the Supream Being, could form any allowable Prejudice in their Favour: As if this very difproportion, were not the most Effential Character of a Deity fovereignly exalted. If you admit of the Reasons of the Atheists, they will oblige you to call in queftion the Existence of Matter, as well as make you doubt of the Existence of God. But if you fuppofe the Existence of Matter,

you

you have answered the principal Objections of thofe that attack the Existence of God.

CHA P. XVIII.

Wherein we shall conclude this Section, by examining whether there be truly and properly Speaking any fuch thing as an Atheist.

T is no difficult matter, after what has been faid, to decide that famous Question, viz. Whether there be any Real Atheists in the World, or whether it be poffible there fhould be any.

We answer in one Word, that there are fuch as are Atheists in their Heart, but there cannot be any that are fo in their Understanding. For we learn both from Experience and Reafon, that our Paffions do eagerly embrace thofe Objects and Opinions which favour them moft; it cannot therefore be thought ftrange, if they take off our Understanding from the confideration of the Proofs of a Deity, from the Contemplation of his Works, or at least from the Characters of Greatnefs and Wisdom to be feen in them; or if by fufpending the Enquiries of our Understanding, by breaking off its Reflections when they are not favourable to them, and fixing it ftrongly upon all the Doubts that feem to make for them, they form fuch an Habit of Incredulity in Men, as may reasonably enough be called the Atheism of the Heart.

The

The Atheist himself fhews us plainly enough, what was the principle of his Incredulity, when fome times in a fharp Fit of Sickness, he abjures his Impiety; and we might very well put this Question to him, Why he has alter'd his Opinion? If his firft Opinion fprang from the lights of his Understanding, he ought to keep it ftill, fince his Understanding is rather more free, and more difintagled from all Extrinfecal Impreffions now, than it was before. What is it then that obliges him to change his Opinion, but only the change of his Heart? 'Tis because his first Opinion proceeded from the Paffions, but the Second fprings from the pureft Lights of the Understanding.

And certainly it is a very glorious thing for the truth of this grand Principle, that there are none but little Souls corrupted by the Vanity they have of imitating great Wits, and making a vain fhew of fuch Abilities as they are not furnish'd with; or else Debauched Perfons who are Slaves to their Paffions, that make Profeffion of Doubting in this refpect. Whence we may perceive that this Monster is bred by the Paffions that are fruitful in Illufions and Errors, and is not the Iffue of found and right Reason.

He that knows how powerful the Paffions are to feduce us, will not wonder at this, nor be furprifed to fee fome of thofe Miferable Wretches that are deceived by their Paffions, continue their Incredulity and Obftinacy even to the Grave; the reason of this, is that the Habit which they have taken up of fubmitting their Understanding to the regular motions of the Heart, is become a Second Nature to them; 'tis because the impreffion of the Paffions is more lasting in fome

than

than in others. A Soul continually imployed upon the Objects of Debauchery and Impiety, becomes at length incapable of making any right and just judgment, Nature is constrained to yield to Custom; as when a Father is fo accustomed to hate his Son, that he can never recover any Affection for him again.

He that shall confider how that one fingle Paffion of Pride was able in fome fort to destroy all the Knowledge of Man, by obliging him to doubt of every thing, will not in the least wonder, that all the Paffions together should fometimes render this one fingle notion of the Existence of God, Obfcure and Dark. Befides, the Paffions do very often make a Man forget himfelf, and therefore may well be thought capable of making him forget God fometimes.

Two Principles then we find in Man continually ftrugling one with another in this refpect. There is fo much Light in the Understanding, that 'tis hardly poffible it fhould be wholly extinguished by the Paffions of the Heart: And there are so many irregular Paffions in the Heart, that it is hard for the pureft Lights of the Understanding, to escape being dimm'd and obfcur❜d by them fometimes. But here lies the advantage, that the Light comes from common Senfe, a Fountain not at all to be fufpected; whereas the Obscurity comes from the Heart, which is a Principle we have reafon to diftruft. So that we may properly conclude with these Words of the Wife Man, The Fool bath faid in his Heart, there is no God, Pfal. 14.

SECT.

SECT. IL

Wherein we shall prove the Truth and Neceffity of Religion against the Deifts.

CHAP. I.

Four Principles to be proved, in oppofition to Four kinds of Deifts.

Aving a Defign Methodically to proceed in

shall take advantage only of the Principle we just now establish'd; viz. The Truth of the Exiftence of God; for that Truth will immediately lead us to other Truths, by a connexion of allowable and natural Confequences.

First, We shall establish the Idea of God, by fuppofing the Truth of his Existence Secondly, We fhall prove the neceflity of general, by the fimple Idea of God. The neceflity of Religion being well es will afterwards lead

tural Religion. Laft ral Religion, from t abused it by their C the Knowledge of a

iple