Continuation.

There is within the range of human thought what I would willingly call a sacred province, for it is that of morality; and the child who comes to us from home, has already entered it. At first he judged of such actions, words, and affections as came under his observation, solely by their effect, whether pleasant or unpleasant, upon himself. Self was all in all to him; but now he has begun to understand what affections, words, and actions are in themselves, and quite independently of their consequences: he has entered the moral world. I will just give a sample of Catechism, putting the customary questions, to which the pupil must give his own answer.

Q. Why ought not you to take anything in this house without your parents' leave?

A. Because everything in the house belongs to them, and not to me.

Q. Why ought you to try to please them?

A. Because they have always taken care of me.
Q. Why should you believe what they tell you?
A. Because they know better than I do.

Q. Why ought you to return what has been lent to

you?

A. Because it don't belong to me.

Q. Ought you ever to be unkind to other children?
A. No; because I should not like them to be unkind

to me.

Q. Ought you to do good to others?

A. Yes, certainly; because I should like others to do good to me.

Q. How ought we to behave to our fellow creatures?
A. As we should wish them to behave to us.

Q. Why?

A. Because they are men, and children of God, like ourselves.

Q. Is it right to refuse bread to the poor, and give it to animals?

A. No, it is very wrong; for men are of more value than beasts.

I shall confine myself to this specimen, which is sufficient. If I do not immediately get the desired answers, I am sure that I shall soon arrive at the substance of them, if I assist the child by slightly varying my manner of putting the question. Let us now make a few simple observations, which arise out of this little Catechism.

I asked the child why he ought to do such and such things, and why he ought not to do such and such others. He answered me by assigning the why, or the reason of the duty which he recognized; and his reasons were always evident and palpable.

All my questions were practical, inquiring what ought or ought not to be done. The child's answers were of another nature; they were theoretical, assigning the reason of the duty.

If we compare the reasons assigned by the child with the questions submitted to his judgment, we shall see clearly that his decisions are in accordance with the great principle of harmony or suitableness which governs our thoughts. Wherever the child found agreement between a mode of action and the nature of the object to which it refers, there he unhesitatingly decided that a duty is to be fulfilled. Wherever, on the contrary, he observed discordance between a mode of action and the object to which it refers, he pronounced that it is wrong, and must not be done.

To the principle of harmony the child adds what I have called above the scale of valuation; and by this scale he places his parents above himself, his companions on a level with himself, and man above animals, thus measuring and regulating duty by the different value of the subjects to which it refers.

Lastly, the reasons of the child are entirely borrowed from the actions themselves, and the objects to which they refer, without any view to the advantage or disadvantage that may accrue to himself. He does not confound what is right with what is agreeable or useful; for this would not be morality, but prudence based upon self-interest. Morality resides in the conscience, or the inmost supreme conviction of man; and is placed

there as a check to self-interest, and in order to inculcate this great maxim: "First, what is right; next, what is agreeable."

Here then we have clearly ascertained a point which is of the last importance in education; and we have been led to it by the simplicity of the child. In morals we all speak the same language, whatever may be the condition in which we are born and spend our lives. What is right in itself, irrespective of all personal advantage, we call just, equitable, decent, right, beautiful, and honest: the reverse we call unjust, iniquitous, wrong, indecent, unhandsome, dishonest. Now, all the words of the first series mark the agreement between the action and its object; those of the second, the discordance between them. The epithet just is primarily given to a measure which exactly fits the object measured; then to an expression which corresponds with the thought which it should convey; and lastly to an act of the will which is in accordance with its object, as for example, the payment of a debt, the restitution of a loan, gratitude towards a benefactor. The epithet equitable is exclusively employed in a moral sense, and implies the idea of equality between what is and what ought to be done. The word ought manifestly refers to the moral suitableness of which we are now speaking. The words decent and indecent are only applied in the same sense; and we often use in their stead the expressions fit or unfit; but while thus employing them we do not allude to any personal advantage that might accrue from such and such modes of acting or speaking, but exclusively to the action itself. Do we not continually hear, "I would willingly do or say such a thing; it would be advantageous and agreeable to me; but it is not fit to do or to say it, it would be wrong ?"

The word beautiful was first applied to corporeal qualities which please the eye; and from thence was extended to qualities and productions of the mind; and after having spoken of a beautiful thought, a beautiful book, the transition was easy to a beautiful action, a beautiful character, for we discover beauty wherever there is harmony and grace. Not so the words honest and dis

honest, for they are used exclusively in a moral sense. They attribute honour to all that is just or proper in the affections and conduct of men; and dishonour to the reverse. Does it ever occur to us to apply the terms beautiful or honest to a man's selfish gains or enjoyments? On the contrary, if in his pursuit of them he offends against the laws of his relationship to his fellow men, we pronounce him to be a bad, a dishonest man; we despise him. Attempts have sometimes been made to deny to human intelligence its moral attributes, on which obviously depends all the well-being of families, of society, and of life in general. With this view, all the incongruous. opinions among men about right and wrong have been adduced. But these differences of judgment cannot prove the absence of the great principle of morality, for this all men recognize, however their standards of it may This difference arises out of their different manner of judging of the relationship between actions and their objects; and thus, while all set out from the same principle of harmony, they yet come to very different moral conclusions. If all could contemplate actions and their objects in the same point of view, all would arrive at the same conclusions.

vary.

We have dwelt at length on the moral attributes of human intelligence, because it is of the greatest importance that teachers should form a just and clear idea on this point; for if they have only obscure notions on the great subject which should call forth their utmost energies, they will never know how to guide their pupils aright towards the end at which they aim.

Before we pass on to another intellectual faculty, we must make one more observation. We have hitherto comprised under the term intelligence all those powers of the mind which apprehend and work out the materials supplied by experience, whether external or internal; and which, rising above this material world, seek also to comprehend within their grasp the world of spirits. In our short nomenclature we have incorporated reason with intelligence; and. so does the language which is in common use among us. But if greater precision is required,

we should define reason as the noble faculty from which are derived the great principles of harmony and causation, and intelligence as the active faculty which applies them to all the ramifications of our thoughts. Reason then, as belonging to the very essence of human nature, which never alters, would, in our acceptation of it, be infallible, and error would only be ascribable to intelligence, which, in the discharge of its duties, depends on attention and reflection, qualities which are under the control of our free-will. Intelligence would then assume the name of good sense whenever, in accordance with reason, it arrived at truth. Therefore, in order to be more explicit, we shall in future use the terms reason, intelligence, and good sense, in this acceptation of them.

Memory.

The mother shows an object to her tender pupil, in order to convey the idea of it to his mind, and then adds the name as the means of recalling the idea. Thus the memory of things is connected with the memory of words, and the former will present themselves to the mind, as soon as the latter meet the ear or the eye. This the teacher of language may rely upon; but let him remember that the moment his instructions go beyond the family vocabulary, he must acquaint his pupils with the things signified, if he wishes them to understand their signs.

Memory is the faculty of recollection; but this faculty works in a twofold manner. Ever active, it incessantly re-produces the past; but ever obedient to our commands, it interrupts its work in order to bring before our eyes that which we require of it. This double power of memory is most important to teachers, if they know how to avail themselves of it. Memory is a sort of storehouse, in which are laid up all the perceptions of the senses and the thoughts which have passed through the mind; and the vividness of recollection is always in proportion to the depth of the impressions that have been received and to the interest they have excited. Everything else is written, as it were, on loose sand, and is quickly obliterated.

Now, recollections are not heaped together indiscrimi