he still finds in Platonism the suggestions for all his teachings on this new topic.

At the basis of his thinking on the method of nature lies the doctrine of flux. This is an inheritance of Plato and the Platonists from the early philosophy of Heraclitus. As Socrates remarks in the Cratylus, "Heracleitus says somewhere that all things move, and nothing is at rest; and comparing things to the flowing of a river, observes that 'Thou canst not twice into the same stream go.' Or, as Plotinus quotes Heraclitus, "bodies are always rising into existence, or becoming to be, and flowing." This idea of flux Plato, and after him the Platonists, incorporated into their theory of the sensible world. In the Timæus the idea finds its fullest statement. "In the first place, then, what we now denominate water, on becoming condensed, seems to take the form of stones and earth, and when melted and dispersed, that of vapour and air; air also when burnt up, becomes fire, while the latter again, on becoming condensed and extinct, resumes the form of air; and again air, when collected and condensed, produces

1 The Works of Plato, Bohn translation, III., 318. 2 Select Works of Plotinus, 276.

mists and clouds, from which, when still more compressed, rain descends; and from water again are formed earth and stones; the whole of them, as it seems, exchanging all round their mutual generation.

"As these, then, never maintain any constancy of existence, who will have the assurance to maintain that any one of them is this rather than that? No one, and it would be far the safest plan to speak about them as follows: When we see anything constantly passing from one state of existence to another, as fire for instance, we should not say that it is fire absolutely, but something fiery-and again, that what we call water is not absolutely so, but something watery; without assigning to them any names that would give the idea of stability, as we think people do, when they express it by this and that; for not being of an abiding nature, it cannot endure to have applied to it such terms as, this thing, of this nature, belonging to this; and any such others as would show it to have a substantive existHence we should not give anyone of them an individual name, but call it something such-like, but ever fluctuating; and especially with respect to fire, we should assert

ence.

that it is wholly such-like, and similarly likewise, everything endued with generation." 1

Emerson reflects this conception of the flux of things in his view of the eternal cycle of change manifested in the universe. "All things are flowing," he writes, "even those that seem immovable. The adamant is always passing into smoke. The plants imbibe the materials which they want from the air and the ground. They burn, that is, exhale and decompose their own bodies into the air and earth again. The animal burns, or undergoes the like perpetual consumption. The earth burns, the mountains burn and decompose, slower, but incessantly. It is almost inevitable to push the generalization up into higher parts of Nature, rank over rank into sentient beings. Nations burn with eternal fire of thought and affection, which wastes while it works. We shall find finer combustion and finer fuel. Intellect is a fire: rash and pitiless it melts this wonderful bone-house which is called man." 2

In this flux of things the constant substance is law. "Thin or solid, everything is in flight. I believe this conviction makes the charm of

1 The Works of Plato, Bohn translation, II., 355-356. 2 Complete Works, VII., 145.

chemistry-that we have the same avoirdupois matter in an alembic, without a vestige of the old form; and in animal transformation not less, as in grub and fly, in egg and bird, in embryo and man; everything undressing and stealing away from its old into new form, and nothing fast but those invisible cords which we call laws, on which all is strung. Then we see that things wear different names and faces, but belong to one family; that the secret cords or laws show their wellknown virtue through every variety, be it animal, or plant, or planet, and the interest is gradually transferred from the forms to the lurking method." 1

Such a view corresponds to Plato's reasoning from the instability of the flux of sensible things to the necessary existence of the idea, "which subsists according to sameness, unproduced and not subject to decay; receiving nothing into itself from elsewhere, and itself never entering into any other nature, but invisible and imperceptible by the senses, and to be apprehended only by pure intellect." 2 The only variation to be noted is that Emerson makes law the permanent substance amid 1 Complete Works, VIII., 5.

2 The Timaus, Bohn translation, II., 358.

all change. But this had been made in accordance with Coleridge's statement of the relation of the science of natural history to the science of intellect; they are correlative sciences and law which is the object of inquiry in the one is a correlative of idea, or the end of inquiry, in the other. By adopting this theory Emerson was able to restate the doctrine of flux in order to show that law is the only fixed thing we know in nature.

But Emerson has another way of handling the idea of flux. Plotinus had used the

doctrine to testify to the unreality of the world of sensible things as opposed to the reality of soul. Emerson follows him, as well as Plato; in fact, in his treatment of flux Emerson is more frequently following the ideas of Plotinus than of the older philosopher. For in Emerson the idea of flux is often associated with spirit or mind. Nature, he holds, is "always the effect, mind the flowing cause." 1 "Nature is not fixed but fluid. Spirit alters, moulds, makes it." 2 His treatment, then, leads to a discussion of the spiritual life of the universe which flows 1 Complete Works, VIII., 223.

2 Ibid., I., 76.