that the dread universal essence, which is not wisdom, or love, or beauty, or power, but all in one, and each entirely, is that for which all things exist, and that by which they are; that spirit creates; that behind nature, throughout nature, spirit is present; one and not compound it does not act upon us from without, that is, in space and time, but spiritually, or through ourselves: therefore, that spirit, that is, the Supreme Being, does not build up nature around us, but puts it forth through us, as the life of the tree puts forth new branches and leaves through the pores of the old." 1

In such a statement is recognized the teaching of Plotinus regarding the creative power of souls. "It is requisite," he holds, "that there should not only be souls, but that their effects also should have a perspicuous subsistence (since every nature possesses an essential ability of producing something posterior to itself, and of unfolding it into light from its occult subsistence in dormant power), and this as if from a certain indivisible principle and seed, proceeding to a sensible extremity, while that which has a priority of subsistence always abides in its proper seat, but that which 1 Complete Works, I., 63-64.

is consequent is generated from an ineffable power, such as belongs to superior beings, and is the proper characteristic of their nature." 1

1

A similar explanation Plotinus gives in his doctrine of the emanation of all things from the One. Of the One he writes: "What shall we say he is? The power of all things, without whose subsistence the universality of things would never have had a being; nor would intellect have been, which is the first and universal life; for that which subsists above life is the cause of life: since energy of life, which is all things, is not the first, but emanates from this principle as its ineffable fountain. Or conceive the life of a mighty tree, propagating itself through the whole tree, the principle at the same time remaining without being divided through the whole, but, as it were, established in the root; this, then, will afford an universal and abundant life to the tree, but will abide itself, without multiplication, and subsisting as the principle of multitude." 2

As a result of the doctrine of emanation, Emerson regards nature as a perpetual effect. She is passive to the presence of the Divine

1 Five Books of Plotinus, 275-276.

2 Ibid., 237-238.

power just as man should be; her passiveness corresponds to man's humility. "The aspect of Nature is devout," Emerson holds.

"Like

the figure of Jesus, she stands with bended head, and hands folded upon the breast. The happiest man is he who learns from nature the lesson of worship." 1

Such conceptions reflect the teachings of Plotinus. His system had ended in establishing the absolute self-sufficiency of the One as well as the absolute nonentity of matter. Between these two extremes was a series of beings who owe all their life to a power over them of which the One is the ultimate source. By submission, then, matter was endowed with quality and so likewise soul. And though the life of the soul seems an upward progress with a union of itself with the One as its end, yet in reality this progress is made by ridding itself of all its characteristic life in order to unite itself with the Divine. Submission, therefore, becomes the one necessary condition on which nature and man can hope to have being: for their life is given to them by this Over-Soul.

In the treatment of the Over-Soul we can appreciate the hold which the system of 1 Complete Works, I., 61.

Plotinus had upon Emerson's way of thought. Toward the end of Nature he reviews his attempts to explain matter and he finds them deficient. The theories of symbolism and correlation of mind and matter did not suffice. They suggested spirit, but they left God out of him. In other words, he finds these idealistic theories inadequate to explain the meaning of the universe; idealism is but "a useful introductory hypothesis, serving to apprize us of the eternal distinction between soul and the world." It is to mysticism, then, that he turns for the final solution.

Mysticism thus becomes the most important element in Emerson's Platonism. In his review of Plato he notes the absence of this element in Plato's work. Yet he holds that "mysticism finds in Plato all its texts;" 2 and he agrees with the Platonists in making Plato do honor to the ineffable One, which it is the object of mysticism to realize in the experience of man. But Emerson does not find Plato teaching this doctrine, for he remarks of him, "he never writes in ecstasy, or catches us up into poetic raptures." This mystic

1 Complete Works, I., 63.

2 Ibid., IV., 40.

8 Ibid., IV., 61.

enjoyment Plotinus afforded him. It was natural, then, that he should find Plotinus the great need of his life at one time; for in him he became acquainted with a scheme of thought in which mysticism of the purest intellectual type was taught.

II.

INTELLECT.

The mysticism of Plotinus is a rational mysticism; it arises as a logical result of a purely rational conception of knowledge. It is an experience which intellect enjoys, intellect being the principle of soul next in order to the One, or the principle of unity. Thus it comes about that Plotinus and the Platonists have much to say of intellect. And as teachers of the intellect Emerson esteems the Platonists most highly.

In his primary conception of intellect Emerson is one with the Platonists. "How can we speak of the action of the mind under any divisions, as of its knowledge, of its ethics, of its works, and so forth, since it melts will into perception, knowledge into act? Each becomes the other. Itself alone is. Its vision