THE situation of Great Britain, at the beginning of the year 1808, was more extraordinary than any that is exhibited in the history of former times. After a war, which, with the short interval of the peace of Amiens, had continued fifteen years, and, at the commencement of which all Europehad been leagued with her against France, her last reliance upon the continental governments had failed, and all Europe (Sweden alone excepted,) was so humbled, that it was manifest the few states which still preserved a semblance of neutrality, would soon be compelled into a confederacy with France against her. The French military force, and the English navy, two the most tremendous powers that had ever yet existed, were opposed to each other without the possibility of coming in conflict. Masters, as the French were, of the continent, all thoughts of

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attacking them by land were at an end, and neither they nor their allies dared show their flag upon the sea. We, therefore, could not in any way lessen the power of the enemy, neither could they subdue, nor in any way weaken us. The threat of invasion had long been laid aside; that it had been seriously intended by Buonaparte, at the recommencement of hostilities, is beyond a doubt; but the spirit with which all England flew to arms at the menace, had in timidated him, and his gun-boats were left to rot in the harbour of Boulogne. Secured against this bugbear, by its confessed abandonment, by our fleets, and still more by our internal strength, we were carrying on the war, equally without fear and without hope.

The state of our home politics was not less remarkable. For the first

VOL. I. PART I.

The sinecure which he had vacated, was secured by one of his colleagues, and then, without a struggle, they yielded to the influence and reputation of their successors.

Lord Castlereagh told them they had succeeded to a bed of roses; a phrase which became for a time, from its ridiculous inapplicability, a bye-word among the people. Great, however, as were the difficulties of the times, the uniform ill success of their measures was to be attributed at least as much to misconduct, as to mishap. It was apprehended that the French would again seize upon Egypt, and take to themselves the whole of the Levant; the Egyptians, weary of the ignorant tyrants who degraded them, longed to be again under the dominion of a more enlightened power; they had successively experienced the effect of French and of British protection, and decidedly preferred the latter: the common cry was, 66 English if we can, but hats at any rate.” "When it was determined to prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of this important country, and information was required concerning the force that would be requisite, it was replied, that five thousand men might secure Alexandria; but, if it was meant to take Egypt, twenty thousand would then be wanted. Five thousand were sent; they attempted to do that for which twenty were necessary, and the consequences were equally disgraceful and disastrous. At the same time, an expedition was sent to Constantinople to overawe the Porte; and there also, from causes which have never yet been satisfactorily explained, we retreated with shame, our fleet narrowly escaping from the enormous stone-balls of the Turkish artillery. But the heaviest loss, and

the deepest dishonour, which the British arms sustained, was at Buenos Ayres. That city having been surprised without the knowledge, and against the wishes of government, the ministry, in condescension to a popular cry, consented to carry on plans of conquest, which, in their own better judgment, they disapproved; and, instead of establishing an independent government in those colonies, for which the opportunity was so favourable, began to dream of subduing South America; they sent out General Whitelocke, and, by his gross incapacity, several hundred brave men were destroyed, and the rest of the army reduced to an ignominious capitulation. Every ministry will be judged of by its contemporaries according to the success of its measures; nor is the criterion altogether false: for, though wise measures may perhaps fail, it is impossible that foolish ones should prosper. Neither was it sufficient in these instances to shift the blame from administration to its agents, and complain that they had been unfortunate in their transactions abroad: in such cases, unfortunate is but another word for unwise; and, as a general is responsible for the safety of his army, so ought a minister to be answerable for the capacity of the ambassador or commander to whom he has intrusted the interests of the nation.

They sinned equally in what they attempted, and in what they omitted to attempt. It was not possible to have assisted Prussia at Jena,-for Prussia had given us no time for cooperation; and her king, relying too confidently upon the fortunes of the house of Brandenburgh, upon his own popularity in the north of Germany, his untried strength, and the inherited reputation of his armies,

was playing an ambitious game, of which Hanover, and perhaps Holland, with an imperial crown, would have been the prize. A memorable lesson was afforded to posterity in that disastrous battle, when a single day sufficed for the overthrow of a power, which it had taken a century of violent and iniquitous policy to build up. But, with the Baltic open to our fleets, we might have assisted Russia; an English force might have relieved Dantzic; an English army might have been present at Pultusk and at Eylau, and would probably have rendered either of those battles a decisive victory over the French; an English army might have drawn off part of the strength of France from Russia, and either by such a diversion, or by its presence, have changed the fortune of the day at Friedland. But, instead of exerting the resources of Great Britain now, when, for the first time, the popular opinion upon the continent was in our favour; when the writings of enlightened men had succeeded in exciting against the French that feeling, upon which, at the commencement of the war, their strength was founded; and when Buonaparte, throwing off the mask, had manifested himself to all Europe, by the murder of Palm, for the bloody and insolent tyrant that he is; instead of taking advantage of these circumstances, and the spirit of resistance which had arisen, our ministry stood aloof from the contest, leaving the continental powers to fight their own battles, as if their victory was not to be our gain, and their defeat our loss. This timorous policy explained what were the con

cessions which the Grenville party had made to their colleagues; and the nation perceived, when it was too late, that the good which either party might have produced by acting wholly upon its own principles, was not to be expected from a coalition which had paralysed both.

The parliamentary conduct of the Foxites disappointed still more poignantly those who had fixed their hopes upon them. Catholic Emancipation was adjourned till a more convenient season; the dissenters looked in vain to Mr Fox for the repeal of the Test Act; and Lord Howick, so many years the foremost. advocate for a reform in the representation, had now discovered that it was not the general wish of the people of England. The income-tax, instead of being more equally proportioned, was doubled; and the full impost of ten per cent., which Mr Pitt, with sufficient rigour, had made commence with incomes of two hundred a-year, was levied upon those of one. Cruel and iniquitous as this tax was in the highest degree, the most oppressive to which a free people has ever submitted, it was made as vexatious as possible, by compelling those persons, whose little incomes were below the standard of taxation, to pay their full proportion, which they were afterwards to recover by producing proper testimonials; thus subjecting them to certain trouble, probable inconvenience, and not unlikely loss, from their ignorance how to apply for restitution, and the difficulty and expence of taking a journey to obtain it. Such, indeed, were the first proceedings of this

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