Inequality in School Financing: The Role of the Law, Volúmenes38-42U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1972 - 77 páginas |
Términos y frases comunes
14th amendment areas ask the court assessed Bath County Board of Education California CHALLENGING STATE SCHOOL cities Civil Rights classification Clune Commission on Civil Cook County Coons County court noted court to declare Dandridge decision defendants discrimination disparities District Court due process educa education a function educational financing educational needs Educational Opportunity Hearings Equal Educational Opportunity equal protection clause Federal Filed Fourteenth Amendment fundamental interest funds Illinois inequality Justice Kansas McInnis Mexican Americans Minnesota Otero County percent Plaintiffs allege Plaintiffs ask programs property tax public education public schools pupil quality of education racial revenue school children school districts school finance system Serrano State's statute substantially equal Sugarman Supp supra note supra note 14 Supreme Court system for financing system of school tax base taxpayers Texas tion tional Treasurer trict U.S. Commission U.S. Constitution U.S. Supreme Court United States Constitution Valtierra violates the equal wealth-free system
Pasajes populares
Página 9 - That must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis.
Página 11 - Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial minorities . . . whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Página 22 - A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.
Página 7 - In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority...
Página 9 - Shelton v. Tucker. 364 US 479. 488 (1960): "In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
Página 10 - The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect.
Página 5 - Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened.
Página 23 - equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
Página 9 - In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
Página 10 - But, of course, the traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest.