The concluding part of the rule under consideration is,

V. That we be angry only so long as we ought.

It is possible indeed, though very uncommon, that men may lay aside their displeasure, at least the appearance of it, too soon; before it hath produced its intended effect: and, giving more credit, than they have cause, to a few fair promises, take little notice, how they are performed. Thus every one around them finds out the way of dealing with them: and perceiving, on how easy terms all may be made up, transgresses without fear. Sometimes the very same person is in the first moments much too violent, and afterwards, possibly from a consciousness of that, as much too remiss: and so is blameable and despised on both accounts. But the opposite extreme is the ordinary one: and generally the worst sin, that accompanies this passion. Some excess of sudden anger is to many a frailty scarce avoidable. For it is exceedingly difficult to escape being carried a little too far by an emotion of mind, which seems to be only zeal for what is right, and allows such short warning to be on our guard. If indeed we let one thing or another be provoking us almost perpetually, we must not think it a great alleviation, that our peevishness doth not dwell on any single point long, but quickly provides itself a fresh object. Or if we fly out at once into such extravagances, as to do in a little time almost as much mischief, as we could in a great deal: it is a poor plea to make in our own favour, that when we have satiated our fury, or worn down our spirits with it, we are calm again.

But if undue hastiness neither returns frequently, nor goes outrageous lengths; though always a träisgression, yet it is in some measure an excusable one ;

whereas the aggravations of rooted lasting bitterness are most heinous. For when there hath been space for warmth to cool, for reason to resume its dominion, for religion to soften men into a spirit of forgiveness, for friends to interpose their advice and persuasions, for every motive to exert itself; still to continue implacable, and deliberately to fortify ourselves in the wrong, is confirmed wickedness. And yet men indulge it strangely and if nothing chances in a very little while to appease their first rage, allow it to settle into a habit of ill-will: which giving them less impetuous agitations, than they felt at first, they fancy themselves to have sufficiently recovered their temper, and proceed in their guilt without suspecting it. We should therefore be conscientiously watchful over our hearts in this particular. And readiest of all we should be to lay aside that displeasure, which we ought never to have entertained: and be friends again immediately, when it is our own fault, that we ever were otherwise. Yet, I fear, many cherish unreasonable resentment, because they secretly feel it is unreasonable, and never forgive those, whom they have once injured. They have run into a difficulty, out of which they cannot extricate themselves to their liking and therefore, will persist for ever in acting amiss, rather than own, that they have acted so at all. Now, it must be granted, their situation is a very mortifying one. Anger implies a charge upon another of misbehaviour. And when this charge hath been brought and urged, perhaps in very strong terms; to retract it, and make submissions instead of receiving them, must doubtless be a task highly disagreeable which is an excellent reason for avoiding causeless wrath; but it is no reason for persevering in it. Solomon's counsel is very wise: Go not forth

hastily to strive, lest thou know not what to do in the end thereof, when thy neighbour hath put thee to shame*. But if we are got into such a condition, the speediest retreat is the best. Good people will moderate our shame, by accepting our first advances towards a confession, that we have erred. And if others require fuller satisfaction, we must give it them: for it would be monstrous to do them yet more wrong, because we have done them some already.

But nearest in guilt to the anger, which was originally causeless, is that which becomes so by lasting beyond its cause. Many things furnish just ground of animadversion; so just, that we should be to blame, if we omitted it: and yet are of so slight a nature, that we should be more to blame, if we did not, after duly signifying our dislike of them, return immediately to our former disposition and behaviour, even towards the person concerned. For there would be no living in any comfort, if every little offence were to be lengthened out, and the most made of it that can. Therefore in such cases, far from letting the sun go down upon our wrath, we should not let the next hour, sometimes the next moment, see the least marks of it. Where there is need, they may continue longer and be increased or lessened, according to the occasion. The tokens of our displeasure may be suspended for a time, and gentler methods tried: which are always the best, when they are likely to be effectual; then resumed, if circumstances demand it. But as soon as ever the fault is reformed, though not perfectly, yet as far as we can fairly expect, after all allowances made, (and in most cases a great many should be made) then without de+ Eph. iv. 26.

• Prov. xxv. 8.

lay we should declare ourselves reconciled, for we cannot any longer be angry and not sin.

One principal discouragement of such reformation is, that we commonly require of persons, besides the assurance of giving no affence for the future, great submissions for what is past. And they should always think it their duty to make them: but we should for the most part think it ours not to insist on them. Indeed their chief objection against acknowledging their misdemeanour, frequently is, that they imagine it will be in vain. And were they but undeceived by any little intimations of our disposition to forgive, they would repay us fully afterwards for that goodness, to which they would gladly have applied before, if despair had not withheld them. Or if they cannot even thus be brought to own themselves culpable in so many words: yet perhaps they will do it, readily and sufficiently, in a less direct manner. And the truth is, that some sorts of acknowledgments may be unsuitable to some sorts of persons on some occasions. But if any one should by mistake apprehend it beneath him to comply with what in strictness he is bound to : yet, provided he shews but any way, that he is conscious of his error, and purposes to avoid it for the future, both charity and humanity forbid rigorous demands of more. Nay, though even such tacit confessions and promises may be somewhat imperfect and ambiguous, favourable and liberal constructions ought to be put upon them; for we should ever encourage persons to amend by facilitating the means of it, to the best of our power. Much more then is it incumbent on us to banish resentment intirely, when all the satisfaction hath been offered us, that can be made, though perhaps a full compensa

t

tion can never be made. For it is not the damage, but the injury done us, that justifies our anger. And therefore, when the injury is removed by repentance, though the damage continue, the anger ought to cease: because the offender being now returned to his right mind, and become what he should, displeasure against him afterwards is displeasure against a good person, instead of a bad one.

I do not say, that we ought always immediately to believe every one, who professes concern, and makes fair promises. But we certainly ought to be careful, that passion doth not keep us from believing what in itself is probable. Unless we are as ready to be reconciled, as we were to be provoked; and give as much credit, upon equal proof, to the penitence, as we did to the crime; we are not in a reasonable and Christian temper. If therefore the evidences of any one's amendment be strong enough only to suspend our bad opinion of him, we should suspend our anger too and as they grow sufficient to change it, we should change proportionably into kind behaviour, and due esteem.

Indeed, supposing there be no amendment in him, though we cannot possibly think well of him in that respect, yet we may in others: for there are strange mixtures in most people of faults and good qualities. Or, were we to think ever so ill of him upon the whole, and with ever so much cause, we should by no means be at liberty, even then, to cherish a constant indignation at him boiling in our breasts: but our disapprobation of his character ought to be gentle and mild. For when anger, from being an occasional passion for a time, degenerates into a settled state of mind, it deserves a harsher name, that of rancour. And though in such a state we may appear composed,