are liable to it. But they themselves cannot reflect too seriously, how often and how much they make all about them suffer for no cause at all: and those most, whom they ought least: how strangely and wildly unreasonable they are, when under the power of this bad spirit: and how firmly they are obliged to watch against it continually, and free themselves, when seized by it, as soon as possibly they can.

In all these instances, anger is so evidently unjust, that happily no pretence can be made for indulging it. But there are others, in which, faults having been really committed, a plea for resenting is really furnished; and yet, if we resolve to act rightly and wisely, no resentment at all must be shewn or entertained. We have not been received perhaps with the good breeding, or treated with the regard or good humour, that we might expect: expressions, not so prudent or obliging, have dropt from persons in relation to us things, in which we meant no harm, have been taken wrong: our desires and inclinations have not been consulted, when they ought: our opinion or recommendation hath been too little attended to our advice or directions too little observed: or some one or another of a thousand matters of this sort, hath happened. And doubtless every one of them, supposing the fact to have been as we imagine, is a fault: and, though of a slighter sort, should be carefully avoided by those, with whom we live; and let me add, by ourselves too. But, alas, they with whom we live, and we ourselves too, are creatures, naturally subject to such faults. Indiscretions and thoughtlessness, odd humours and perverseness, little partialities and prejudices, ever were and will be amongst men, even the better kind of men. And therefore what can be done? Either we must all give

and take offence almost every hour of our lives; or we must be content to make mutual allowances, and put good constructions on things: wink at what had better not be seen; forget as soon as possible, what we could not help seeing; and teach those by our example, who, we think have need to learn, friendly dispositions, and respectful behaviour. This is the only way of mending matters: and shameful as it is to our species, half the uneasinesses that we feel in life, proceed from our not taking it.

2. The next part of the rule before mentioned is, that we be angry only with such persons as we ought.

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And here immediately occurs a criminal use of this passion, almost too shocking to mention: I mean, when we are angry with our Maker. For against whom else is it, that our displeasure is pointed, when we murmur at the distribution of things here, either because our own condition is less agreeable than we would have it, or that of others more prosperous, than we imagine they deserve? The former is direct rebellion of the heart against the dispositions of infinite wisdom and goodness: an arrogance, which in creatures otherwise innocent would be monstrous; and how much more so in miserable sinners! The latter indeed would appear a virtuous concern at the encouragement, which frequent success gives to wickedness and unworthiness. Nor can it be doubted, but we have cause, often to be sorry, and sometimes to be angry, with those around us, when this happens through their fault. And yet indulging either of these dispositions too far, will reduce us to a very uncomfortable and very blameable state of mind. But to be provoked, that God suffers men to act thus, is claiming to govern the world in his stead: whose abhorrence of sin, and of disproportion, we ought to

consider, is infinitely greater than ours can be: and therefore if, for good and wise reasons he thinks fit to bear with it, well may we do so too: and wait with patience for the appointed time, when, every seeming irregularity shall appear to have joined in producing the most beautiful order. Fret not thyself because of the ungodly, neither be thou envious against the evil-doers. Leave off from wrath, and let go displeasure: else shalt thou be moved to do evil. Hold thee still in the Lord, and abide patiently upon him*. For surely there is an end, and thine expectation shall not be cut offt.

But as anger against our Maker is impious, against some of our fellow-creatures also it is highly improper: those particularly, under whose authority we are: and all, in some measure, whose rank is higher than our own. Of them, beyond others, we ought not without strong reasons even to think ill, much less to blame them openly, and least of all to their faces. But if some extraordinary occasion should happen to require it, their station absolutely demands, that we suppress much of that roughness of manner, and familiar warmth of expostulation, which perhaps towards equals might not be unfit. For he, who is angry and finds fault, assumes a kind of superiority for the time: which inferiors ought rarely to do, and with great moderation, if at all: though doubtless in gentler terms, they may freely represent whatever concerns them.

Another sort of persons, exempted from all heat of resentment, and therefore certainly of reproof, are our benefactors and our friends. Where we have received favours, it would be very hard to let a few unkindnesses, because they came last, blot out every Psalm xxxvii. 1. 7, 8. + Prov. xxiii. 18.

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thing that went before; and move us to speak or think with the same severity, as we would of others. Nothing, but gross and repeated provocations, ought to have this effect. And we should be extremely backward to imagine, that they, whom we have seen taking pleasure to do us good, design us any harm. Then as to our friends: the esteem, which we have entertained for them, surely must be founded on merit sufficient to shelter a number of lesser faults from angry notice. Friendship implies a tacit covenant of mutual forbearance, without which it would be in danger of breaking every day. It permits indeed, and sometimes requires, remonstrances to be made: but never without some weighty cause; and always with such gentleness, and evident proofs of cordial good-will, as may, if possible, draw closer those bonds, which nothing but the last necessity should untie. And even then, having once been friends is a powerful reason, both of prudence and conscience, to restrain us from ever becoming enemies.

Others are privileged against our anger upon any particular misbehaviour, by the general goodness of their character and conduct. We are all so far from perfection, that whoever intends, and acts right in the main, merits an esteem for it, that should cover a multitude of smaller offences, or however greatly moderate our displeasure at them. And indeed, shewing worthy persons, in the mildest way, that they have done amiss, will give them a concern, that needs no aggravation.

But many, who are more liable to faults, must yet, on account of their natural dispositions, be tenderly used. Some cannot support any harshness of treatment, but sink under it immediately. Some again,

anger, though not excessive, serves only to exasperate. They will readily enough yield to calm, soft representations: but are impatient of rebuke. To such therefore we should condescend a little: and think it sufficient amends, that we are almost sure of prevailing on them by such means, as (if we have any good nature,) will be far the most agreeable to ourselves. But there are likewise, it must be owned, people in the world, whom it is easy to make worse by rough usage, and not easy to make better by any other. That these deserve to have their tempers much consulted, cannot be said. But still, partly from charity and partly from discretion, we must treat them in the method, by which they are likeliest to prove tractable: and, resolving first, to have as little to do with them as we can; endeavour to get over what we must have to do with them, as quietly as we are able.

There is also a great variety not only in tempers, but in understandings and abilities, which ought to be considered on this occasion. We pass by many faults in children without anger, if we are at all considerate: because they know not, as yet, the rules of behaviour; or, through the levity, incident to their age, are turned aside from recollecting them. Now, for the same reason, such of riper years, as either by nature have less readiness, or accuracy, or sedateness; or, from their education less acquaintance with propriety, or the customs of the world, should in proportion be exempted from blame, when they misbehave; especially in small points, and such as are beyond their reach, or out of their way. Besides, men cannot be always attentive to every part of what they do know. And some have constitutionally so uncommon a share of thoughtlessness, that, with the