enemies; but faith must be preserved, even in the midst of arms: else a state of hostility would be yet more calamitous than it is, and besides would be endless too. For overtures of truce or peace could have no effect, if no confidence remained between the contending parties. Add to this, that if one side may deceive, the other may: and so neither is in a better condition, than if both abstained from it: and indeed the attempt of it by both, will for the most part be ineffectual*.

A third case, in which many plead for the lawfulness of making free with truth, is in dealing with those, who have either lost in a great measure the use of their understandings, or are not yet sufficiently. arrived to it. For it is argued, that these have no title to conduct themselves, because they have no ability of doing it: and since the only service, that truth can do them, is conducting them properly; and instead of that, it will often only discompose them, and make them refractory: if employing falsehood will lead them on quietly in the right way, it can be no injury, and may be a great advantage to them. But consider: persons naturally weak, or, through infirmities, decayed, in their intellects, may be managed, with a little skill and care, intirely to their satisfaction, or, however, may soon be pacified again, by methods very consistent with sincerity. And they, whose disorder is a species of madness, are not only for the most part incredibly jealous, but more sagacious too, than is often imagined: and to what degrees, both of rage and violence, deceits, attempted

Polyb. 1. xii. p. 671. condemns deceit in princes and generals, even against enemies: which he saith the Achaians used not, and the Romans not much. He adds, p. 673. that truth always gets the better of falsehood sooner or later.

upon them and detected, will drive them, can scarce be credited. Whereas, plain dealing, if proper authority be mildly assumed along with it, will generally soon subdue them once for all; most of them submitting readily to it from a secret consciousness of their own state. Then as to children: it is true, they are easily cheated, and so for a while easily quieted. But what follows? that they quickly come to see through these artifices, and then are much more intractable than before, and quite outrageous on the very apprehension of your repeating them. Your credit with them is lost, the next time you want to use it for their good: and their sole aim for the future is to deceive the deceiver, gratify their own inclinations, and carry their own ends. Now treating them with fairness and steadiness, telling them only so much as was proper, but nothing that they should ever find to be otherwise than they were told, would have totally different effects: would teach them betimes to hear reason and yield to it; would prevent their agitating themselves with perpetual fits of passion, by shewing them clearly, what they were to expect, what they were to consider as unfit; and, which is a much greater benefit still, would habituate them from the first to integrity and honesty in their own behaviour: whereas perhaps one of their chief inducements to that vile trick of lying; of which most of them get something, and too many so much, that they never leave it; is what really makes their condition a pitiable one: that they learn it originally from its being used towards themselves by those, who afterwards reprove and punish them for it.

The last case, which I shall mention, is that of sick persons: concerning whom it is alledged, that com

mon good nature directs us to conceal from them sometimes, be it ever so much at the expence of truth, the real name of their disease, the danger of their situation, the sort of medicines given them, and all facts of all kinds, which, if known, might deject or disturb them: for that not only such deceit is useful, but they upon whom it is practised, will, when recovered, approve it, and be thankful for it, nay, perhaps have already approved it, and set the example of it on former like occasions, and therefore have in effect consented to it now. But, plausible as this plea may appear, the need and the benefit of employing falsehood, even in these circumstances, for the most part at least, cometh of evil*. It is because people will not in the time of their health Become virtuous and reasonable, pious and resigned, that they want the wretched support of untruths in the time of sickness. And, if they who are about them scruple to support them thus, as they well may, then they are void of all consolation. But even supposing the lies, which they wish for, are told them; they will seldom be told so, as neither to be found out, nor suspected: and suspicions will often disturb sick persons more fatally, than knowing the worst would. Or, let prevarications of this kind work ever so happy effect on some particular occasions, yet there follows a most dreadful general inconvenience from them: that because some must needs be told their condition is hopeful and safe, though it be not; others are told in vain, that theirs is so, though it be; for their friends, they think, will affirm any thing, to please them. And thus, no more may recover by being deceived, than may be lost by the impossibility, arising from hence, of knowing that they are not de

* Matth. v. 37.

ceived. Their lives may depend on the composedness of their spirits: their spirits would have been composed, if they could have believed those who attend them: but being sensible what liberties they will take in these matters, they cannot believe them; and therefore can have no relief or comfort from their assurances.

However, it must be owned, that in most or all of the above-mentioned cases, there are sometimes difficulties, with which we have much more cause to pray God we may never be tried, than to be confident that we shall judge and act rightly, if we are. And, therefore, though adhering strictly to truth, as the rule, which our Maker hath given us, and trusting him with the consequences, evidently appears to be the securest way: yet, if any one ventures to deviate from it with a visibly good intention, we should not, I think, pronounce a severe sentence upon him, considering how prone the best of us is to err in plainer things; always provided, that the liberties, which he takes, be few and modest, and almost extorted from him; and conscientiously restrained to things in themselves the least exceptionable. But if persons, because something may be colourably said for making a little free with truth on very uncommon occasions, where no one seems injured by it, will indulge themselves in whatever falsities they please on almost any occasion: if, because it hath been apprehended, that malefactors, and those with whom we are at war, have no right to veracity; and that such, as are incapable of judging at all for themselves, may be deceived for their advantage by others; if, I say, upon this, they will imagine they are allowed to treat one part of mankind as villains and enemies, with whom no faith is to be kept, and another as children

and fools, upon whom they may freely impose any way this must proceed from a bad heart; and the tendency of it is, to dissolve intirely the bonds of human society, and open a high road to all possible wickedness and universal confusion. The arguments, were they ever so specious, for the lawfulness of fraud in seemingly harmless cases, can never prove it lawful in others of a nature quite contrary. But, I beg it may be observed, the extreme danger, which there is notwithstanding, of men's proceeding in falsehood to very pernicious lengths, if once they begin, is a most unanswerable objection against its being permitted in any degree at all.

A consideration so interesting must be urged more at large and shall, God willing, the next opportunity. But I hope you have already seen very great reason to follow the son of Sirach's wise counsel, Use not to make any manner of lie: for the custom thereof is not good*.

Ecclus. vii. 13.