a certain point, but it will be well for us as a nation when we realise that we have had enough. In Morocco, what is easy for France, with her contiguous province, with her plans for trans-Saharian traffic, and her thirst to copy our colonial expansion-though without men to spare-would have been for us costly and unremunerative. We are well quit of the temptation. Moreover, we have freed ourselves of a possible, almost certain, cause of friction with France, of itself a most important gain. Just as France would never have acquiesced in our establishing a protectorate in Morocco without something more than words, so the rag-fel British public, always capable of being goaded to madness by the newspapers, would have bitterly objected to French action if overt, while powerless to prevent the insidious grasp from closing on Morocco by degrees. The first war engaging at once British attention and forces was like to see France installed in Morocco without our leave. The early reverses of the Transvaal War induced her to appropriate Tût and Fîgîg, and had the fortune of war been against us, Morocco would have been French already. These facts must not be overlooked in discussing what was our wisest course. We were unprepared to do what France was straining to do; we occupied the manger to no one's good-practically the position of Germany should she hold out. Surely we were wise to come to terms while we could, not, as in the case of Tauis, when too late. Most British residents in Morocco; probably every tourist who has been conducted along the coast, or sniffed at the capital cities; all those firms of ours who share the bulk of the Moorish trade, and others who yearned to open up possible mines, and undertake the public works so urgently needed; aye, and the concession-prospector and company-monger who see the prey eluding their grasp; even the would-be heroes across the Straits who have dreamed in vain of great deeds to be done on those hills before them; all will unite in deploring what appears to them a gross blander. After all this is but natural. So few of us can see beyond our own domains, so many hunger after anything-in their particular linethat belongs to a weaker neighbour, that it is well we have disinterested statesmen who can take a wider view. Else had we long since attempted to possess ourselves of the whole earth, like the conquering hordes of Asia, and in consequence become dispossessed ourselves. But among these objecting critics one class has a right to be heard, those who have invested life and fortune in the Morocco trade : in the men who have toiled for years against the discouraging odds involved, who have wondered whether Moorish corruption or British apathy were their worse foe, such feeling is not only natural, it is excusable. Only those who have experienced it know what it means to be defrauded by complacent orientals, and to be refused the redress they see officials of other nations obtaining for their rivals. The British policy has all along been to maintain the status quo in spite of individual interests, deprecating interference that might seem high-handed, or create a precedent from which retraction would be difficult. In the collection of debts, in enforcing the performance of contracts, or in securing justice of any sort where the policy is to promise all and evade all till pressure is brought to bear, British subjects in Morocco have therefore always found themselves at a disadvantage in competition with others whose governments openly supported them. The hope that has buoyed them up was that one day the tide might turn, and that Great Britain might feel it incumbent on her to "protect" Morocco against all comers. After months of inauspicious rumours the deluge has come. Hope has fled! What avails it that grace of generation's span is allowed them, that they may not individually suffer from the change? It is the dream of years that lies shattered. Here are the provisions for their protection: а ART. IV." The two Governments, equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty, both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not lend themselves to any inequality either in the establishment of Customs rights or other taxes, or in the establishment of tariffs for transport on the railways. . . . This mutual agreement is valid for a period of thirty years" [subject to extensions of five years]. Art. II. quoted above preserves the right to convey goods by sea from one Moorish port to another, till recently prohibited. Art. V. secures the maintenance in their posts of British officials in the Moorish service. Thus, as there can be no immediate exhibition of favouritism beyond the inevitable placing of all concessions in French hands, there is really not much ground of complaint, while there is a hope of cause for thankfulness. Released from its former bugbears, no longer open to suspicion of secret designs, our Foreign Office can afford to impart a little more backbone into its dealings with Moorish officials, and a much more acceptable policy should be forthwith inaugurated, that the Morocco traders may see that what they have lost in possibilities they have gained in actualities. Still more. The French, now that their hands are free, are in a position to "advise" reforms which will benefit all. Thus out of the ashes of one hope another rises. Therefore the writer's verdict is in favour of the fait accompli. But that the views expressed are not a veering round with circumstances, he may be permitted to show by quoting the concluding passage of his description of "The Land of the Moors," published in 1901 : "France alone is to be feared in the Land of the Moors, which, as things trend to-day, must in time form part of her colony. There is no use disguising the fact, and, as England certainly would not be prepared to go to war with her neighbour to prevent her repeating in Morocco what she has done in Tunis, it were better not to grumble at her action. All England cares about is the mouth of the Mediterranean, and if this were secured to her, or even guaranteed neutral-were that possible-she could have no cause to object to the French extension. Our Moorish friends will not listen to our advice; they keep their country closed, as far as they can, refusing administrative reforms which would prevent excuses for annexation. Why should we trouble them? It were better far to come to an agreement with France, and to acknowledge, what will prove itself one day, that France is the normal heir to Morocco whenever the present empire breaks up." Since the above was written there has occurred the carrying off of two foreign residents of Tangier-one British, one Americanby an insurgent chief, in order to bring the Moorish Government to terms through fear of foreign complications. This threatens to force the hand of France, by reason of hot-headed and ill-advised action at Washington, where the situation appears to have been quite misunderstood. Treating the case as one of brigandage, the Moorish Government has been held responsible, and France has been appealed to as though this new agreement authorised her to police Morocco. France, however, will probably be too wise to interfere, but owing to the conflicting elements at work, the end is not to be foreseen. The presence of American and English warships in Tangier Bay, required to protect other foreigners from similar outrages, at the same time leads the rebel Raisuli to hope that the Government will be thereby forced to concede his arrogant demands. Active operations on land, whether native or foreign, would probably end in the death of the captives: diplomacy alone is available now, but when once it has succeeded-or failed-it is essential that prompt and effective punishment follow, to preclude all possibility of such methods being repeated. In this, the less foreigners appear the better, though their practical support of the Sultan may be required in several ways. Here is France's opportunity. BUDGETT MEAKIN TRIANGULAR FOREIGN TRADE. TRADE statistics for recent years show, it is true, a certain decline in our exports of manufactures to foreign protected markets, while to the British Possessions our exports increase steadily. This fact is seized on by advocates of Mr. Chamberlain's scheme as a conclusive argument for preferential trade. For, since there is little hope of expansion in our exports to foreign countries, we are told we must look more and more to the Colonies for a market, even though our foreign trade should suffer somewhat in consequence. We send to our Colonies on the whole as much as they send us; whereas, in the case of our trade with most European countries, and with the United States, our imports largely exceed our exports. As, according to Protectionist principles, the proportion of exports to imports forms the criterion of profitableness in our commercial intercourse with any country, this furnishes a further reason for encouraging our colonial trade, and at the same time lends support to the view that we might lose little by restricting our manufactured imports from foreign nations, even though in so doing we should diminish our exports to them. The home market secured to ourselves would more than compensate us for the loss of the foreign market. All this is based on the assumption that our exports to the Colonies pay for our imports therefrom, the same being the case with our foreign trade, and that, accordingly, one branch of our trade might grow or decline without affecting the other. How far this is from being the case may be seen by glancing at the statistics of the oversea commerce of the British Possessions. In the following figures all the principal Possessions are included, viz., Australasia, Canada, Newfoundland, South Africa, Jamaica, Barbadoes, Trinidad, Mauritius, Ceylon, India, Straits Settlement, Gold Coast, Lagos, Sierra Leone, British Guiana. Complete statistics for the other Colonies are not available, but, so far as they exist, they point even more markedly in the same direction. The period 1889-98 has been chosen to avoid the disturbance caused by the South African War. VOL. 162.-No. 1. B IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF ABOVE-MENTIONED COLONIES. It should be noted that these are the values at colonial ports, and therefore the figures for the imports include freight, a considerable part of which is earned by British ships. For instance, the balance against Germany shown by the above figures is only 1.9 millions. Valued at the German ports, the trade with Australasia, British East Indies, British North America, and South Africa alone shows an average balance against Germany of over 3 millions per annum during the period 1894-8. The colonial imports from the United Kingdom on the other hand exceed the exports thereto by 3.9 millions, though this does not by any means represent the real balance of indebtedness to the Mother Country. An enormous amount of British capital is invested in our foreign possessions, and the interest has each year to be met either by the direct export of goods or by remitting bills drawn on foreign countries. The movements of bullion and specie, though considerable in the case of one or two Colonies, forms a small part of the total volume of trade. It is impossible to get exact figures for the sum thus due, but in the case of Australia, for example, it has been roughly estimated at 12 millions. India, again, has to remit about 15 millions yearly to cover cost of administration, interest, &c. The total indebtedness is bound in any case to be considerable, and statistics show clearly that it is not remitted directly either in gold or commodities. It must obviously be discharged by bills drawn on foreign countries in consideration of goods sent to them. This coincides exactly with the fact that there is the large balance of 11.4 millions against the five foreign countries in question. The balance would be still further increased if we included the remaining minor possessions, such as British East Africa, Nigeria, &c. It appears, then, that British exports to the Colonies, the exports from the Colories to foreign countries, and the exports of foreign countries to the United Kingdom, cancel each other to a large extent, the adjustment taking |