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author has received information from the leaders, and from individuals of the French, as well as of the British armies, which enables him to rectify many mistakes that have been made by preceding writers, as well as to explain many things that might otherwise have been involved in obscurity. He does not think it necessary to the cause which he has in hand, to detract on any occasion from the merit of those who were then our bitter enemies. He freely censures their conduct, indeed, when blame is deserved, and points out their errors, when errors were committed. But all this he does with the frankness, chivalry, and good faith of an honourable foe. He eulogises the French marshals whenever they are entitled to his approbation, explains the merit of their plans and combinations without a particle of bias, and indeed thus more completely establishes the superiority of that gifted warrior, who baffled and overthrew, before crossing the Pyrennees to a still higher destiny, the ablest men whom Napoleon could send against him.

Notwithstanding the foolish boasts of the Spaniards,-boasts which they persevere in to this hour,-we shall not follow Colonel Napier in his demonstrations, tiresome from their number, that upon every point where Spanish troops were assailed, they were absolutely incapable of defending their own cause. It is enough for us to know that every action, every correspondence, every proceeding of the six years that the war lasted, rise up in support of this fact.' Neither do we deem it necessary to make any observation upon the author's account of the defence of Portugal by the Duke of Wellington. That great operation which enabled him at first to make a bold stand against the French invaders, and afterwards to expel them from the whole Peninsula, must for ever shew that fortune had less to do with that warrior's splendid successes, than the military sagacity, and inflexibility, which so strongly characterise his mind. Indeed it was not in Portugal alone, that his comprehensive genius displayed itself most conspicuously. From the commencement of his contact with the enemy in Spain, he clearly foresaw the points on which they would be most vulnerable, and the periods at which his resources might be applied against them with the greatest advantage; and in his calculations, moral causes and results were considered with as much attention as military probabilities. It is in this respect that the fame of the Duke of Wellington will shine with the truest lustre; no envious criticism can rob him of this part of his glory. Firm and full of hope at a period when his plans were the subject of much opposition, both in the camp, and the senate at home, he still grandly persevered; and even when there was a question of altogether giving up the contest in Portugal, and withdrawing the troops, a question which was not only entertained by our statesmen, but decided by them in the affirmative, he did not despair of the fortunes of his country. Besides the efficacy of the celebrated lines, which he established for protecting the re-embarkation of his troops, if that should ultimately

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be unavoidable, he well knew the character of the soldiers upon whose assistance he chiefly relied--a character which Colonel Napier describes with not less accuracy than eloquence.

'That the British infantry soldier is more robust than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe; and, notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue, and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat, with incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and his movements free; the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing, nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not, indeed, possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them; but he is observant and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril.

It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle, is the result of a phlegmatic constitution uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered! Napoleon's troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory, but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy; no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen ; his life of danger and hardship was uncheered by hope; his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore! Did he not endure with surpassing fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, and, with incredible energy, overthrow every opponent, at all times proving that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him!

'The result of a hundred battles and the united testimony of impartial writers of different nations has given the first place, amongst the European infantry, to the British; but, in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world.'-vol. iii. pp. 271, 272.

Nor were the soldiers against whom such troops were matched unworthy of their admiration. On few occasions, perhaps, during the Peninsular war, were the opposing regiments committed in closer conflict, bayonet to bayonet, and sword to sword, than during that series of remarkable operations which was undertaken by Colonel Crawfurd in the summer of 1810, with the view of affording succour to Ciudad Rodrigo. The combat of the Coa afforded brilliant evidence of the courage and determination, which actuated every man engaged on either side.

'Crawfurd's whole force under arms consisted of four thousand infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and six guns, and his position, one mile and a half in length, extended in an oblique line towards the Coa. The cavalry piquets were upon the plain in his front, his right on some broken ground, and his left, resting on an unfinished tower, eight hundred yards

from Almeida, was defended by the guns of that fortress; but his back was on the edge of the ravine, forming the channel of the Coa, and the bridge was more than a mile distant, in the bottom of the chasm.

A stormy night ushered in the 24th of July. The troops, drenched with rain, were under arms before day-light, expecting to retire, when a few pistol shots in front, followed by an order for the cavalry reserves and the guns to advance, gave notice of the enemy's approach; and as the morning cleared, twenty-four thousand French infantry, five thousand cavalry, and thirty pieces of artillery were observed marching beyond the Turones. The British line was immediately contracted and brought under the edge of the ravine; but meanwhile, Ney, who had observed Crawfurd's false disposition, came down with the swoop of an eagle. Four thousand horsemen and a powerful artillery swept the plain. The allied cavalry gave back, and Loison's division coming up at a charging pace, made towards the centre and left of the position.

While the French were thus pouring onward, several ill-judged changes were made on the English side, part of the troops were advanced, others drawn back, and the forty-third most unaccountably placed within an enclosure of solid masonry, at least ten feet high, situated at the left of the road, with but one narrow outlet about half-musket shot down the ravine. While thus imprisoned, the firing in front redoubled, the cavalry, the artillery, and the caçadores successively passed by in retreat, and the sharp clang of the ninety-fifth rifle was heard along the edge of the plain above. A few moments later, and the forty-third would have been surrounded; but that here, as in every other part of this field, the quickness and knowledge of the battalion officers remedied the faults of the general. One minute sufficed to loosen some large stones, a powerful effort burst the enclosure, and the regiment, reformed in column of companies, was the next instant up with the riflemen; there was no room to array the line, no time for any thing but battle, every captain carried off his company as an independent body, and joining as he could with the ninety-fifth or fifty-second, the whole presented a mass of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no regular command; yet each confident in the courage and discipline of those on his right and left, and all regulating their movements by a common discretion, and keeping together with surprising vigour.

It is unnecessary to describe the first burst of French soldiers. It is well known with what gallantry the officers lead, with what vehemence the troops follow, and with what a storm of fire they waste a field of battle. At this moment with the advantage of ground and numbers, they were breaking over the edge of the ravine, their guns ranged along the summit, played hotly with grape, and their hussars, galloping over the glacis of Almeida, poured down the road, sabring every thing in their way. Ney, desirous that Montbrun should follow this movement with the whole of the French cavalry, and so cut off the troops from the bridge, sent five officers in succession to urge him on, and so mixed were friends and enemies at the moment, that only a few guns of the fortress durst open, and no courage could have availed against such overwhelming numbers. But Montbrun enjoyed an independent command, and, as the attack was made without Massena's knowledge, he would not stir. Then the British regiments, with singular intelligence and discipline, extricated themselves

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from their perilous situation. For falling back slowly, and yet stopping and fighting whenever opportunity offered, they made their way through a rugged country, tangled with vineyards, in despite of their enemies, who were so fierce and eager, that even the horsemen rode in amongst the enclosures, striking at the soldiers as they mounted the walls or scrambled over the rocks.

'As the retreating troops approached the river, they came upon a more open space; but the left wing being harder pressed, and having the shortest distance, arrived while the bridge was still crowded, and some of the right wing distant. Major M'Leod, of the forty-third, seeing this, rallied four companies on a hill just in front of the passage, and was immediately joined by a party of the ninety-fifth, and at the same time, two other companies were posted by brigade-major Rowan, on another hill flanking the road; these posts were thus maintained until the enemy, gathering in great numbers, made a second burst, when the companies fell back. At this moment the right wing of the fifty-second was seen marching towards the bridge, which was still crowded with the passing troops; M'Leod, a very young man, but with a natural genius for war, immediately turned his horse round, called to the troops to follow, and, taking off his cap, rode with a shout towards the enemy. The suddenness of the thing, and the distinguished action of the man, produced the effect he designed; a mob of soldiers rushed after him, cheering and charging as if a whole army had been at their backs, and the enemy's skirmishers, astonished at this unexpected movement, stopped short. Before they could recover from their surprise, the fifty-second crossed the river, and M'Leod, following at full speed, gained the other side also without a disaster.

As the regiments passed the bridge, they planted themselves in loose. order on the side of the mountain. The artillery drew up on the summit, and the cavalry were disposed in parties on the roads to the right, because two miles higher up the stream there were fords, and beyond them the bridge of Castello Bom, and it was to be apprehended that, while the sixth corps was in front, the reserves, and a division of the eighth corps, then on the Agueda, might pass at those places and get between the division. and Celerico. The river was, however, rising fast from the rains, and it was impossible to retreat farther.

'The French skirmishers, swarming on the right, opened a biting fire, which was returned as bitterly; the artillery on both sides played across the ravine, the sounds were repeated by numberless echoes, and the smoke rising slowly, resolved itself into an immense arch, spanning the whole chasm, and sparkling with the whirling fuzes of the flying shells. The enemy gathered fast and thickly; his columns were discovered forming behind the high rocks, and a dragoon was seen to try the depth of the stream above, but two shots from the fifty-second killed horse and man, and the carcases floating between the hostile bands, showed that the river was impassable. The monotonous tones of a French drum were then heard, and, in another instant, the head of a noble column was at the long narrow bridge. A drummer, and an officer in a splendid uniform, leaped forward together, and the whole rushed on with loud cries. The depth of the ravine at first deceived the soldiers' aim, and two thirds of the passage was won ere an English shot had brought down an enemy; yet a few paces onwards the line of death was traced, and the whole of the leading

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French section fell as one man! Still the gallant column pressed forward, but no foot could pass that terrible line; the killed and wounded rolled together, until the heap rose nearly even with the parapet, and the living mass behind melted away rather than gave back.

The shouts of the British now rose loudly, but they were confidently answered; and, in half an hour, a second column, more numerous than the first, again crowded the bridge. This time, however, the range was better judged, and ere half the distance was won, the multitude was again torn, shattered, dispersed, and slain; ten or twelve men only succeeded in crossing, and took shelter under the rocks at the brink of the river. The skirmishing was renewed, and a French surgeon coming down to the very foot of the bridge, waved his handkerchief, and commenced dressing the wounded under the hottest fire; nor was his appeal unheeded: every musket turned from him, although his still undaunted countrymen were preparing for a third attempt. The impossibility of forcing the passage was, however, become too apparent, and this last effort, made with feeble numbers and less energy, failed almost as soon as it commenced.'—vol. iii. pp. 287-292.

This affair was soon after followed by the third invasion of Portugal, expressly ordered by Napoleon, the prudence of whose plans is warmly vindicated by Colonel Napier. The instructions of that great warrior were however but feebly seconded by his marshals, who, from personal envy, or other causes, were almost always at variance with each other. The Duke of Wellington had also his difficulties to encounter; if his general officers were usually more obedient than those of the French Emperor, it was by no means uniformly the case. He held no practical controul whatever over the Spanish armies, and although those of Portugal were infinitely better disciplined, they were not always to be depended upon. He had moreover to contend against the open opposition, for open and manly it was at all times, of the Parliamentary antagonists of the ministers, and against the dark intrigues and vindictive deep rooted hostility of the Souza faction at Lisbon. He had not yet acquired that moral elevation, which victory gives to a military chieftain; and so little was known of his real plans at the time when he established the celebrated lines of Torres Vedras, that not only the French generals, but the Spanish and Portuguese people, the opposition at home, and even the ministers, looked upon them as merely intended to cover his retreat and departure from Portugal, threatened now, as every body apprehended, for the last time. So prevalent was this conviction, that an officer of engineers arrived at this period at Lisbon, with a letter of instructions in his pocket from Lord Liverpool, (which at the time was unknown to Wellington) beginning thus:-" As it is probable that the army will embark in September.

Nor was this probability unreasonably looked to, for it would appear that such an event was most likely to have taken place, if Massena had acted cordially with Ney and Regnier, and had not lost, by unaccountable delays, much precious time immediately

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