IN proportion to the general consternation excited not only in Germany but throughout Europe, France itself perhaps not excepted, was the joy and exultation at the result of the two battles on the Danube, of Aspern and Essling. The invincible, it was said, was at · last vanquished; the tide of fortune has turned; Germany is saved; Europe breathes; the world is revived! There was a general expectation that the repulse of Buonaparte to his island would be quickly followed by further disasters, and that the glorious achievements of the Austrians would immediately be followed up by farther successes. But day elapsed after day, and week after week. No intelligence of any farther operation on one side or other: an unequivocal sign that both parties were excessively weakened and exhausted. But while the archduke Charles contented himself with recruiting his army by new levies, as well as some garrisons in Moravia and Bohemia, and strengthening his position on the left bank of the Danube by new works and entrenchments, Buonaparte was allowed for the space of six weeks to restore the spirits, and to reinforce his army by troops called from different quarters, and to make every other preparation

for crossing the Danube; and with a greater force, and greater wisdom or skill too, derived from the experience of the two former battles, to attack the Austrians.

On the morrow after the battle of Essling, when general Hiller was advancing against the French in the isle of Lobau with 60 pieces of heavy cannon, colonel Smolla, the particular favourite of the archduke, came up at full gallop, with orders to the general to desist from his enterprize, as his imperial highness did not think it worth while to waste his troops, or even ammunition, for the possession of the isle of Lobau. He was no doubt aware of the desperate resistance that would be made in so perilous a situation by such a general as Buonaparte. It was said by some, that the archduke, by crossing the Danube, might have cut off the retreat of the French from the island. But if the archduke had ventured on this enterprize, he would have placed himself between Buonaparte and the numerous corps that were advancing rapidly to his assistance. There were some other animadversions on the conduct of the archduke that appear to have been better founded, or at least much more plausible. The first movements of his highness, it was said,

in the present campaign, were faulty. Instead of taking advantage of the great superiority of his numbers, his army being little short of 200,000 men, he marched with his undivided force to one part, namely, Ratisbon, suffered Davoust with his corps to escape, and gave Buonaparte an opportunity of beating the Austrian corps one after another. The operations of the archduke Charles, it was observed, were so il combined, that there were no less than three corps of the Austrian army that were not engaged in the battles of Abensberg, Eckmüll, and Ratisbon; although these French corps or armies were not at a greater distance than one day's march from the Austrian army. When the archduke found it necessary to Cross to the left bank of the Danube by the bridge at Ratisbon, he should have withdrawn the garrison there and cut down the bridge. If he could not withstand the inpetuosity of the French with his whole force, how could it be expected that it should be withstood by 10 or 12,000 troops, including the cavalry and others stationed without the city for covering it, as above related, and the garrison. In truth, the conduct of the archduke on this occasion, bore a strong resemblance to that of sir A. Wellesley, when he chose the option given him by Cuesta, of going or remaining at Talavera. The archduke, instead of attacking Davoust at Ratisbon while Buonaparte was in pursuit of fieldmarshal Hiller to Lintz and Vienna, and of obliging the French, by this diversion, to halt in Bavaria, (where Buonaparte had just the same reasons to defend the passage

of the Danube against the archduke, as the archduke had to defend the passage of the Danube against Buonaparte at Vienna) ran with the main Austrian army along the left bank of the Danube after Buonaparte to Vienna. After thedefeat at Aspern and Essling, Buonaparte extended his right wing along the Danube into Hungary, exercising his troops by excursions, and thus preparing them for a fresh, general, and decisive engagement.

The same inotives that induced Buonaparte to occupy the territory of his adversary to the right, should have induced the Austrians also to have extended their right, and made incursions into the north of Germany. They might have employed in this quarter, besides what regular troops could be spared, 30,000 militia of Bohemia. It should have been their object to place Germany in a state in which that large and populous country alone would have engrossed the whole attention of Buonaparte, namely, a state of insurrection. That the German nation was ripe for such an explosion was manifest from the insurrections that burst forth in so many parts of the German empire, even divided as it was into so many hands. It may easily be conceived what the 80,000 Germans who were forced to fight the battles of Buonaparte against the Austrians could have done, if they had been encouraged by the presence of a great Austrian army. The king of Saxony, who like the rest of Buonaparte's vassal princes had been forced to take up arms against Austria, was stripped of a great part of his dominions by the army sent under the archduke Ferdinand into Poland, and compelled

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to abandon his capital. The Austrians had not only obtained possession of Dresden and Leipsick, but even threatened the territories bestowed on Jerome by his brother Napoleon Buonaparte. A formidable insurrection had started up in Saxony, Westphalia, and Hanover. At the head of the insurgents appeared two men well fitted to unite and to animate them by their characters, their talents, and their influence, colonel Schill and the duke of Brunswick Oels, the only German prince (the Austrians in the present case of course excepted) who needed not to blush in the present struggle for his conduct. Colonel Schill had been raised for his eminent services to the rank of lieutenantcolonel by the king of Prussia, who gave him a regiment, with which he was doing duty at Berlin, when he formed the resolution of again trying his fortune against the common enemy of Germany. He was soon joined by a very considerable number of partizans, calculated in the German newspapers, not yet under the entire control of Buonaparte, at not less than 40,000 men: an exaggeration undoubtedly, but which exaggeration plainly indicated the wishes of the country. That the insurrections headed by colonel Schill and the duke of Brunswick were considered to be formidable by Buonaparte, appears from the circumstance that marshal Kellerman was sent to the Elbe with a force from 30 to 40,000 men to watch and counteract their movements. Colonel Schill, after traversing the whole of the north of Germany in different directions, and after defeating or perplexing the troops sent

against him, by the boldness and vigour of his attacks and the rapidity of his movements, was compelled to take refuge in Stralsund, where the town being forced he was killed with 20 of his officers, in the act of a brave and glorious resistance to overwhelming numbers. Such of his officers as were taken prisoners were tried, condemned, and executed, as déserters from the service of the king of Prussia.-The duke of Brunswick distracted for some time the attention of the French, and arrested the progress of those troops which, but for him, would have reinforced the army of Buonaparte, but he was compelled, with his little corps, not exceeding 2000 men, to retreat to the shores of the German ocean, where he, with his troops, was received on board some British ships of war, and conveyed safely to England. The tide of war had been turned against the Austrians in Poland and Saxony; but it was stemmed and driven back by the Austrian general, Kinmaire, who defeated the French general Junot, and defeated the Saxons, Hollanders, and Westphalians, under the authority and orders of king Jerome.

In a word, the state of affairs in the north of Germany was such as to invite the archduke to turn his main force towards that quarter, where he might have gained as much territory as Buonaparte did to the south of Vienna, and where his power might have been consolidated by an easy co-operation with England. Ideas of this kind had been entertained by the emperor Francis, who had issued proclamations for rousing the exertions of the whole of the German nations; but after the P 3

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successes of Aspern and Essling, insurrections began to be considered as dangerous to the predominating influence of Austria in Germany. The archduke said, "It is on the field of battle that we must contend with Buonaparte; thus Germany shall be freed without the dangers of insurrection ;" which was, in other words, to say that all Germany as well as the glory of having defended it, should appertain solely to the Austrians.

After the disastrous battles of Eckmüll and Ratisbon, the archduke John was recalled with his army from Italy, where he had at first met with rapid success, to form a junction, or to co-operate with the main Austrian army under the command of Charles on the Danube. He had taken Padua and Vicenza, crossed the Adige, and threatened Venice; but he was stopped in his career by Eugene Beauharnois, viceroy of Italy, who, reinforced by 10,000 men from Tuscany, retook Padua and Vicenza, crossed the Brenta, drove the Austrians from the Pavia, and pursued them in their retreat across the Tagliamento. Two engagements took place and several skirmishes. The Austrians sustained the greatest loss of men; but they every where presented an undauntcd front to the enemy. The viceroy of Italy still hung on the rear of the retreating Austrians. It had now indeed become as necessary for the French army of Italy to hasten their junction with the main army under Buonaparte, as

it had been before for the archduke John to form a junction with his brother Charles. On the 14th of June, the anniversary of the battle of Marengo,* the two armies came to a third, and that a very severe and important engagement, near Raab. The numbers of Eugene Beauharnois's army, according to the French bulletins, was thirty-five, and that of the archduke John fifty thousand. According to the Austrian accounts, the combined Austrian army was not more than 36,000 strong, while that of the French was 50,000. The combined Austrian army was composed of the army of Italy, now reduced greatly in numbers, 10,000 men drawn from different garrisons in Hungary, five or six thousand of the corps of general Jellacheik, and other columns that had come from the Tyrol through the Gorges of Carinthia, and finally the Hungarian insurrection, from 12 to 15,000 infantry and cavalry. The Hungarians were conducted to the army of John by his brother, the archduke Palatine, who was present in the engagement ; but they were under the immediate orders of general Haddick. The battle began about 2 o'clock, p. m. victory was long doubtful; but in the space of four hours it was decided. That part of the archduke's army which consisted of the undisciplined troops of the Hungarian insurrection, and formed the greater part of the right wing, gave way before the impetuous at

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tack of the French soldiers and the dreadful fire of the French artillery. The loss of the Austrians, according to the French, was 3000 killed and 3000 prisoners, while their own did not exceed 900 in killed and wounded. The Austrian bulletin stated that the loss of the French was 2000 killed or wounded, and 400 taken prisoners; their loss they admitted, in killed or wounded, was 1300 men; they also admitted that they had lost some prisoners, but the number of these was not stated. The exaggerations of the gazettes and bulletimes had now become commonly so excessive that it is a wonder that the French and Austrian accounts of the battle of Raab do not differ still more widely. It is of no importance to calculate the exact numbers either of those engaged or those lost in this action on either side. The French were decidedly victorious: the Austrians were forced to save themselves by flight. The archduke John retreated to Comorn, a town in Hungary, at the confluence of the Waag and the Danube, so strongly fortified that it never had been taken, in order to secure and facilitate a junction with the grand Austrian army. On the 26th day of May the most advanced parties of the French army of Italy came up with the most advanced posts of the grand French dfmy, and early in June their muction was completed. The French army occupied a long line

from Lintz to Raab.

On the 4th of July the different divisions were called in, and the whole of the French army concentrated in and about the island of Lo

bau. Never did the strength and resources of Buonaparte's mind, whether in planning campaigns, or giv ing orders for battle, or improving to his own advantage every occurrence or accident in the heat of action, appear in so striking a light as during the solemn pause that intervened between the battles of Aspern and Essling, and the great and decisive engagement that took place there six weeks after. The first step towards an ascendancy over other men, is to acquire the perfect command of one's self. Buonaparte commanded his own passions, restrained the natural fire and impetuosity of his temper, assumed not only a calm but cheerful aspect, and set himself to recover and raise the spirits of his discomfited army by a series of bulletins, in which he made no scruple to vilify the Austrians, whose successes he affected to ascribe to the great swelling of the river, which he stiled general Danube. He exaggerated, the losses which the Austrians had sustained from the opening of the campaign to the battle of Raab ; congratulated them on the junction that had been formed with the army of Italy; and confidently predicted complete success in his intended attack, as general Bertrand would soon triumph over the only general, at all formidable to the French, namely generalDanube. In an incredibly short time general count Bertrand raised three bridges between the island he occupied and the left bank of the river.In order to protect them against fire ships, stockadoes, raised on piles, were placed 250 fathoms

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