ing near the frontier fortresses of Catalonia and Navarre; or concentrating their force in the northern provinces of Gallicia, Asturias, and Biscay. To retain a sure footing in Spain by keeping open the communication between Bayonne and Madrid; retaining possession of the capital and other towns in the interior of Spain; the northern provinces, together with Navarre and Catalonia; and to complete the conquest of all that lay on the east side of the Ebro, by reducing the fortified cities of Saragossa and Gerona, were the objects that seemed to bound the views of the French in Spain during the first part of 1809, and until the decisive battle, July 5th, of Wagram on the Danube.

But while hostilities were carried on with alternate success in Asturias and Biscay, and several important places were taken, and retaken by the joint exertions of the Spanish patriots, supported by English ships of war, a line of which extended from Cape Finisterre to the Garonne, the French were, at the close of June, obliged to evacuate both Ferrol and Corunna, St. Jago de Compostella, the capital of Gallicia, fell into the hands of the patriots. St. Vigo too, garrisoned by 1,400 French, surrendered to the Gallicians, supported by two English frigates. The French were afterwards driven from the towns of Tay and Viana. In a word, all Gallicia was evacuated by the French. The corps under marshal Soult having evacuated Oporto, together with that of Ney, which had evacuated Corunna and Ferrol, proceeded through Leon towards Madrid, threatened by for

midable preparations on the part of both the Spaniards and theEnglish. Three armies were formed for acting, it would seem, in concert, (rather in conjunction) with each other, against the French, and even advancing on Madrid. One of these armies was commanded by general Cuesta, another by general Venegas, and the third, which was the auxiliary British army, by sir Arthur Wel lesley.

There was a French army in La Mancha, under general Sebas tiani; and one under Victor, duke of Belluno, in New Castille. These two bodies drew nearer both to each other and the capital, and concentrated their force at a short distance and to the south-west of Toledo; a position admirably well chosen for making head against the force of the allies, cutting off their effective communication with each other, and attacking them in detail.

The position of the allied army was as follows. Cuesta, with what might be called the central army, (though all the three armies were at a considerable and too great a distance from each other) was contiguous to Talavera del Reyna, from whence the French had just retreated. Venegas, with the right wing, was descending from the heights, called the Mountains of Toledo. Sir Arthur Wellesley, with the left, occupied a position north of the Tagus, in the vicinity of Monte Ciaros. Cuesta had under his immediate orders about 38,000 men, of which 12,000 were cavalry; the right wing, commanded by Venegas, was 26,000 strong; and the left, under sir Arthur Wellesley, 30,000.

By

By this rapid view, this bare outline, our readers may be enabled to trace the principal links in the chain of events that brought the hostile powers in Spain to measure their main strength with each other, more easily than if the attention to these principal links had been distracted by a vast number of intervening circumstances and events of subordinate and inferior importance. Nevertheless, at the point when the contending armies, gradually concentrated, were placed in relative positions that were to lead to a succession of battles decisive of the campaign, (the only point in which its history begins to possess any great degree of interest) it may be proper to pause, and to take a brief retrospect of such of the occurrences as were most interesting in themselves, or were most immediately and materially connected with the main action.

On the side of Portugal, general Beresford, with the rank and title of field marshal, was appointed generalissimo, and was employed with great activity and success in organizing and disciplining a Portuguese army. The general was in the laudable practice of occasionally issuing bulletins for the information of the Portuguese army and nation, in which he communicated events both favourable and unfavourable, and took occasion to illustrate the happy effects of discipline and good order on the one hand, and the fatal consequences of insubordination and anarchy on the other. Chaves, a frontier town of Portugal, in the province of Tralosmontes, a most important military station, and garrisoned, it was said,

VOL. LI.

by upwards of 10,000 French, was besieged by a numerous force of Spanish patriots, under the command of general Silviera. The citadel of Chaves surrendered by capitulation on the 25th of March. During this siege the communica tion between the French and the north of Portugal, was wholly obstructed by the patriots on the frontiers.

The character of the war in Spain, at this period, is well exemplified by the complete victory gained, 28th of March, at Medellin, by marshal Victor over general Cuesta; and the celerity with which the Spanish general was enabled to reassemble and recruit his broken and dispersed army, and again to make head against the enemy. On the day above mentioned, the Spanish general found the whole division under Victor, consisting of about 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, drawn up in front of Medellin, a town on the Guadiana, in the province of Estramadura. The French infantry, formed into close columns presented a formidable front to their opponents for repelling an attack; and at the same time one fitted for making an attack, if the French should deem it advisable to risk one. The flanks of the infantry were covered by the 'cavalry, and in their front were raised six batteries. Against the enemy, so drawn up and defended, general Cuesta did not hesitate to commence a rapid and general attack. His infantry advanced with great steadiness and gallantry, notwithstanding the tremendous fire from the batteries in front of the enemy. The manoeuvres which he directed for the purpose of

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gaining possession of these batteries, were executed with a promptitude, precision, and regularity, that would have done honour to the most veteran and experienced troops. The left wing of the Spanish infantry advanced within pistol shot of the French. The first battery was already taken. The French cavalry made a charge, in order to regain possession of it. Two regiments of Spanish cavalry and two squadrons of chasseurs were ordered to oppose them. But, instead of executing this order, the whole, both cavalry and chasseurs, immediately wheeled round, fled before the enemy, and threw the left wing of the Spanish army into confusion. The French, perceiving this, directed their undivided efforts against the right and the centre of the Spaniards. General Cuesta did every thing in his power for the restoration of order in his left wing, and to check and repel the attack on his centre and right. His efforts were in vain he was obliged to retreat. Of this battle of Medellin we find an account in the gazette of king Joseph, dated Madrid, April 18. "Ten thousand Spaniards have been killed, and four thousand made prisoners by our light troops; the rest saved themselves by flight in the best manner they could. Their whole artillery, to the number of twentyfive pieces, with six standards, fell into our hands. The greater part of the upper officers and staffofficers were left on the field. Our loss, in comparison of that of the enemy, appears incredibly small, as this glorious day cost us only three hundred men. The army of Cuesta, and a part of that of

Andalusia are by this fortunate event annihilated. This victory secures us the conquest of Andalusia, the whole of which will be shortly in possession of our troops." Great allowances are to be made for French exaggeration now reduced to a system; the proportion of which to the truth some ingenious men from an accumulation and combination of data have attempted to calculate. But it was admitted on all hands, that the loss of the Spaniards in this engagement was very great: upwards of 170 officers were either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners; and the loss in rank and file bore rather a greater than the usual proportion to this number of officers.

The supreme junta issued from Seville a decree, declaring to the Spanish nation that the general of the army of Estramadura and the corps who had withstood the enemy before Medellin, had deserved well of their country. Cuesta was raised to the rank of captain general; the officers of his army of whom he reported favourably were advanced one degree; the soldiers were decorated with a badge of honour, and re ceived for a month from the battle double pay.

In this decree no notice was taken of the officers and men to whose misconduct the victory of the enemy was owing; but general Cuesta, in his general orders, suspended, or, according to some accounts, cashiered three of his colonels, and severely reprimanded the two squadrons of chasseurs and two regiments of cavalry. The pay of these regiments and squadrons was reduced for the space of a month, and the surplus resulting

from

from this operation formed part of the fund for granting double pay for the same space of time to the soldiers who had sustained with honour the Spanish character. After the defeat and flight of the Spaniards from Medellin, the French, under Victor, immediately entered Merida, where, and be-, tween which place and Badajoz, they remained for a considerable time stationary; after which they marched from the Guadiana to the Tagus, and, having forced the bridge of Alcantara, proceeded down the river with their face towards Abrantes and Liston. Cuesta on the confines of Estramadura and Andalusia re-assembled and strengthened his broken army, which increased fast in numbers, although they were, for some time, greatly in want of arms. It is the noble character of the Spanish nation to rise under misfortune. Though, like all raw and undisciplined troops, they were subject to panics, and were easily drawn to follow any example of flight, they were as easily rallied. Though dispersed, they re-assembled. Though vanquished, the unconquerable will remained to defend their country at the risk of their lives. It is this invincible spirit of liberty, which, by protracting the war, and keeping up a warlike disposition and warlike habits, may be favoured by some of those events which we call chance, that opens a gleam of hope at the present moment that, the Spanish cause, even against such fearful odds, may yet be ultimately triumphant.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had arrived at Lisbon on the 22d of April, proceeded on the 28th to

join and take the command of the army, whose head quarters were at Coimbra, and advanced against Oporto. At the same time, marshal Beresford, at the head of a body of Portuguese, marched to the upper Douro. Marshal Soult, who commanded there, knowing how unequal he was to its defence against an English army of superior force, the forces under general Beresford, and the spirit of the country, determined to evacuate Oporto and proceed through Leon to join the other French corps in Gallicia, according to the general system of concentration adopted after the certain and immediate prospect of an Austrian war, as already stated. The marshal, that he might effect his retreat with the least danger of being overtaken by the English, adopted a curious stratagem, which was found not to be altogether unsuccessful. While he talked loudly of defending Oporto to the last extremity, certain of receiving all necessary succour and support from his sovereign and nation, he sent out one detachment of his army after another, on pretence of exercising. The commanding officers of these alone were entrusted with the secret orders, to send back a few companies, by way of a blind, but to march the main body, with all possible expedition, in an opposite direction. Thus the marshal stole away from Oporto; but, at the same time, from the view, it was conjectured, of drawing sir Arthur further on in pursuit of him, thereby to give general Victor an opportunity of pushing down the Tagus into the south of Portugal, or from whatever other motive, he left his rear N 2

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guard on the left side of the Douro. When the advanced guard of the British army arrived at Verdas Novas, they fell in with the outposts of the enemy, consisting of about 4000 infantry, and a few squadrons of cavalry, strongly posted in the heights above Grijon, having their front covered by wood and broken ground; but their flank was soon turned by a brigade under the command of general Murray; and, while their right was vigorously attacked by a Portuguese brigade, their centre was driven in by a body of riflemen, drawn from different companies, under the direction of major Way. On the night of May 11th, the rear guard of the French crossed the Douro, destroyed the bridge over that river and were closely pursued by our army, which also crossed the Douro, notwithstanding all the endeavours of the French to oppose it at the ferry of Ovintas. About four or five miles above the towns of Oporto and Villa Nova, our troops, after sustaining repeated attacks, made their appearance on both the left and the right flanks of the French, who then retired, as the dispatch to our government states, in the utmost confusion towards Ama ranthe, leaving behind them five pieces of cannon, eight tumbrils of ammunition, and many prisoners. They were pursued by the British to a short distance, and some skirmishing took place between our advanced guard and the rear of the enemy, in which it was stated we had uniformly the advantage; Soult, however,

made good his retreat, it would appear, with very little molestation, though it was said, that, in order to render his flight more rapid and successful, he was under the necessity of abandoning the greater part of his artillery and baggage. He was pursued by general Beresford as far as Örense.

When sir Arthur Wellesley's letter to lord Castlereagh, giving an account of these and other particulars respecting the evacuation of Oporto, and what had been done by our army, arrived, his lordship ordered the Park and Tower guns to be fired.

Sir A. Wellesley, after he gave up the pursuit of Soult, immediately commenced his March to the south of Portugal, where his presence had become necessary to watch the motions of Victor.

Marshal Ney, when he evacuated Corunna, at first took the road towards Vigo. Thither also a body of Spaniards, under the Condé de Norona, were on their way, with the twofold view of obtaining supplies, of which they stood greatly in need, and occupying an advantageous defensive position. On the 7th of June the opposite armies met at the bridge of St. Payo, on the small river of Soto-major, within three leagues of Vigo. The Spaniards were 9000 in number, whereof 6000 were armed; and they had some small field artillery, with two 18 pounders. The number of the French was 8000, of which 2500 was cavalry; for artillery, they had only five 12 pounders. After repeated attacks on the Spaniards,