omnia, si bene instituantur, præsto erunt magna legum obscuritati subsidia. De Perscriptione Judiciorum. APHORISMUS 73. Ante omnia, judicia reddita in curiis supremis et principalibus atque causis gravioribus, præsertim dubiis, quæque aliquid habent difficultatis aut novitatis, diligenter et cum fide excipiunto. Judicia enim anchoræ legum sunt, ut leges reipublicæ. APHORISMUS 74. Modus hujusmodi judicia excipiendi et in scripta referendi, talis esto. Casus præcise, judicia ipsa exacte, perscribito; rationes judiciorum, quas adduxerunt judices, adjicito; casuum ad exemplum adductorum authoritatem cum casibus principalibus ne commisceto; de advocatorum perorationibus, nisi quidpiam in iis fuerit admodum eximium, sileto. APHORISMUS 75. Personæ quæ hujusmodi judicia excipiant, ex advocatis maxime doctis sunto, et honorarium liberale ex publico excipiunto. Judices ipsi ab hujusmodi perscriptionibus abstinento; ne forte opinionibus propriis addicti, et authoritate propria freti, limites referendarii transcendant. APHORISMUS 76. Judicia illa in ordine et serie temporis digerito, non per methodum et titulos. Sunt enim scripta ejusmodi tanquam historiæ aut narrationes legum. Neque solum acta ipsa, sed et tempora ipsorum, judici prudenti lucem præbent. De Scriptoribus Authenticis. APHORISMUS 77. Ex legibus ipsis, quæ Jus Commune constituunt; deinde ex constitutionibus sive statutis; tertio loco ex judiciis perscriptis, Corpus Juris tantummodo constituitor. Præter illa, alia authentica aut nulla sunto, aut parce recipiuntor. APHORISMUS 78. Nihil tam interest Certitudinis Legum (de qua nunc tractamus) quam ut scripta authentica intra fines moderatos coërceantur, et facessat multitudo enormis authorum et doctorum in jure; unde laceratur sententia legum, judex fit attonitus, processus immortales, atque advocatus ipse, cum tot libros per legere et vincere non possit, compendia sectatur. Glossa fortasse aliqua bona, et ex scriptoribus classicis pauci, vel potius scriptorum paucorum pauculæ portiones, recipi possint pro authenticis. Reliquorum nihilominus maneat usus nonnullus in bibliothecis, ut eorum tractatus inspiciant judices aut advocati, cum opus fuerit; sed in causis agendis, in foro citare eos non permittitor, nec in authoritatem transeunto. De Libris Auxiliaribus. APHORISMUS 79. At Scientiam Juris et Practicam auxiliaribus libris ne nudanto, sed potius instruunto.' Ii sex in genere sunto. Institutiones. De Verborum Significatione. De Regulis Juris.2 Antiquitates Legum. Summæ. Agendi Formulæ. APHORISMUS 80. Præparandi sunt juvenes et novitii ad scientiam et ardua juris altius et commodius haurienda et imbibenda, per Institutiones. Institutiones illas ordine claro et perspicuo componito. In illis ipsis universum Jus Privatum percurrito; non alia omittendo, in aliis plus satis immorando, sed ex singulis quædam breviter delibando, ut ad Corpus Legum perlegendum accessuro nil se ostendat prorsus novum, sed levi aliqua notione præceptum. Jus Publicum in Institutionibus ne attingito, verum illud ex fontibus ipsis hauriatur. APHORISMUS 81. Commentarium de Vocabulis Juris conficito. In explicatione ipsorum, et sensu reddendo, ne curiose nimis aut laboriose versator. Neque enim hoc agitur, ut diffinitiones verborum quærantur exacte, sed explicationes tantum quæ legendis juris libris viam aperiant faciliorem. Tractatum autem istum per literas alphabeti ne digerito; id indici alicui relinquito; sed collocentur simul verba quæ circa eandem rem versantur, ut alterum alteri sit juvamento ad intelligendum. APHORISMUS 82. Ad Certitudinem Legum facit (si quid aliud) tractatus bonus et diligens de Diversis Regulis Juris. Is dignus est, qui maximis ingeniis et prudentissimis jure-consultis committatur. Neque enim placent quæ in hoc genere extant. Colligendæ instruito.-J. S. So in the original edition: q. nudato .. 2 "De verborum significatione" and "De diversis regulis antiqui juris," are respectively the penultimate and the last Tituli in the Digest. autem sunt regulæ, non tantum notæ et vulgatæ, sed et aliæ magis subtiles et reconditæ, quæ ex legum et rerum judicatarum harmonia extrahi possint; quales in rubricis optimis quandoque inveniuntur; suntque dictamina generalia rationis, quæ per materias legis diversas percurrunt, et sunt tanquam Saburra Juris. APHORISMUS 83. At singula Juris Scita aut Placita non intelligantur pro Regulis, ut fieri solet satis imperite. Hoc enim si reciperetur, quot Leges tot Regulæ; Lex enim nil aliud quam Regula Imperans. Verum eas pro Regulis habeto, quæ in forma ipsa justitiæ hærent: unde, ut plurimum, per Jura Civilia diversarum rerumpublicarum eædem Regulæ fere reperiuntur; nisi forte propter relationem ad formas politiarum varient. APHORISMUS 84. Post Regulam brevi et solido verborum complexu enuntiatam, adjiciantur Exempla, et Decisiones Casuum maxime luculentæ, ad Explicationem; Distinctiones et Exceptiones, ad Limitationem; Cognata, ad Ampliationem ejusdem Regulæ. APHORISMUS 85. Recte jubetur, ut non ex Regulis Jus sumatur; sed ex Jure quod est, Regula fiat. Neque enim ex Verbis Regulæ petenda est probatio, ac si esset Textus Legis. Regula enim Legem (ut acus nautica polos) indicat, non statuit. APHORISMUS 86. Præter Corpus ipsum Juris, juvabit etiam Antiquitates Legum invisere; quibus licet evanuerit authoritas, manet tamen reverentia. Pro antiquitatibus autem legum habeantur scripta circa leges et judicia, sive illa fuerint edita sive non, quæ ipsum Corpus Legum tempore præcesserunt. Earum siquidem jactura facienda non est. Itaque ex iis utilissima quæque excerpito (multa enim invenientur inania et frivola), eaque in unum volumen redigito; ne antiquæ fabulæ, ut loquitur Trebonianus, cum Legibus ipsis misceantur. APHORISMUS 87. Practicæ vero plurimum interest, ut jus universum digeratur ordine in Locos et Titulos; ad quos subito (prout dabitur occasio) recurrere quis possit, veluti in promptuarium paratum ad præsentes usus. Hujusmodi Libri Summarum et ordinant 1 "Non ex regulâ jus sumatur ; sed ex jure quod est, regula fiat."§ De diversis regulis antiqui juris, 1. 1. - Paulus, D. sparsa, et abbreviant fusa et prolixa in lege. Cavenduin autem est, ne summæ istæ reddant homines promptos ad practicam, cessatores in scientia ipsa. Earum enim officium est tale, ut ex iis recolatur jus, non perdiscatur. Summæ autem omnino magna diligentia, fide, et judicio sunt conficienda, ne furtum faciant legibus. APHORISMUS 88. Formulas Agendi diversas in unoquoque genere colligito. Nam et practicæ hoc interest; et certe pandunt illæ oracula et occulta legum. Sunt enim non pauca quæ latent in legibus, at in formulis agendi melius et fusius perspiciuntur; instar pugni et palmæ. De Responsis et Consultis. APHORISMUS 89. Dubitationes Particulares quæ de tempore in tempus emergunt dirimendi et solvendi, aliqua ratio iniri debet. Durum enim est ut ii qui ab errore cavere cupiant ducem viæ non inveniant, verum ut actus ipsi periclitentur, neque sit aliquis ante rem peractam juris prænoscendi modus. APHORISMUS 90. Responsa Prudentum, quæ petentibus dantur de jure sive ab advocatis sive a doctoribus, tanta valere authoritate ut ab eorum sententia judici recedere non sit licitum, non placet.' Jura a Juratis Judicibus sumunto. APHORISMUS 91. Tentari judicia per causas et personas fictas, ut eo modo experiantur homines qualis futura sit legis norma, non placet.2 1 By the Roman Jurists the Responsa prudentium are reckoned among the Fontes Juris, but there are few points in the history of Roman law on which it is more difficult to form a satisfactory opinion. We have no satisfactory information either as to the form in which these Responsa were given, or as to the degree of authority with which they were invested. The common opinion is, that they received absolute force of law in virtue of an ordinance of Augustus, and that more precise regulations with respect to cases in which a diversity of opinion existed were made by Hadrian. The connexion between them and the law of citations of Honorius and Valentinian is also a matter of much obscurity. See Böcking's Pandekten, i. p. 36. Walter, Gesch, d. R. Rechts, § 409. and 421. Hugo, Gesch. d. R. Rechts, § 313. and 385. * Lord Ellenborough refused to try a case in which a bet had been made on a point of law. He asked, it is said, to see the record, and threw it down "with much indignation." Tradition adds that he threw it at the head of the plaintiff's attorney. Until lately, when it was found necessary in proceedings in equity to have the decision of a jury on a question of fact, recourse was had to the machinery of a feigned issue; that is, an action was brought on an imaginary wager as to the truth or falsehood of an agreed upon statement of facts. Possibly in Bacon's time a similar course may have been adopted in order to obtain the opinion of the judges on points of law. In Dedecorat enim majestatem legum, et pro prævaricatione quapiam censenda est. Judicia autem aliquid habere ex scena deforme est. APHORISMUS 92. Judicum igitur solummodo, tam Judicia quam Responsa et Consulta sunto. Illa de litibus pendentibus, hæc de arduis juris quæstionibus in thesi. Ea Consulta, sive in privatis rebus sive in publicis, a Judicibus ipsis ne poscito (id enim si fiat, judex transeat in advocatum); sed a Principe, aut Statu. Ab illis ad Judices demandentur. Judices vero, tali authoritate freti, disceptationes advocatorum, vel ab his quorum interest adhibitorum, vel a Judicibus ipsis (si opus sit) assignatorum, et argumenta ex utraque parte audiunto; et, re deliberata, jus expediunto et declaranto. Consulta hujusmodi inter Judicia referunto et edunto, et paris authoritatis sunto.1 De Prælectionibus. APHORISMUS 93. Prælectiones de Jure, atque Exercitationes eorum qui juris studiis incumbunt et operam dant, ita instituuntor et ordinantor, ut omnia tendant ad quæstiones et controversias de jure sedandas potius quam excitandas. Ludus enim (ut nunc fit) fere apud omnes instituitur et aperitur ad altercationes et quæstiones de jure multiplicandas, tanquam ostentandi ingenii causa. Atque hoc vetus est malum. Etenim etiam apud antiquos modern times the practice has been in accordance with what he a little further on recommends; the point of law being referred to the judges directly, who, after hearing counsel, certify their opinion of it to the Chancellor. Bacon refers to the practice of extra-judicial consultations as it existed in his own time. It does not, I believe, appear that it was ever the practice for private persons to obtain through the intervention of the Privy Council authoritative decisions on legal questions, but it is well known that the Court occasionally obtained "præjudicia" from the judges on points in which it was itself interested. The effect of this practice in promoting judicial servility is well seen in the case of ship-money; the extra-judicial decision of the judges in favour of its legality being unanimous, whereas when the case came on in the exchequer chamber, it was affirmed to be legal by a bare majority of seven against five. [I cannot think that Bacon alludes to extra-judicial consultations of this kind; which were conducted in a different way from those he recommends, and resorted to for a different purpose. The object of the Government in asking the judges' opinions on the case privately before commencing a prosecution, was to ascertain that the case was a good one, and so avoid the scandal and disrepute which then attended the failure of a Crown prosecution. The object of the proceeding which Bacon here advocates, is to provide a means of settling any disputed point of law, without either waiting for a real cause in which it may be involved, or getting up a fictitious one; and the manner of it is to be public and formal. The case is to be regularly argued and the judgment formally recorded. — J. S.] |