GENERAL PREFACE ΤΟ BACON'S PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS. BY ROBERT LESLIE ELLIS. (1) OUR knowledge of Bacon's method is much less complete than it is commonly supposed to be. Of the Novum Organum, which was to contain a complete statement of its nature and principles, we have only the first two books; and although in other parts of Bacon's writings, as for instance in the Cogitata et Visa de Interpretatione Natura, many of the ideas contained in these books recur in a less systematic form, we yet meet with but few indications of the nature of the subjects which were to have been discussed in the others. It seems not improbable that some parts of Bacon's system were never perfectly developed even in his own mind. However this may be, it is certain that an attempt to determine what his method, taken as a whole, was or would have been, must necessarily involve a conjectural or hypothetical element; and it is, I think, chiefly because this circumstance has not been sufficiently recognised, that the idea of Bacon's philosophy has generally speaking been but imperfectly apprehended. (2.) Of the subjects which were to have occupied the remainder of the Novum Organum we learn something from a passage at the end of the second book. "Nunc vero," it is said at the conclusion of the doctrine of prerogative instances, "ad adminicula et rectificationes inductionis, et deinceps ad concreta, et latentes processus, et latentes schematismos, et reliqua quæ aphorismo XXI ordine proposuimus, pergendum." On referring to the twenty-first aphorism we find a sort of table of contents of the whole work. "Dice X mus itaque primo loco, de prærogativis instantiarum; secundo, (3.) Bacon's method was essentially inductive. He rejected the use of syllogistic or deductive reasoning, except when practical applications were to be made of the conclusions, axiomata, to which the inquirer had been led by a systematic process of induction. "Logica quæ nunc habetur inutilis est ad inventionem scientiaruın. . . Spes est una in inductione verâ.”1 It is to be observed that wherever Bacon speaks of an "ascending" process, he is to be understood to mean induction, of which it is the character to proceed from that which is nobis notius to that which is notius simpliciter. Contrariwise when he speaks of a descent, he always refers to the correlative process of deduction. Thus when in the Partis secundæ Delineatio he says, "meminerint homines in inquisitione activâ necesse esse rem per scalam descensoriam (cujus usum in contemplativâ sustulimus) confici: omnis enim operatio in individuis versatur quæ infimo loco sunt," we are to understand that in Bacon's system deduction is only admissible in the inquisitio activa; that is, in practical applications of the results of induction. Similarly in the Distributio Operis he says, "Rejicimus syllogismum; neque id solùm quoad principia (ad quæ nec illi eam adhibent) sed etiam quoad propositiones medias." Everything was to be established by induction. "In constituendo autem axiomate forma inductionis alia quàm adhuc in usu fuit excogitanda est, eaque non ad principia tantùm (quæ vocant) probanda et invenienda, sed etiam ad axiomata minora, et media, denique omnia."2 (4.) It is necessary to determine the relation in which Bacon conceived his method to stand to ordinary induction. Both methods set out" a sensu et particularibus," and acquiesce “in 1 Nov. Org. i. 11. and 14. 2 Nov. Org. i. 105. maximè generalibus;" but while ordinary induction proceeds "per enumerationem simplicem," by a mere enumeration of particular cases, "et precario concludit et periculo exponitur ab instantiâ contradictoriâ," the new method" naturam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; et deinde post negativas tot quot sufficiunt super affirmativas concludere." A form of induction was to be introduced, "quæ ex aliquibus generaliter concludat ita ut instantiam contradictoriam inveniri non 66 posse demonstretur."3 In strong contrast with this method stands "the induction which the logicians speak of," which "is utterly vicious and incompetent. ..." For to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory, is no conclusion, but a conjecture." "And this form, to say truth, is so gross, as it had not been possible for wits so subtile as have managed these things to have offered it to the world, but that they trusted to their theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful towards particulars."4 We thus see what is meant by the phrase "quot sufficiunt" in the passage which has been cited from the Novum Organum ; it means as many as may suffice in order to the attainment of certainty," it being necessary to have a method of induction, "quæ experientiam solvat et separet, et per exclusiones et rejectiones debitas necessario concludat."5 Absolute certainty is therefore one of the distinguishing characters of (1) the Baconian induction. Another is that it renders all men ( equally capable, or nearly so, of attaining to the truth. "Nostra verò inveniendi scientias ea est ratio ut non multum ingeniorum acumini et robori relinquatur; sed quæ ingenia et intellectus ferè exæquet;" and this is illustrated by the difficulty of describing a circle liberâ manu, whereas every one can do it with a pair of compasses. "Omninò similis est nostra ratio." The cause to which this peculiarity is owing, is sufficiently indicated by the illustration: the method "exæquat ingenia," "cùm omnia per certissimas regulas et demonstrationes transigat." (5.) Absolute certainty, and a mechanical mode of procedure 1 Nov. Org. i. 22. * Cogitata et Visa, § 18. 2 Nov. Org. i. 105. * Advancement of Learning. The corresponding passage in the De Augm. is in the 2nd chap. of the 5th book. ♪ Distrib. Operis, § 10. Nov. Org. i. 61., and comp. i. 122. Also the Inquisitio legitima de Motu, and Valerius Terminus, c 19. (11) * to us. such that all men should be capable of employing it, are thus two great features of the Baconian method. His system can never be rightly understood if they are neglected, and any explanation of it which passes them over in silence leaves unexplained the principal difficulty which that system presents But another difficulty takes the place of the one which is thus set aside. It becomes impossible to justify or to understand Bacon's assertion that his method was essentially new. "Nam nos," he says in the preface to the Novum Organum, "si profiteamur nos meliora afferre quam antiqui, eandem quam illi viam ingressi, nullâ verborum arte efficere possimus, quin inducatur quædam ingenii, vel excellentiæ, vel facultatis comparatio, sive contentio.... Verùm cùm per nos illud agatur, ut alia omnino via intellectui aperiatur illis intentata et incognita, commutata tota jam ratio est," &c. He elsewhere speaks of himself as being "in hâc re plane protopirus, et vestigia nullius sequutus."1 Surely this language would be out of place, if the difference between him and those who had gone before him related merely to matters of detail; as, for instance, that his way of arranging the facts of observation was more convenient than theirs, and his way of applying an inductive process to them more systematic. And it need not be remarked that induction in itself was no novelty at all. The nature of the act of induction is as clearly stated by Aristotle as by any later writer. Bacon's design was surely much larger than it would thus appear to have been. Whoever considers his writings without reference to their place in the history of philosophy will I think be convinced that he aimed at giving a wholly new method,-a method universally applicable, and in all cases infallible. By this method, all the knowledge which the human mind is capable of receiving might be attained, and attained without unnecessary labour. Men were no longer to wander from the truth in helpless uncertainty. The publication of this new doctrine was the Temporis Partus Masculus; it was as the rising of a new sun, before which "the borrowed beams of moon and stars" were to fade away and disappear.2 (6.) That the wide distinction which Bacon conceived to exist between his own method and any which had previously Nov. Org. i 113, ? See, for instance, the Præfatio Generalis, where Bacon compares his method to the mariner's compass, until the discovery of which no wide sea could be crossed; an image probably connected with his favourite device of a ship passing through the pillars of Hercules, with the motto "Plus ultra." In been known has often been but slightly noticed by those who have spoken of his philosophy, arises probably from a wish to recognise in the history of the scientific discoveries of the last two centuries the fulfilment of his hopes and prophecies. One of his early disciples however, who wrote before the scientific movement which commenced about Bacon's time had assumed a definite form and character I mean Dr. Hooke has explicitly adopted those portions of Bacon's doctrine which have seemingly been as a stumbling-block to his later followers. Hooke's General Scheme or Idea of the Present State of Natural Philosophy', which is in many respects the best commentary on Bacon, we find it asserted that in the pursuit of knowledge, the intellect "is continually to be assisted by some method or engine which shall be as a guide to regulate its actions, so as that it shall not be able to act amiss. Of this engine no man except the incomparable Verulam hath had any thoughts, and he indeed hath promoted it to a very good pitch." Something however still remained to be added to this engine or art of invention, to which Hooke gives the name of philosophical algebra. He goes on to say, "I cannot doubt but that if this art be well prosecuted and made use of, an ordinary capacity with industry will be able to do very much more than has yet been done, and to show that even physical and natural inquiries as well as mathematical and geometrical will be capable also of demonstration; so that henceforward the business of invention will not be so much the effect of acute wit, as of a serious and industrious prosecution." Here the absolute novelty of Bacon's method, its demonstrative character, and its power of reducing all minds to nearly the same level, are distinctly recognised. (7.) Before we examine the method of which Bacon proposed to make use, it is necessary to determine the nature of the problems to which it was, for the most part at least, to be applied. In other words, we must endeavour to determine the idea which he had formed of the nature of science. Throughout his writings, science and power are spoken of as correlative" in idem coincidunt;" and the reason of this is that Bacon always assumed that the knowledge of the cause would in almost all cases enable us to produce the observed effect. We shall see hereafter how this assumption connected Published posthumously in 1705. 2 Present State of Nat. Phil. pp. 6, 7. |