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ART. the production of all infects whatsoever is in the way of generation: heat and corruption do only hatch those eggs, that infects leave to a prodigious quantity every where. So that this, which is the only fpecious thing in the whole plea for atheifm, is now given up by the univerfal confent of all the enquirers into nature.

And now to bring the force of this long argument to a head: If this world was neither from all eternity in the ftate in which it is at prefent, nor could fall into it by chance or accident, then it must follow, that it was put into the state in which we now fee it, by a Being of vaft power and wifdom. This is the great and folid argument on which Religion refts; and it receives a vaft acceffion of ftrength from this, that we plainly fee matter has not motion in or of itself: every part of it is at quiet till it is put in motion, that is not natural to it; for many parts of matter fall into a state of reft and quiet; fo that motion must be put in them by fome impulfe or other. Matter, after it has paffed through the highest refinings and rectifyings poffible, becomes only more capable of motion than it was before; but ftill it is a paffive principle, and must be put in motion by fome other being. This has appeared fo neceffary even to those who have tried their utmost force to make God as little needful as poffible in the ftructure of the universe, that they have yet been forced to own, that there must have been once a vast motion given to matter by the Supreme Mind.

A third argument for the being of a God, is, that upon fome great occafions, and before a vast number of witneses, fome perfons have wrought miracles: that is, they have put nature out of its courfe, by fome words or figns, that of themfelves could not produce thofe extraordinary effects: and therefore fuch perfons were affifted by a Power fuperior to the course of nature; and by confequence there is fuch a Being, and that is God. To this the atheists do firft fay, that we do not know the fecret virtues that are in nature: the loadftone and opium produce wonderful effects: therefore, unless we knew the whole extent of nature, we cannot define what is fupernatural and miraculous, and what is not fo. But though we cannot tell how far nature may go, yet of fome things we may, without hefitation, fay, they are beyond natural powers. Such were the wonders that Mofes wrought in Egypt and in the wildernefs, by the speaking a few words, or the ftretching out of a rod. We are fure thefe could not by any natural efficiency produce those wonders. And the like is to be faid of the miracles of Chrift, particularly of his raifing the

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dead to life again, and of his own refurrection. These we ART. are fure did not arise out of natural caufes. The next thing atheifts fay to this, is, to difpute the truth of the facts: but of that I fhall treat in another place, when the authority of revealed religion comes to be proved from those facts. All that is neceffary to be added here, is, that if facts, that are plainly fupernatural, are proved to have been really done, then here is another clear and full argument, to prove a Being fuperior to nature, that can difpofe of it at pleasure: and that Being muft either be God, or fome other invifible Being, that has a ftrength fuperior to the fettled course of nature. And if invifible Beings, fuperior to nature, whether good or bad, are once acknowledged, a great step is made to the proof of the Supreme Being.

There is another famed argument taken from the idea of God; which is laid thus: that because one frames a notion of infinite perfection, therefore there must be fuch a Being, from whom that notion is conveyed to us. This argument is alfo managed by other methods, to give us a demonstration of the being of a God. I am unwilling to fay any thing to derogate from any argument that is brought to prove this conclufion; but when he, who infifts on this, lays all other arguments afide, or at least flights them as not ftrong enough to prove the point, this naturally gives jealoufy, when all thofe reafons, that had for so many ages been confidered as folid proofs, are neglected, as if this only could amount to a demonftration. But, befides, this is an argument that cannot be offered by any to another perfon, for his conviction; fince if he denies that he has any fuch idea, he is without the reach of the argument. And if a man will fay that any fuch idea, which he may raise in himself, is only an aggregate that he makes of all thofe perfections, of which he can form a thought, which he lays together, feparating from them every imperfection that he obferves to be often mixed with fome of those perfections: if, I fay, a man will affirm this, I do not fee that the inference from any fuch thought that he has formed within himself, can have any great force to perfuade him that there is any fuch Being. Upon the whole, it seems to be fully proved, that there is a Being that is fuperior to matter, and that gave both being and order to it, and to all other things. This may ferve to prove the being of a God: it is fit in the next place to confider, with all humble modefty, what thoughts we can, or ought to have of the Deity.

That Supreme Being must have its effence of itself neseffarily and eternally; for it is impoffible that any thing

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can give itself being; fo it must be eternal. And though eternity in a fucceffion of determinate durations was proved to be impoffible, yet it is certain that fomething must be eternal; either matter, or a Being fuperior to it, that has not a duration defined by fucceffion, but is a fimple effence, and eternally was, is, and fhall be the fame. There is nothing contradictory to itself in this notion: it is indeed above our capacity to form a clear thought of it; but it is plain it must be fo, and that this is only a defect in our nature and capacity, that we cannot diftinctly apprehend that which is fo far above us. Such a Being muft have alfo neceffary existence in its notion; for whatsoever is infinitely perfect, muft neceffarily exift; fince we plainly perceive, that neceffary existence is a perfection, and that contingent exiftence is an imperfection, which supposes a being that is produced by another, and that depends upon it: and as this fuperior Being did exift from all eternity, fo it is impoffible it should cease to be; fince nothing, that once has actually a being, can ever cease to be, but by an act of a fuperior Being annihilating it. But there being nothing fuperior to the Deity, it is impoffible that it fhould ever ceafe to be: what was felf-existent from all eternity, must also be so to all eternity; and it is as impoffible that a fimple eflence can annihilate itself, as that it can make itself.

So much concerning the first and capital article of all religion, the existence and being of a God; which ought not to be proved by any authorities from Scripture, unless from the recitals that are given in it concerning miracles, as was already hinted at. But as to the authority of fuch paffages in Scripture, which affirm, that there is a God, it is to be confidered, that before we can be bound to fubmit to them, we must believe three propofitions antecedent to that; 1. That there is a God. 2. That all his words are true. 3. That these are his words. What therefore muft be believed before we acknowledge the Scriptures, cannot be proved out of them. It is then a ftrange affertion, to fay, that the being of a God cannot be proved by the light of nature, but mult be proved by the Scriptures; fince our being affured, that there is a God, is the first principle, upon which the authority of the Scriptures depends.

The fecond propofition in the Article is, That there is. but one God. As to this, the common argument, by which it is proved, is the order of the world; from whence it is inferred, that there cannot be more Gods than one, fince where there are more than one, there must happen diverfity and confufion. This is by fome thought to be no good

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reafon; for if there are more Gods, that is, more beings ART. infinitely perfect, they will always think the fame thing, and be knit together with an entire love. It is true, in things of a moral nature this must fo happen: for beings infinitely perfect muft ever agree. But in phyfical things, capable of no morality, as in creating the world fooner or later, and the different fyftems of beings, with a thousand other things that have no moral goodness in them, different beings infinitely perfect might have different thoughts. So this argument feems ftill of great force to prove the unity of the Deity. The other argument from reafon to prove the unity of God, is from the notion of a Being infinitely perfect. For a fuperiority over all other beings comes fo naturally into the idea of infinite perfection, that we cannot feparate it from it. A Being therefore, that has not all other beings inferior and fubordinate to it, cannot be infinitely perfect; whence it is evident, that there is but one God. But befides all this, the unity of God feems to be fo frequently and fo plainly afferted in the Scripture, that we fee it was the chief defign of the whole Old Teftament, both of Mofes and the prophets, to eftablish it, in oppofition to the falle opinions of the heathen, concerning a diverfity of Gods. This is often repeated in the moft folemn words, as, Hear O Ifrael, the Deut. vi. 4 Lord our God is one God. It is the first of the Ten Commandments, Thou shalt bave no other Gods but me. And all things in heaven and earth are often faid to be made by this one God. Negative words are alfo often ufed, There is none other God but one: befides me there is Ifa. xliv. 6, none else, and I know no other; the going after other Gods 8. is reckoned the highest and the most unpardonable act of idolatry. The New Teftament goes on in the fame ftrain. Chrift fpeaks of the only true God, and that he John xvii.3. alone ought to be worshipped and ferved; all the Apoftles Mat. iv. 10. do frequently affirm the fame thing: they make the Cor. viii. believing of one God, in oppofition to the many Gods of the Heathens, the chief article of the Chriftian religion; and they lay down this as the chief ground of our obligation to mutual love and union among ourselves, That there is one God, one Lord, one Faith, one Baptifm. Now Eph. iv. 4. fince we are fure that there is but one Meffias, and one 5, 6. doctrine delivered by him, it will clearly follow, that there must be but one God.

So the unity of the divine Effence is clearly proved both from the order and government of the world, from the idea of infinite perfection, and from thofe exprefs declarations that are made concerning it in the Scriptures;

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ART. which last is a full proof to all fuch as own and submit to

The third head in this Article is that which is negatively expreffed, That God is without Body, Parts, or Paffions. In general, all these are fo plainly contrary to the ideas of infinite perfection, and they appear fo evidently to be imperfections, that this part of the Article will need little explanation. We do plainly perceive that our bodies are clogs to our minds; and all the ufe, that even the pureft fort of body, in an estate conceived to be glorified, can be of to a mind, is to be an inftrument of local motion, or to be a repofitory of ideas for memory and imagination: but God, who is every where, and is one pure and fimple act, can have no fuch ufe for a body. A mind dwelling in a body is in many refpects fuperior to it; yet in fome refpects is under it. We who feel how an act of our mind can fo direct the motions of our body, that a thought fets our limbs and joints a going, can from thence conceive, how that the whole extent of matter fhould receive fuch motions as the acts of the Supreme Mind give it; but yet not as a body united to it, or that the Deity either needs fuch a body, or can receive any trouble from it. Thus far the apprehenfion of the thing is very plainly made out to us. Our thoughts put fome parts of our body in a prefent motion, when the organization is regular, and all the parts are exact, and when there is no obftruction in thofe veffels or paffages, through which that heat and thofe fpirits do pafs, that caufe the motion. We do in this perceive, that a thought does command matter; but our minds are limited to our bodies, and thefe do not obey them, but as they are in an exact difpofition and a fitness to be fo moved. Now these are plain imperfections; but removing them from God, we can from hence apprehend that all the matter in the univerfe may be fo entirely subject to the divine Mind, that it fhall move and be whatsoever and wherefoever he will have it to be. This is that which all men do agree in.

But many of the philofophers thought that matter, though it was moved and moulded by God at his pleasure, yet was not made by him, but was felf-exiftent, and was a paffive principle, but coexiftent to the Deity, which they thought was the active principle: from whence fome have thought, that the belief of two Gods, one good and another bad, did fpring: though others imagine that the belief of a bad God did arife from the corruption of that tradition concerning fallen angels, as was before

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