that in some parts of Egypt the lion is worshipped, in others the wolf: and in every province they worshipped the virtues and the powers of the God who is over all, in those animals which were most proper to that province; so that each province had its several gods: that they worshipped all animals, and men too, in the village of Anubis: and that in their excellent wisdom and intimate communion with the Divinity, they came to know to which of the deities certain animals were dearer than men.* And again he affirms, that it was through their wisdom and extraordinary knowledge of God and of divine things, that they came to the worship of animals: though he acknowledges that it might appear strange to the unlearned, that wise men, who were not carried away by the prejudices of the vulgar, and who had got above their ignorance, made those things the objects of their worship, which seemed not to be worthy of honour. Thus it is that Porphyry endeavours to justify the Egyptian worship of animals. But if we may depend upon the account given by Philostratus, the Egyptians were not able to assign any reasons to Apollonius Tyanæus of this their worship. The priests and wise men of Egypt (as hath been already observed) were very careful to conceal their theology from the people, under hieroglyphics or symbolical characters, and allegorical fables. And at length it came to pass, that the true original symbolical sense, being a secret transmitted but to few, was in a great measure lost and forgotten among those pretended wise men themselves. This sufficiently appears from Plutarch's book of Isis and Osiris, which plainly shows, that notwithstanding the high opinion that philosopher had entertained of the wisdom of the Egyptians, there was a great deal of darkness and confusion in their theology, which was full of monstrous fables, taken by the vulgar in the literal sense, and in the interpretation of which their learned men and priests were very much divided. * De Abstin. lib. iv. sect. 9. p. 155. edit. Cantab. The last thing I would here observe with regard to the philosophers is, that some of them who were thought to have the sublimest notions of the Divinity, seemed to be against all external worship of the supreme God. It was before shown, that Plato did not propose him to the people as the object of public worship, as being incomprehensible, and not to be named or expressed in words. Apollonius Tyanæus, * The account Plato and the Platonists give of the first principle, who in their theology is the first and highest God, is perfectly unintelligible. They suppose him to be a simple unity, or unity itself; so simple, that, as Plotinus speaks, "nothing can be predicated of it, not being, nor essence, nor life, because it is "above all these things." Plotin. Ennead. III. lib. viii. cap. 9. He sets himself to show that the first principle, which he, after Plato, calls rò ¿yaðòv, is not intellect, because intellect implies multiplicity. Plotin. Ennead. III. lib. viii. cap. 7, 8. "When therefore," says he, "you speak of the ¿yaðòv, or good itself, you "must add nothing to it even in thought.-You ought not to add to it intellect or "intelligence, lest you should add something alien from it, and so of one you "will make two, intellect and good.-zonσeis dúo vouv xaì åyaðòv.” Plotin. Ennead. III. lib. viii. cap. 10. Thus the first principle was not to have any thing predi cated of it, nor consequently any attributes ascribed to it for fear of destroying its unity. Nor would they allow that the first transcendental unity, the rò "Ey or ayadov, which is simply and absolutely one, had any thing properly to do either in the creation of the world, or the government of it. Numenius, a celebrated Platonic philosopher, in a passage quoted from him by Eusebius, gives it as Plato's doctrine, that "it was not fitting the first principle should [dnuogyn] act "as a demiurgus, or maker of the world." And he afterwards mentions it as a thing certain, and which admits of no doubt, that "the first God is idle or va"cant from all works: but that the demiurgical god governs all things, going 66 through heaven.—Τὸν μὲν πρῶτον θεὸν ἀργὸν εἶναι ἔργων ξυμπάντων καὶ βασιλέα, “ τὸν δημιουργικὸν δὲ θεὸν ἡγεμονεῖν δι ̓ οὐρανοῦ ἰόντα.” Euseb. Præp. Evangel. lib. xi. cap. 18. p. 537. B. C. edit. Paris, 1528. The same philosopher represents Plato as upbraiding men for being ignorant of the first God: for that he whom they regarded as the first, viz. the demiurgus, is not really the first, but there is another more ancient and more divine. Ibid. p. 359. C. It is upon this foundation, that the emperor Julian intimates that the Hebrews did not know the first God, because they supposed the maker of the world to be the first and highest God. Apud Cyril. contra Julian, lib. iv. p. 141, 142. D. This first Platonic principle, therefore, seems to be an abstract metaphysical deity, very different from the true supreme God as described to us in the sacred writings, whose understanding is infinite, who is the almighty Maker of heaven and earth, and who governeth all things by his wise and good providence. For none of these things could be properly predicated of the Platonic first god, as appears by a passage cited by Eusebius, from a book of his upon sacrifices, was of opinion, that "no sensible thing "was fit to be offered or dedicated to the God whom we call "the first," and whom he afterwards describes to be the God over all: "there being no sensible thing which is not a "kind of pollution compared with him but that he ought "to be worshipped by the word or reason which is inward, "not that which proceedeth out of the mouth: and that we "must ask good things from the best of Beings, by that "which is best and most excellent in us; and this is intellect "which does not need any organ or instrument of speech."* To the same purpose Porphyry, who seems to have had this very passage of Apollonius in view, declares that, "as a cer"tain wise man hath observed, we ought not to offer up, or "dedicate any sensible thing to that God who is over all: "for there is no material thing which is not impure to him "who is abstracted from all matter: neither is any outward "word proper to be offered to him which is uttered by the "voice, nor even that which is internal, if it be polluted with any passion but we must worship him in silence and pure "thought." Thus under pretence of inward religion and pure devotion, the outward expressions of it were to be neglected and the only true God, who alone deserves to be worshipped, is not to have any outward homage rendered to him at all. This is certainly a false refinement, and which tendeth in a great measure to banish all appearance of religion, as it signifieth the worship of the one true supreme God, out of the world. It is however to be observed, that though some of the more refined Platonists and Pythagoreans declared against offering up any external material oblation or sacrifice to him whom they regarded as the first and highest whom they represent as eternally unactive, idle, as an Epicurean deity, having no concern with our world: nor is he therefore the proper object of our prayers and invocations, our thanksgivings and praises. * Euseb. Præp. Evangel. lib. iv. cap. 13. p. 150. † Ibid. cap. 11. p. 149. God, yet they recommended the observation of the public rites and ceremonies of religion, and the worship of the gods appointed by the laws, of which sacrifices and oblations made a principal part: a plain proof, that the Pagan public worship was not according to their notion of it, the worship of the one supreme God, but was wholly offered up to inferior deities, or to demons. CHAP. XVII. The state of the heathen world with respect to their notions of divine providence. The belief of a providence superintending human affairs, obtained generally among the vulgar Pagans: but the providence they acknowledged was parcelled out among a multiplicity of gods and goddesses. Their notions of providence were also in other respects very imperfect and confused. The doctrine of the philosophers concerning providence considered. Many of them, and of the learned and polite Pagans, denied a providence. Of those who professed to acknowledge it, some confined it to heaven and heavenly things. Others supposed it to extend to the earth and to mankind,y et so as only to exercise a general care and superintendency, but not to extend to individuals. Others supposed all things, the least as well as the greatest, to be under the care of providence: but they ascribed this not to the supreme God, who they thought was above concerning himself with such things as these, and committed the care of them wholly to inferior deities. The great advantage of Revelation shown for instructing men in the doctrine of providence: and the noble idea given of it in the holy Scriptures. NEXT to the existence of God, that which is of the greatest importance to be known by us is, that he governs the world by his providence; and particularly that he takes care of men and their affairs. Without a belief of providence there can be no such thing as religion. This the wisest of the heathens were sensible of. Cicero, in the beginning of his celebrated books of the nature of the gods, speaking of those philosophers who maintained that the gods take no care at all of mankind or their concernments, observes, that "if their "opinion were true, there would be no piety, no sanctity, no "religion-that if the gods do not mind what men do, or "what events befall them, there is no reason to pray to them, " or worship them; and that if religion and piety be taken "away from amongst men, the greatest confusion and dis"order would ensue in human life: and together with piety, "mutual fidelity, and the social ties which bind mankind to"gether, and that most excellent virtue, justice, would be ban"ished out of the world.-Sunt enim philosophi et fuerunt, "qui omnino nullam habere censerent rerum humanarum "procurationem deos. Quorum si vera sententia est, quæ |