CHAP. XIV. The greatest and best of the ancient Pagan philosophers generally expressed themselves in the polytheistic strain; and, instead of leading the people to the one true God, they spoke of a plurality of gods, even in their most serious discourses. They ascribed those works to the gods, and directed those duties to be rendered to them, which properly belong to the Supreme. ANOTHER thing to be observed concerning the ancient Pagan philosophers, and which shows how improper they were to bring the people to a right knowledge of God and religion, and to turn them from their superstition and idolatry, is, that they generally fell into the common language of polytheism, and talked as much of the gods as any of the people, and this even in their most serious discourses. Instead of urging the worship of the one true God, and endeavouring to preserve on the minds of men a sense of the infinite distance between him and all other beings whatsoever, they recommended to the veneration of the people a plurality of deities, to whom they gave those peculiar attributes and honours which were due to him alone. Zaleucus, the Locrian, who may be regarded as having been a wise philosopher as well as lawgiver, in his celebrated proœmium or preface to his laws, where he argues from the evidences of the divine power, wisdom, and goodness, in the orderly disposition of things in the universe, does not lead the people to the acknowledgment of the one true supreme God, but of a plurality of gods. See the passage quoted above, chap. 2d, p. 62, to which I now add, that he afterwards goes on to urge it upon them as their duty" to remember the gods, both that they really exist, and "that they inflict judgments upon unrighteous persons."* To the same purpose, Archytas, a celebrated Pythagorean, in the fragments of his work, De Lege, preserved by Stobæus, delivers himself in this manner, that "the first law of the consti"tution should be for the support of what relates to the gods, * Apud Stob. Serm. 42. "the demons, and our parents." The learned Bishop of Gloucester, who takes notice of this, observes that, "in like "manner, if we may believe antiquity, all their civil institutes "were prefaced; its constant phrase being, when speaking of “ a legislator, διεκόσμει τήν πολιτείαν ἀπο θεῶν ἀρχόμενος. *He set " in order the polity, beginning from the gods." It has been already observed concerning that best of the ancient philosophers, Socrates, that, in those excellent discourses of his with Aristodemus and Euthydemus, in which he treats particularly of religion and the Deity, he all along speaks of God and the gods promiscuously, as the authors of the human frame, and of all the good things we enjoy. And to this probably Velleius, in Cicero, refers, when he blames Xenophon for introducing Socrates as mentioning now one, then many gods. "Modo unum, tum autem plures deos." + The same Socrates, speaking of the unwritten laws, as he calls them, which are observed after the same manner in all places, and which he supposes not to have been made by men, since all men are not of one language, nor could meet together to consult about them and enact them, but to have been given by the gods themselves to mankind, mentions it, in the first place, as a universal law received all among 66 men, τές θεός σε ειν "to worship the gods." As if it were the law of nature obligatory on all mankind, to worship not one God only, but a plurality of deities. Xenophon mentions it to the praise of Socrates, that whereas "oi woλ20-the generality of men, sup"posing that there are some things which the gods know, and "other things which they do not know, Socrates was of opi"nion that the gods know all things, both the things which "are said, and the things which are done, and even the things "which are deliberated upon in secret: and that they are every where present, and give significations to men concern❝ing all human affairs."+ A noble sentence this, if applied * Div. Leg. of Moses, vol. I. p. 112. Edit. 4th. + De. Nat. Deor. lib. i. cap. 12. Xen. Memorab. Socrat. lib. iv. s. 19. p. 327. Edit. Sympson. to the one true God: but when applied to a multiplicity of gods, tended to mislead the people, and to confirm them in their polytheism, as if there was a number of omniscient, omnipresent deities. The same observation may be made concerning a remarkable saying of Thales, mentioned by Laërtius: being asked, Whether a man in his unjust actions can escape the notice of the gods? He answered, No, not in his thoughts. * Plato, in his arguings for the existence of a Deity against the atheists, which he professedly undertakes in his tenth book of laws, speaks all along, of gods in the plural. The point he sets himself to prove in opposition to Atheism, which he represents as at that time much prevailing, is not that there is one God, but that there are gods. And, in the beginning of that book, he introduces one of his dialogists as saying " that it is "easy to prove the existence of the gods: the earth, the sun "the stars, and the universe, and the well-ordered variety of 66 seasons, show it: as also the consent both of Greeks and "barbarians, who all agree that there are gods.”+ In like manner, when, in the same tenth book of laws, he argues for a Providence, what he undertakes to prove is, That the gods take care of mankind and their affairs, and do not neglect even small matters. ‡ And, in his Epinomis, or sequel to his books of laws, he lays it down as a principle, "s eidi Deoì êtque« λέμενοι πάντων σμίκρων καὶ μεγάλων.” § That “ the gods exist, ❝and take care of all things, both small and great." And, in his whole disputation on that subject, it is the providence of the gods that he asserts, and even of the gods which are appointed by the laws. Cicero has many noble passages relating to the existence of a Deity, and a Providence. But they tend to lead the people not so much to the acknowledgment of the one supreme God, • Laërt. lib. i. segm. 36. + Plato Oper. p. 664. E. Edit. Fic. Ludg. 1590. Ibid. p. 670, 671. § Ibid. p. 700. E. 66 as of a multiplicity of gods. Some notice was taken of this before, in the second chapter of this work. To which I now add, that when he is speaking of the consent of nations, he seems to make it relate, as Plato had done before him, not to the belief of one supreme Cause and Author of all things, but to a plurality of gods or divine powers. He observes, that "it is a strong argument to engage us to believe that "there are gods, that there is no nation so wild and savage, "no man so rude and uncultivated, whose mind is not im"bued with the opinion that there are gods. Many have "wrong sentiments concerning the gods, but all think there "is a divine power, and nature.' He adds, that "in every thing, the consent of all nations is to be looked upon "as the law of nature.-Ut porrò firmissimum hoc adferri ❝videtur cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, “ nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit ❝ deorum opinio. Multi de diis prava sentiunt, omnes "autèm esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur.-Omni au"tèm in re consensio omnium gentium, lex naturæ putanda "est." And again he says, that "it is as it were, en66 graven on the minds of all men that there are gods. "What they are is not agreed, but that they are is denied by "none. Omnibus innatum est, et animo quasi insculptum, "esse deos; quales sint varium est; esse nemo negat."‡ And Cota represents it as a thing in which all men agree, except those that are very impious, and which could never be erased out of his mind, that there are gods. "Quod inter " omnes, nisi admodùm impios, convenit, mihi quidèm ex "animo exuri non potest, esse deos."§ Many other passages might be produced, in which the consent of nations is * But then it is to be observed, that though all are here supposed to believe that there is a divine nature and power, yet many imagined that this divine nature and power resided in a multitude of deities. + Tuscul. Disput. lib. i. cap. 13. § Ibid. lib. iii. cap. 3. De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. 4. urged to show that there are gods.* The same conclusion is drawn from the pulchritude and order of the universe, and other arguments usually brought in proof of a Deity. Balbus, the Stoic, in Cicero's second book, De Naturâ Deorum, having mentioned some of those arguments, says that "he "that considers them will be forced to confess that there are "gods. Hæc et innumerabilia ex eodem genere qui videat, "nonne cogitur profiteri deos esse ?" He expresses himself to the same purpose, in several other parts of that book. Thus, as was before observed, their very disputes against atheism were so managed, as to uphold and maintain the public polytheism, and were not so much directed to prove that there is one Supreme God, as that there are many gods; all of whom are to be honoured and adored. When Balbus sets himself to show that the world is governed by Divine Providence, which he does admirably well, what he proposes to prove is, that it is by the providence of the gods that the world is administered and governed. "Deorum providentiâ mundum "administrari."+ And again, that the world and all its parts were constituted in the beginning, and are at all times administered and governed by the providence of the gods. "Dico " igitur providentiâ deorum, mundum et omnes mundi partes, "et initio constitutas esse, et omni tempore administrari."‡ To the same purpose Cicero observes, in his first book of laws, that "all nature is governed by the power, reason, authority, “mind, divinity, of the immortal gods.-Deorum immorta"lium, vi, ratione, potestate, mente, numine naturam om"nem regi."§ And in his second book of laws, he lays it • There is a remarkable passage of Seneca to the same purpose, in the begin. ning of his 117th epistle. "6 Apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omni"bus videri: tanquàm deos esse inter alia sic colligimus, quod omnibus de Diis "opinio insita est, nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque projecta, "ut non aliquos deos credat." † De Nat. Deor. lib. ii. cap. 29. p. 175. Edit. Davis. 2do. Ibid. lib. ii. cap. 29. p. 177. § De Leg. lib. i. cap. 7. p. 25. Edit. Davis. 4to. |