suffice for the present, that no estate expect to be great that is not awake upon any just occasion of arming.

No body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor politic; and certainly to a kingdom or estate a just and honourable war is the true exercise. A civil war indeed is like the heat of a fever; but a foreign war is like the heat of exercise, and serves most of all to keep the body in health. For in a slothful peace both courage will effeminate and manners corrupt. But howsoever it be for happiness, without all question for greatness, it makes to be still for the most part in arms; and the strength of a veteran army (though it be doubtless a costly business), always on foot, is that which commonly gives the law, or at least the reputation amongst all neighbour states, as may be well seen in Spain; which has had, in one part or other, a veteran army almost continually, now by the space of six-score years.

To be master of the sea, is an abridgment of a monarchy. Cicero writing to Atticus of Pompey's preparation against Cæsar, says, "Pompey's counsel is plainly that of Themistocles, for he thinks that whoever is master of the sea is master of the empire." 1 And without doubt Pompey had tired out and reduced Cæsar, if upon vain confidence he had not left that way. We see the great effects of battles by sea from many instances. The battle of Actium decided the empire of the world. The battle of Lepanto arrested the greatness of the Turk. There be certainly many examples where sea-fights have put an end to the war; but this is, when princes or states have risked their whole fortune upon the battles. But thus much is certain, that he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will; whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits. Surely at this day with us of Europe the advantage of strength at sea (which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great Britain) is great; both because most of the kingdoms of Europe are not merely inland, but girt with the sea most part of their compass; and because the wealth and treasures of both Indies seem in great part but an accessory to the command of the sea.

The wars of latter ages seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honour which reflected upon men from the

Cic. Ep. ad Att. x. 8.

wars in ancient time. There be now for martial encouragement some degrees and orders of chivalry, which nevertheless are conferred promiscuously upon soldiers and no soldiers; and some remembrance perhaps upon the escutcheon, and some hospitals for maimed soldiers, and such like things. But in ancient times, the trophies erected upon the place of the victory, the funeral laudatives and monuments for those that died in the wars, the crowns and garlands personal, the style of emperor, which the great kings of the world afterwards borrowed, the triumphs of the generals upon their return, the great donatives and largesses to the soldiers upon the disbanding of the armies, these, I say, and such like dazzling honours, were things able to inflame all men's courage and excite even the coldest breast; but above all, that of the triumph among the Romans was not a pageant or gaudery but one of the wisest and noblest institutions that ever was. For it contained three things, honour to the general, riches to the treasury out of the spoils, and donatives to the army. But that honour perhaps were not fit for monarchies, except it be in the person of the monarch himself or his sons; as it came to pass in the times of the Roman emperors, who did appropriate the actual triumphs to themselves and their sons for such wars as they achieved in person, and left only for wars achieved by subjects some triumphal garments and ensigns to the general.

To conclude: no man can, by taking thought, as the Scripture saith, "add one cubit to his stature" in this little model of a man's body; but in the great frame of kingdoms and commonwealths it is in the power of princes or states to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms. For by wisely introducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs, as we have now touched, and others like them they may sow greatness to their posterity and succession. But these counsels are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.

Such then are the thoughts that now occur to me touching the extension of empire. But what avails this consideration, seeing that the Roman is supposed to have been the last of earthly monarchies ? Yet because the extension of empire was set down as the last of the three political duties, I could not have passed it by altogether without deviating from my

1 St. Matth. vi. 27.; St. Luke, xii. 25.

proposed course.

There remains now the other of the two deficients which I mentioned; namely, the treatise of Universal Justice, or the Fountains of Equity.

All who have written concerning laws have written either as philosophers or lawyers. The philosophers lay down many precepts fair in argument, but not applicable to use: the lawyers, being subject and addicted to the positive rules either of the laws of their own country or else of the Roman or Pontifical, have no freedom of opinion, but as it were talk in bonds. But surely the consideration of this properly belongs to statesmen, who best understand the condition of civil society, welfare of the people, natural equity, customs of nations, and different forms of government; and who may therefore determine laws by the rules and principles both of natural equity and policy. Wherefore let it be my present object to go to the fountains of justice and public expediency, and endeavour with reference to the several provinces of law to exhibit a character and idea of justice, in general comparison with which the laws of particular states and kingdoms may be tested and amended. I will now therefore according to my custom set forth an example thereof in one of its heads.

Example of a Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms: one Title of it.

PREFACE.

APHORISM 1.

IN Civil Society, either law or force prevails. But there is a kind of force which pretends law, and a kind of law which savours of force rather than equity. Whence there are three fountains of injustice; namely, mere force, a malicious ensnarement under colour of law, and harshness of the law itself.

APHORISM 2.

The ground on which private right rests is this. He who commits an injury, receives either pleasure or profit from the act, but incurs danger from the precedent. For others do not share in the particular pleasure or profit, but look upon the precedent as concerning themselves And hence they readily agree to protect themselves by laws, that the course of injury may not come round to them in turn. But if through the state of the times, and a communion of guilt, it happen that those

whom a law protects are not so numerous or so powerful as those whom it endangers, a party is made to overthrow the law; and this is often the case.

APHORISM 3.

Private right depends upon the protection of public right. For the law protects the people, and magistrates protect the laws; but the authority of the magistrates depends on the sovereign power of the government, the structure of the constitution, and the fundamental laws. Wherefore, if this part of the constitution be sound and healthy, the laws will be of good effect, but if not, there will be little security in them.

APHORISM 4.

It is not however the only object of public law, to be attached as the guardian of private right, to protect it from violation and prevent injuries; but it extends also to religion, arms, discipline, ornaments, wealth, and in a word, to everything that regards the well-being of a state.

APHORISM 5.

The end and scope which laws should have in view, and to which they should direct their decrees and sanctions, is no other than the happiness of the citizens. And this will be effected, if the people be rightly trained in piety and religion, sound in morality, protected by arms against foreign enemies, guarded by the shield of the laws against civil discords and private injuries, obedient to the government and the magistrates, and rich and flourishing in forces and wealth. And for all these objects

laws are the sinews and instruments.

APHORISM 6.

This end the best laws attain, but many pass wide it. For there is a strange and extreme difference in laws; some being excellent, some moderately good, and others entirely vicious. I will therefore set down, according to the best of my judgment, what may be called certain "laws of laws," whereby we may derive information as to the good or ill set down and determined in every law.

APHORISM 7.

7. But before I proceed to the actual body of particular laws, I will take a brief survey of the virtues and dignities of laws in general. That law may be set down as good, which is certain in meaning, just in precept, convenient in execution,

agreeable to the form of government, and productive of virtue in those that live under it.

TITLE I.

Of the Primary Dignity of Laws, that they be certain.

APHORISM 8.

Certainty is so essential to law, that law cannot even be just without it. "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" So if the law give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare to obey it? It ought therefore to warn before it strikes. It is well said also, "That that is the best law which leaves least to the discretion of the judge; "2 and this comes from the certainty of it.

APHORISM 9.

Uncertainty of laws is of two kinds; the one, where no law is prescribed; the other, where the law is ambiguous and obscure. We must therefore speak first of cases omitted by the law, that in these also we may find some rule of certainty.

Of Cases omitted by the Law.

APHORISM 10.

The narrow compass of human wisdom cannot take in all the cases which time may discover; whence new and omitted cases often present themselves. For these, the remedy or supplement is threefold; namely, by reference to similar cases, by employment of examples which have not yet grown into law, and by jurisdictions empowered to decide according to the arbitration of a good man and sound discretion, whether they be Prætorian or Censorian Courts.

Of Reference to Similar Cases, and the Extensions of Laws.

APHORISM 11.

In omitted cases, the rule of law is to be drawn from cases similar to them, but with caution and judgment; wherein the following rules are to be observed: Let reason be esteemed prolific, and custom barren. Custom must not make cases. Whatever therefore is received contrary to the reason of a law, or even where its reason is obscure, must not be drawn into consequence.

1 1 Corinth. xiv. 8.

2 Arist. Rhet. i. 1.