and we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the body. So then the first article of this knowledge is concerned with the different characters of natures and dispositions. And we are not here speaking of the common inclinations either to virtues and vices, or to disorders and passions, but of those which are more profound and radical. And in truth I cannot sometimes but wonder that this part of knowledge should for the most part be omitted both in Morality and Policy, considering it might shed such a ray of light on both sciences. In the traditions of astrology men's natures and dispositions are not unaptly distinguished according to the predominances of the planets; for some are naturally formed for contemplation, others for business, others for war, others for advancement of fortune, others for love, others for the arts, others for a varied kind of life; so among the poets (heroic, satiric, tragic, comic) are everywhere interspersed representations of characters, though generally exaggerated and surpassing the truth. And this argument touching the different characters of dispositions, is one of those subjects in which the common discourse of men (as sometimes though very rarely happens) is wiser than books. But far the best provision and material for this treatise is to be gained from the wiser sort of historians, not only from the commemorations which they commonly add on recording the deaths of illustrious persons, but much more from the entire body of history as often as such a person enters upon the stage; for a character so worked into the narrative gives a better idea of the man, than any formal criticism and review can; such is that of Africanus and Cato the Elder in Livy, of Tiberius, and Claudius, and Nero in Tacitus, of Septimius Severus in Herodian, of Louis XI., King of France, in Philip de Comines, of Ferdinand of Spain, the Cæsar Maximilian, and the Popes Leo and Clement in Francesco Guicciardini. For these writers, having the images of those persons whom they have selected to describe constantly before their eyes, hardly ever make mention of any of their actions without inserting something concerning their nature. So some of the relations which I have met with touching the conclaves of the popes, present good characters of the Cardinals; as the letters of ambassadors do likewise of the councillors of princes. Wherefore out of these materials (which are surely rich and abundant) let a full and careful treatise be constructed. Not however that I would have these characters presented in ethics (as we find them in history or poetry or even in common discourse), in the shape of complete individual portraits, but rather the several features and simple lineaments of which they are composed, and by the various combinations and arrangements of which all characters whatever are made up, showing how many, and of what nature these are, and how connected and subordinate one to another; that so we may have a scientific and accurate dissection of minds and characters, and the secret dispositions of particular men may be revealed; and that from the knowledge thereof better rules may be framed for the treatment of the mind. And not only should the characters of dispositions which are impressed by nature be received into this treatise, but those also which are imposed on the mind by sex, by age, by region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like; and again, those which are caused by fortune, as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, and the like. For we see that Plautus makes it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, "His beneficence is that of a young man."1 St. Paul advising that severity of discipline should be used towards the Cretans ("Reproach them severely "), accuses the disposition of their country; citing the poet's censure, "the Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies."2 Sallust notes that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories, "the desires of kings, as they are violent, so are they generally changeable and often contrary to themselves."3 Tacitus observes that honours and fortune more often alter men's dispositions to the worse than to the better; "Vespasian alone was changed for the better."4 Pindar makes the observation that great and sudden good fortune for the most part defeats and enervates men's minds. "There be, that are not able to digest great prosperity." The Psalm shows it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase thereof, "If riches increase, set not your heart upon them." These observations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle in his Rhetoric, and here and there in some other men's writings, but they have never been incorporated into moral philosophy, to which they prin 1 Mil. Glor. iii. 1. 40. Tac. Hist. i. 50. 2 Ep. Tit. i. 12. Cf. Pind. Olymp. i. 88. In Jugurth. c. 113. cipally appertain; no less than the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds does to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions does to medicine. It should be done however now, except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics, who minister the same medicines to all patients of every constitution. Next in order is the knowledge touching the affections and perturbations, which are, as I have said, the diseases of the mind. For as the ancient politicians in popular states were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation': so it may be fitly said, that the mind in its own nature would be temperate and staid; if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find it strange, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of ethics, and never handled the affections, as a principal portion thereof; yet in his Rhetoric, where they are considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved and excited by speech), he finds a place for them, and handles them acutely and well, for the quantity thereof. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry: no more than he who should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of particular colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections, as light is to particular colours. Better pains, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which remains of them; but yet I conceive it was rather in subtlety of definitions than in any full and ample description. So likewise I find some particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections, as of anger, of tenderness of countenance, and some few others. But to speak the real truth, the poets and writers of history are the best doctors of this knowledge, where we may find painted forth with great life and dissected, how affections are kindled and excited, and how pacified and restrained, and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves, though repressed and concealed; how they work; how they vary; how they are enwrapped one within another; Cicero Pro Cluent. c. 49. how they fight and encounter one with another; and many other particularities of this kind; amongst which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against affection, and to use the aid of one to master another; like hunters and fowlers who use to hunt beast with beast, and catch bird with bird, which otherwise perhaps without their aid man of himself could not so easily contrive; upon which foundation is erected that excellent and general use in civil government of reward and punishment, whereon commonwealths lean; seeing those predominant affections of fear and hope suppress and bridle all the rest. For as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the internal government of the mind. I now come to those points which are within our own command, and have operation on the mind to affect and influence the will and appetite, and so have great power in altering manners; wherein philosophers ought carefully and actively to have inquired of the strength and energy of custom, exercise, habit, education, imitation, emulation, company, friendship, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies, and the like. For these are the things that rule in morals; these the agents by which the mind is affected and disposed; and the ingredients of which are compounded the medicines to preserve or recover the health of the mind, as far as it can be done by human remedies; of which number I will select some one or two, upon which to insist, as patterns of the rest. I will therefore make a few observations on Custom and Habit. The opinion of Aristotle seems to me to savour of negligence and narrowness of contemplation, when he asserts that custom has no power over those actions which are natural; using for example, "that if a stone be thrown up a thousand times, it will not learn to ascend of itself; and that by often seeing or hearing we do not learn to see or hear the better." For though this principle be true in some things, wherein nature is peremptory (the reasons whereof we have not now leisure to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admits, within certain limits, intension and remission. For he might see that a tight glove will come on more easily with use; that Nic. Eth. ii. 1. a wand by use and continuance will be bent contrary to its natural growth, and after a while will continue in the same position; that by use of the voice it becomes stronger and louder; that by custom we can better bear heat and cold, and the like; which two latter examples have a nearer resemblance to the subject, than those instances which he alleges. But however it be, the more true it is that virtues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the rules for acquiring or removing that habit; for there may be many precepts for the wise ordering of the exercises of the mind, as well as of the body; whereof I will recite a few. The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the first either a greater or a smaller task than the case requires. For if too great a burden be imposed, in a diffident nature you discourage; in a confident nature you breed an opinion, whereby a man promises to himself more than he is able to perform, which produces sloth; and in both these natures the trial will fail to satisfy the expectation, a thing which ever discourages and confounds the mind. But if the tasks be too weak, progress will be much retarded. The second precept shall be, that to practise any faculty by which a habit may be acquired, two several times should be observed; the one, when the mind is best disposed, the other when it is worst disposed; that by the one, you may gain a great step, by the other, you may through strenuous exertion work out the knots and obstacles of the mind, and so make the middle times the more easy and pleasant. The third precept shall be that which Aristotle mentions by the way. "To bear ever with all our strength, so it be without vice, towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined; as when we row against the stream, or straighten a wand by bending it contrary to its natural crookedness. The fourth precept depends on that axiom, which is most true; that the mind is brought to anything with more sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but be obtained as it were by the way while you are attending to something else; because of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint. Many other useful 1 Nic. Eth. ii. 9. |