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But the reply is good;

that many may be done justly." "Present justice is in your power, for that which is to come you have no security." Men must pursue things which are good and just at present, leaving the future to the Divine Providence. And so much for the knowledge touching the exem

plar and description of good.


The Division of the Doctrine concerning the Culture of the Mind, into the Doctrine concerning the Characters of the Mind, the Affections, and the Remedies or Cures. An Appendix of this same Doctrine, touching the Congruity between the Good of the Mind and the Good of the Body.

Now therefore that I have spoken of the fruit of life (understanding it in a philosophical sense), it remains to speak of the husbandry which belongs thereto; without which the former part seems to be no better than a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion; whereunto Aristotle eloquently subscribes in these words, " It is necessary then to speak of virtue, both what it is, and whence it proceeds, for it were almost useless to know what virtue is, but to be ignorant of the ways and means of acquiring it; therefore we must inquire not only to what kind virtue belongs, but also how it may be obtained; for we wish both to be acquainted with the thing itself, and to gain possession of it; wherein we shall not fully succeed, unless we know both the whence and the how." 2 In such express words and with such iteration does he inculcate this part, although he does not himself pursue it. This likewise it is which Cicero bestows on Cato the younger as no ordinary praise; that he had applied himself to philosophy, "not for the sake of disputing as most do, but for the sake of living according to its rules." And although through the negligence of our times, wherein few men take any care touching the cultivation and disposition of the mind, and the framing of their life to any fixed rule, (as Seneca excellently says, "Everyone takes thought about the

1 Plut. Reip. ger. Princip. 817.
Pro Muræna, c. 30.

2 Magn. Mor. lib. i. 1.
Sen. Ep. 71.

parts of life, no one about the whole:") this part may seem superfluous, yet I will not on that account pass it by untouched, but rather conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, "That they who are sick and feel no pain are sick in their mind;"1 they need medicine not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be objected that the cure of men's minds belongs to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral philosophy may be admitted into the train of theology, as a wise servant and faithful handmaid to be ready at her beck to minister to her service and requirements. For as the Psalm says, "That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually to the hands of her mistress," and yet no doubt many things are left to the care and discretion of the handmaid; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and be obedient to them, and yet so as it may yield of itself within its own limits many sound and profitable directions.

This part therefore, when I recall the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not yet reduced to written inquiry. Wherefore seeing I set it down among the deficients, I will according to my custom sketch out some of the heads and points thereof.

First therefore in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account what is in our power and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command either the nature of the soil or the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician either the natural temper and constitution of the patient, or the variety of accidents. Now in the culture of the mind and the cure for its diseases three things are to be considered; the different characters of dispositions, the affections, and the remedies; just as in the treatment of the body three things are observed; the complexion or constitution of the sick man, the disease, and the cure; but of these three, only the last is in our power, the two former are not. Yet the inquiry into things beyond our power ought to be as careful as into those within it; for the exact and distinct knowledge thereof is the groundwork of the doctrine of remedies, that they may be more conveniently and successfully applied;

1 Aph. ii. 6.

2 Psalm cxxiii. 2.

and we cannot fit a garment, except we first take measure of the body.

So then the first article of this knowledge is concerned with the different characters of natures and dispositions. And we are not here speaking of the common inclinations either to virtues and vices, or to disorders and passions, but of those which are more profound and radical. And in truth I cannot sometimes but wonder that this part of knowledge should for the most part be omitted both in Morality and Policy, considering it might shed such a ray of light on both sciences. In the traditions of astrology men's natures and dispositions are not unaptly distinguished according to the predominances of the planets; for some are naturally formed for contemplation, others for business, others for war, others for advancement of fortune, others for love, others for the arts, others for a varied kind of life; so among the poets (heroic, satiric, tragic, comic) are everywhere interspersed representations of characters, though generally exaggerated and surpassing the truth. And this argument touching the different characters of dispositions, is one of those subjects in which the common discourse of men (as sometimes though very rarely happens) is wiser than books. But far the best provision and material for this treatise is to be gained from the wiser sort of historians, not only from the commemorations which they commonly add on recording the deaths of illustrious persons, but much more from the entire body of history as often as such a person enters upon the stage; for a character so worked into the narrative gives a better idea of the man, than any formal criticism and review can; such is that of Africanus and Cato the Elder in Livy, of Tiberius, and Claudius, and Nero in Tacitus, of Septimius Severus in Herodian, of Louis XI., King of France, in Philip de Comines, of Ferdinand of Spain, the Cæsar Maximilian, and the Popes Leo and Clement in Francesco Guicciardini. For these writers, having the images of those persons whom they have selected to describe constantly before their eyes, hardly ever make mention of any of their actions without inserting something concerning their nature. So some of the relations which I have met with touching the conclaves of the popes, present good characters of the Car.. dinals; as the letters of ambassadors do likewise of the councillors of princes. Wherefore out of these materials (which are surely rich and abundant) let a full and careful treatise be

constructed. Not however that I would have these characters presented in ethics (as we find them in history or poetry or even in common discourse), in the shape of complete individual portraits, but rather the several features and simple lineaments of which they are composed, and by the various combinations and arrangements of which all characters whatever are made up, showing how many, and of what nature these are, and how connected and subordinate one to another; that so we may have a scientific and accurate dissection of minds and characters, and the secret dispositions of particular men may be revealed; and that from the knowledge thereof better rules may be framed for the treatment of the mind.

And not only should the characters of dispositions which are impressed by nature be received into this treatise, but those also which are imposed on the mind by sex, by age, by region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, and the like; and again, those which are caused by fortune, as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, and the like. For we see that Plautus makes it a wonder to see an old man beneficent, "His beneficence is that of a young man." St. Paul advising that severity of discipline should be used towards the Cretans ("Reproach them severely "), accuses the disposition of their country; citing the poet's censure," the Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies."2 Sallust notes that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories, "the desires of kings, as they are violent, so are they generally changeable and often contrary to themselves."3 Tacitus observes that honours and fortune more often alter men's dispositions to the worse than to the better; "Vespasian alone was changed for the better."4 Pindar makes the observation that great and sudden good fortune for the most part defeats and enervates men's minds. "There be, that are not able to digest great prosperity." The Psalm shows it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in the increase thereof, "If riches increase, set not your heart upon them." These observations and the like I deny not but are touched a little by Aristotle in his Rhetoric, and here and there in some other men's writings, but they have never been incorporated into moral philosophy, to which they prin

1 Mil. Glor. iii. 1. 40. Tac. Hist. i. 50.

2 Ep. Tit. i. 12.

* Cf. Pind. Olymp. i. 88.

3 In Jugurth. c. 113. 6 Psalm lxii. 10.

cipally appertain; no less than the knowledge of the diversity of grounds and moulds does to agriculture, and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions does to medicine. It should be done however now, except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics, who minister the same medicines to all patients of every constitution.

Next in order is the knowledge touching the affections and perturbations, which are, as I have said, the diseases of the mind. For as the ancient politicians in popular states were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds; because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet, if the winds did not move and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation': so it may be fitly said, that the mind in its own nature would be temperate and staid; if the affections, as winds, did not put it into tumult and perturbation. And here again I find it strange, that Aristotle should have written divers volumes of ethics, and never handled the affections, as a principal portion thereof; yet in his Rhetoric, where they are considered but collaterally and in a second degree (as they may be moved and excited by speech), he finds a place for them, and handles them acutely and well, for the quantity thereof. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry: no more than he who should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of particular colours; for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections, as light is to particular colours. Better pains, I suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can gather by that which remains of them; but yet I conceive it was rather in subtlety of definitions than in any full and ample description. So likewise I find some particular writings of an elegant nature, touching some of the affections, as of anger, of tenderness of countenance, and some few others. But to speak the real truth, the poets and writers of history are the best doctors of this knowledge, where we may find painted forth with great life and dissected, how affections are kindled and excited, and how pacified and restrained, and how again contained from act and further degree; how they disclose themselves, though repressed and concealed; how they work; how they vary; how they are enwrapped one within another;

'Cicero Pro Cluent. c. 49.

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