In which kind it were inexcusable not to mention (honoris causâ) your Majesty's excellent book touching the duties of a king, a work richly compounded of many known and secret treasures of divinity, morality, and policy, with great aspersion of all other arts, and being in my opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read; not distempered in the heat of invention, nor chilled in the coldness of negligence; not subject to fits of dizziness, and so falling into confusion and disorder; not distracted by digressions, so as to embrace in a discursive narrative things impertinent to the purpose; not savouring of perfumes and paintings, as those do, who attend more to the pleasure of the reader than the nature of the argument; above all, being a book as good in spirit as in body, since it is both agreeable to truth, and apt for action. And it is moreover quite free from that vice which I have noted above (which, if it were tolerated in any, certainly it would be so in a king, writing of the authority of a king), seeing it does not exalt invidiously or above measure the height and summit of kingly power; for your Majesty has represented, not a king of Assyria, or Persia, in the glitter of outward pride and glory; but truly a Moses or a David, that is, shepherds of their people. Neither can I ever forget the observation so truly worthy of a king, which your Majesty delivered, in the same sacred spirit of government, in deciding a great cause of judicature; which was, "That kings ruled by the laws of their kingdoms, as God did by the laws of Nature, and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative, as God does his power of working miracles." And yet, notwithstanding, in your other book of a free monarchy it well appears that you no less perceive and understand the plenitude of the power of a king, and the ultimities (as the schoolmen say) of regal rights, than the circle and bounds of his office and duty. Thus have I presumed to allege this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a prime or eminent example of treatises concerning special and respective duties; wherein I should have said as much if it had been written by any king a thousand years since. Nor am I moved with that rule of manners which is usually laid down, "that one should not praise in presence; " provided that the praise be not beyond the truth, and bestowed unseasonably, or without occasion. Surely Cicero, in that brilliant oration for Marcellus, was but exhibiting an excellent picture of Cæsar's praises, though he was speaking before his face. And the like did Pliny the younger to Trajan. But to return to our purpose. There belongs further to the handling of this part, touching the respective duties of vocations and professions, a relative or opposite doctrine touching the frauds, cautions, impostures, and vices of every profession; for corruptions and vices are opposed to duties and virtues. And it is true that these are not altogether passed over, but there are many treatises and writings in which they are touched upon at least in passing; but how? rather in a satire, and cynically after the manner of Lucian, than seriously and wisely. For men have rather sought by wit to traduce much that is good or useful in professions, and expose it to ridicule, than to discover and sever that which is vicious and corrupt. But Solomon says well, "A scorner seeks wisdom, and finds it not, but knowledge offers itself unto him that is desirous thereof;" for he who comes to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure will be sure to find matter enough for his humour, but very little for his instruction. But the serious handling of this argument with integrity and sincerity ought, as it appears to me, to be reckoned among the best fortifications. for honesty and virtue. For as the fable goes of the basilisk, that if he see you first, you die for it, but if you see him first, he dies; so is it with deceits, impostures, and evil arts, which, if they be first espied, they lose their life, but if they prevent, they endanger; so that we are much beholden to Machiavelli and other writers of that class, who openly and unfeignedly declare or describe what men do, and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to join the wisdom of the serpent with the innocence of the dove, except men be perfectly acquainted with the nature of evil itself; for without this, virtue is open and unfenced; nay, a virtuous and honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked, to correct and reclaim them, without first exploring all the depths and recesses of their malice. For men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty grows out of an ignorance or simplicity of manners, and believing of preachers, schoolmasters, books, moral precepts, common discourses, and opinions; so as, except they plainly perceive that you know as much of their corrupt opinions and depraved prin ciples as they do themselves, they despise all honesty of manners and counsel; according to the excellent proverb of Solomon, "The fool receives not the word of the wise, unless thou speakest the very things that are in his heart." But this part, touching respective cautions and vices, we set down as deficient, and will call it by the name of "Serious Satire," or the Treatise of the Inner Nature of Things. Unto this part, touching respective duty, do also appertain the mutual duties between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant; so likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude, the civil bonds of companies, colleges, neighbourhood, and the like; but it must ever be kept in mind, that they are here handled, not as they are parts of civil society (for that is referred to policy), but as to the framing and predisposing of the minds of particular persons towards the preservation of those bonds of society. The knowledge concerning good respecting Society (as well as that which respects Individual good) handles it not simply alone, but comparatively; whereunto belongs the weighing of duties between person and person, case and case, particular and public, present and future; as we see in the stern and severe proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, how it was generally extolled to the sky; and yet what did another say of it? "It was an unhappy deed, whatever posterity might say of it.”2 And we see the same in that supper to which Marcus Brutus, Caius Cassius, and others were invited. When to make trial of their opinions touching the intended murder of Cæsar, the question was cunningly raised, "whether the killing of a tyrant were lawful," they were divided in opinion; some holding that it was clearly lawful, for servitude was the extreme of evils; others, not so, for tyranny was better than a civil war; while a third set affirmed, according to the doctrine of Epicurus, that it was unfit for wise men to endanger themselves in the cause of fools.3 But there are a number of like cases of comparative duties; amongst which, that is most frequent where the question is, whether injustice may be committed in order to save one's country, or for some great future advantage of that kind; touching which, Jason of Thessaly used to say, "Some things must be done unjustly, 1 Prov. xviii. 2. 2 Virg. Æn. vi. 823. Infelix, utcumque ferent ea facta minores. that many may be done justly." But the reply is good; "Present justice is in your power, for that which is to come you have no security." Men must pursue things which are good and just at present, leaving the future to the Divine Providence. And so much for the knowledge touching the exemplar and description of good. CHAP. III. The Division of the Doctrine concerning the Culture of the Mind, into the Doctrine concerning the Characters of the Mind, the Affections, and the Remedies or Cures. - An Appendix of this same Doctrine, touching the Congruity between the Good of the Mind and the Good of the Body. Now therefore that I have spoken of the fruit of life (understanding it in a philosophical sense), it remains to speak of the husbandry which belongs thereto; without which the former part seems to be no better than a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is without life and motion; whereunto Aristotle eloquently subscribes in these words, "It is necessary then to speak of virtue, both what it is, and whence it proceeds, for it were almost useless to know what virtue is, but to be ignorant of the ways and means of acquiring it; therefore we must inquire not only to what kind virtue belongs, but also how it may be obtained; for we wish both to be acquainted with the thing itself, and to gain possession of it; wherein we shall not fully succeed, unless we know both the whence and the how."2 In such express words and with such iteration does he inculcate this part, although he does not himself pursue it. This likewise it is which Cicero bestows on Cato the younger as no ordinary praise; that he had applied himself to philosophy, "not for the sake of disputing as most do, but for the sake of living according to its rules." And although through the negligence of our times, wherein few men take any care touching the cultivation and disposition of the mind, and the framing of their life to any fixed rule, (as Seneca' excellently says, "Everyone takes thought about the 1 Plut. Reip. ger. Princip. 817. 2 Magn. Mor. lib. i. 1. 1 parts of life, no one about the whole: ") this part may seem superfluous, yet I will not on that account pass it by untouched, but rather conclude with that aphorism of Hippocrates, “That they who are sick and feel no pain are sick in their mind;" they need medicine not only to assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be objected that the cure of men's minds belongs to sacred divinity, it is most true; but yet moral philosophy may be admitted into the train of theology, as a wise servant and faithful handmaid to be ready at her beck to minister to her service and requirements. For as the Psalm says, "That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually to the hands of her mistress," and yet no doubt many things are left to the care and discretion of the handmaid; so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity, and be obedient to them, and yet so as it may yield of itself within its own limits many sound and profitable directions. This part therefore, when I recall the excellency thereof, I cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not yet reduced to written inquiry. Wherefore seeing I set it down among the deficients, I will according to my custom sketch out some of the heads and points thereof. First therefore in this, as in all things which are practical, we ought to cast up our account what is in our power and what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the other by way of application only. The husbandman cannot command either the nature of the soil or the seasons of the weather; no more can the physician either the natural temper and constitution of the patient, or the variety of accidents. Now in the culture of the mind and the cure for its diseases three things are to be considered; the different characters of dispositions, the affections, and the remedies; just as in the treatment of the body three things are observed; the complexion or constitution of the sick man, the disease, and the cure; but of these three, only the last is in our power, the two former are not. Yet the inquiry into things beyond our power ought to be as careful as into those within it; for the exact and distinct knowledge thereof is the groundwork of the doctrine of remedies, that they may be more conveniently and successfully applied; Aph. ii. 6. 2 Psalm cxxiii. 2. |