BOOK IX.

CHAP. I.

The Divisions of Inspired Divinity are omitted-Introduction only is made to three Deficients; namely, the Doctrine concerning the Legitimate Use of the Human Reason in Divine Subjects; the Doctrine concerning the Degrees of Unity in the Kingdom of God; and the Emanations of the Scriptures.

SEEING now, most excellent king, that my little bark, such as it is, has sailed round the whole circumference of the old and new world of sciences (with what success and fortune it is for posterity to decide), what remains but that having at length finished my course I should pay my vows? But there still remains Sacred or Inspired Divinity; whereof however if I proceed to treat I shall step out of the bark of human reason, and enter into the ship of the church; which is only able by the Divine compass to rightly direct its course. Neither will the stars of philosophy, which have hitherto so nobly shone upon us, any longer supply their light. So that on this subject also it will be as well to keep silence. I will accordingly omit the proper divisions thereof, contributing however a few remarks upon it, according to my slender ability, by way of paying my And I am the more inclined to do this, because in the body of Theology I find no region or district entirely desert and uncultivated; such has been the diligence of man in sowing wheat or tares.

I will propose therefore three Appendices of Theology, which treat, not of the matter concerning which theology gives or shall give information, but only of the manner in which the information is imparted. I will not however, as in other like cases, either introduce examples or give precepts. That I will leave to theologians; for these, as I have said, are only in the place of vows.

The prerogative of God comprehends the whole man, extending to the reason as well as to the will; that man may deny himself entirely, and draw near unto God. Wherefore as we are bound to obey the divine law though we find a reluctation in our will, so are we to believe His word though we find a reluctation in our reason.

For if we believe only that which is

agreeable to our sense, we give consent to the matter and not to the author, which is no more than we would do to a suspected witness. But that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteousness was of such a nature that Sarah laughed at it, who therein was an image of natural reason. The more discordant therefore and incredible the Divine mystery is, the more honour is shown to God in believing it, and the nobler is the victory of faith. Nay, even sinners, the more they are oppressed in their conscience, trusting nevertheless to be saved through the mercy of God, the more do they honour Him; for all despair is a kind of reproach towards God. Howbeit, if we will truly consider it, it is more worthy to believe, than to know as we now know. For in knowledge man's mind suffers from sense which is the reflection of things material, but in faith the spirit suffers from spirit which is a worthier agent. Otherwise it is in the state of man glorified, for then faith shall cease, and we shall know even as we are known.

"2

Wherefore we conclude that Sacred Theology ought to be derived from the word and oracles of God, and not from the light of nature, or the dictates of reason. For it is written, "The heavens declare the glory of God," but it is nowhere written, "The heavens declare the will of God; " but of that it is said, "To the law and to the testimony; if men do not according to this word, &c." And this holds not only in those great mysteries which concern the Deity, the Creation, and the Redemption; but it pertains likewise to a more perfect interpretation of the moral law, "Love your enemies; " " do good to them that hate you," and so on; "that ye may be the children of your father who is in heaven, that sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust."3 To which words this applause may well be applied, "that they do not sound human"4; since it is a voice beyond the light of nature. Again, we see the heathen poets, especially when they discourse of the passions, often expostulate with laws and moral doctrines (which yet are far more easy and indulgent than the divine laws), as if they were contradictory and malignant to the liberty of nature; "What nature grants the envious laws deny." So said Dendamis the Indian to

Alexander's messengers, "That he had heard somewhat of the name of Pythagoras and some other wise men of Greece, and that he held them for excellent men; but that they had a fault, which was that they had too great reverence and veneration for a kind of phantom, which they called law and manners."1 Wherefore it must be confessed that a great part of the moral law is higher than the light of nature can aspire to. Nevertheless what is said, that man has by the light and law of nature some. notions of virtue and vice, justice and injustice, good and evil, is most true. For we must observe that the light of nature is used in two several senses; the one, as far as it springs from sense, induction, reason, argument, according to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, as far as it flashes upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct, according to the law of conscience; which is a spark and relic of his primitive and original purity. And in this latter sense chiefly does the soul partake of some light to behold and discern the perfection of the moral law; a light however not altogether clear, but such as suffices rather to reprove the vice in some measure, than to give full information of the duty. So then religion, whether considered with regard to morals or mysteries, depends on revelation from God.

The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things is manifold and very general. For it is not for nothing that the Apostle called religion, "Our reasonable service of God."2 If we review the types and ceremonies of the old law we see that they were full of reason and signification, differing widely from the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, which were like surds and non-significants, mostly without meaning, and not even suggestive of anything. But especially the Christian faith, as in all things, so in this is pre-eminent; holding the golden mean touching the use of reason and discussion (the child of reason) between the law of the heathen and the law of Mahomet, which embrace the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or confession; and the religion of Mahomet on the other side interdicts argument altogether; so that the one has the very face of vague and manifold error, the other of crafty and cautious imposture; whereas the holy Christian faith both admits and

Cf. Plut. in Alex. c. 65.; and Strabo, I. XV.
VOL. V.
I

2 Romans, xii, 1.

rejects the use of reason and disputation, but according to just limitations.

The use of human reason in matters of religion is of two sorts; the former in the explanation of the mystery, the latter in the inferences derived from it. With regard to the explanation of the mysteries, we see that God vouchsafes to descend to the weakness of our apprehension, by so expressing his mysteries that they may be most sensible to us; and by grafting his revelations upon the notions and conceptions of our reason; and by applying his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. But here we ought by no means to be wanting to ourselves; for as God uses the help of our reason to illuminate us, so should we likewise turn it every way, that we may be more capable of receiving and understanding His mysteries; provided only that the mind be enlarged, according to its capacity, to the grandeur of the mysteries, and not the mysteries contracted to the narrowness of the mind.

But with regard to inferences, we should know that there is allowed us a use of reason and argument (in regard to mysteries) secondary and respective, though not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion have been set in their true place, so as to be completely exempted from the examination of reason, it is then permitted us to derive and deduce inferences from them according to their analogy. In nature indeed this holds not. For both the principles themselves are examinable, though not by a syllogism, yet by induction; and besides, these same principles have no discordance with reason, so that the first and middle propositions are derived from the same fountain. It is otherwise in religion, where the first propositions are not only self-existent and self-supporting; but likewise unamenable to that reason which deduces consequent propositions. Nor yet does this hold in religion alone, but also in other sciences both of a greater and smaller nature; namely, wherein the primary propositions are arbitrary and not positive; for in these also there can be no use of absolute reason. For we see in games, as chess or the like, that the first rules and laws are merely positive, and at will; and that they must be received as they are, and not disputed; but how to play a skilful and winning game is scientific and rational. So in human laws there are many maxims, as they call them, which are mere Placets of Law, dependent on authority rather than upon reason, and

therefore not to be disputed. But what is most just, not absolutely but relatively (that is, according to these maxims), that is a matter of reason, and opens a wide field for disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason which has place in Divinity, which is grounded upon the Placets of God.

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But as the use of the human reason in things divine is of two kinds, so likewise in the use there are two kinds of excess; the one when it inquires too curiously into the manner of the mystery; the other when the same authority is attached to inferences as to principles. For he may appear to be the disciple of Nicodemus who persists in asking, "How can a man be born when he is old?" And he can be nowise considered the disciple of Paul who does not sometimes insert in his doctrines, " I, not the Lord;" or again," According to my counsel; "2 which style is generally suited to inferences. Wherefore it appears to me that it would be of especial use and benefit, if a temperate and careful treatise were instituted, which, as a kind of divine logic, should lay down proper precepts touching the use of human reason in theology. For it would act as an opiate, not only to lull to sleep the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith sometimes the schools labour, but also in some degree to assuage the fury of controversies, wherewith the church is troubled. Such a treatise I reckon among the things deficient; and call it Sophron, or The Legitimate Use of Human Reason in Divine Subjects.

It is of extreme importance to the peace of the Church, that the Christian covenant ordained by our Saviour be properly and clearly explained in those two heads, which appear somewhat discordant; whereof the one lays down, "He that is not with us is against us; "3 and the other, "He that is not against us is with us."4 From this it is evident that there are some articles, wherein if a man dissent he is placed beyond the pale of the covenant; but that there are others in which he may dissent, and yet remain within it. For the bonds of the Christian Communion are set down, "one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, &c.,"5 not one Ceremony, one Opinion. So we see the coat of our Saviour was without seam, but the garment of the church was of divers colours. The chaff should