age, was reserved for a monarch so mean and pusillanimous as James the First."

I give these comments entire, that they may be compared with the general doctrine of public wrongs above quoted. It will be seen that Mr. Jardine's censure applies to the course of proceeding prescribed by Blackstone in the general case, quite as exactly as to the proceeding pursued by James in this particular case. But an analogous case on a smaller scale, having the sanction of a man who cannot be suspected of a disposition to prostrate England to Spain, will perhaps be more easily understood, and will help us to a juster judgment.

When Ralegh touched at Gomera on his way to Guiana, and his ships, being mistaken for Turkish pirates, were shot at, he took measures to satisfy the Governor that they were Christians and wanted nothing but water. The Governor replied that in that case "he would willingly afford as much as they were pleased to take, if he might be assured they would not attempt the town and spoil it, with the churches and other religious houses, nor destroy the gardens nor fruits."

"I returned him my answer that I would give him my faith and the word of the King of Great Britain, my sovereign Lord, that the people of the town and island should not lose so much as one grape; and if any of my company did take from them, were it but an orange or grape, without paying for it, I would make him an example to the rest and hang him up in the market-place."2

So far Ralegh's position towards the Spanish Governor was exactly analogous to that of James towards the Spanish Government. James had in like manner given his faith to the Spanish Government that Ralegh should not take from them any of their property; and that if he did, he should be either beheaded in England or given up with all his spoils to Spain. And if the parallel ends there, it is only because none of Ralegh's company dared to incur the penalty. But suppose one of them had taken something without paying for it, and Ralegh had been as good as his wordhad made him an example and hung him up in the market-place: in what respect would his position with regard to that man have been different from the King's position with regard to himself? He would have executed an Englishman for an offence committed against Spaniards. To give content to a Spanish governor, he would have sacrificed a man, whose preservation (I will answer for it) would have given great satisfaction to his company. Would he have been

1 Criminal Trials, i. p. 520.

2

Ralegh's Apology, p. 76.

delivering the sword of English Justice into the hands of the governor of Gomera, and committing a dastardly murder?

State the facts simply, and it will be seen that in both cases there is a sacrifice, but it is made to the demands of Justice. Ralegh had been guilty of a gross outrage; for which (against whomsoever committed) punishment was due. The outrage had been committed against Spain; and since the prosecution of injuries is naturally regarded as belonging more especially to the party injured, Spain (in that character) demands justice-not injustice, but justice. King James admits that the demand cannot be justly refused, though he is sensible that it will cost him much to comply. He must lose one of his ablest subjects, and incur great odium from the rest. Still the Spaniards have a right to demand the sacrifice, and accordingly it is made. To give them content, he does not spare him, though by preserving him he might give great satisfaction to his subjects. Invert the case and it will be seen that it was but doing as we would be done by. Suppose some Spanish adventurer, abusing a commission from the King of Spain, had landed in Virginia, attacked, pillaged, and burned down one of our settlements there; killed the governor, dispersed the inhabitants, carried off papers, goods, and treasure. Would not our ambassador have been ordered to demand the punishment of that man? Would not the Spanish government have been bound to comply? Should we not have been justified, if they refused, in going to war upon that quarrel? Still, if they had complied (especially if at the cost of unpopularity and discontent) it would no doubt have been for our sake, not for their own-in justice to us, not themselves-that they would have done it. And Ralegh in like manner, if he had had to hang an orange stealer in the market-place of Gomera, would have done it, not to please himself and his company, but in justice to the owner of the orange.

But the truth is that the real justification of the punishment in all these cases is not the satisfaction of this party or that, but the necessity of preventing breaches of faith between nations-that faith without which there cannot be either peaceful commerce or interchange of offices of humanity. Why could not Ralegh approach Gomera for the purpose of taking in water, without an exchange of cannon-shot? Because they could not trust him not to sack the town if he landed. If his own proceedings on the Orinoco had been allowed and upheld, no armed English ship could have been trusted within reach of any Spanish town, and peaceful commerce would have been at an end. Indeed the very excuse which is set up for him-namely, that "no peace beyond the line" was the creed in which he had been brought up-is the best justification of the

severity. No one could be brought up in that creed afterwards. No one could either deceive himself or offer to defend another by pretending that excuse for an act of unprovoked and unannounced hostility, and the pillage and ruin, without warning and without conditions, of a peaceful and unoffending community.

11.

I have not hitherto thought it necessary to enquire into the particulars of any of the Chancery suits in which Buckingham recommended parties to the Chancellor's favour; for I have seen no reason for suspecting that anything was done in them out of ordinary course; and to give an account of Bacon's administration as a Judge in Equity is a task which I must leave to lawyers. But the case to which the two next letters relate appeared to form an exception. Here, for the first time, Buckingham seemed to be putting some pressure upon Bacon in behalf of a suitor. Instead of merely recommending the party to such favour as his case would bear, he seemed to be asking for the reconsideration and modification of a decree pronounced, and even to hint that there might be some danger in carrying it out; the danger being that the party might make some "complaint" against him. In this case therefore I have thought it expedient to enquire what the matter at issue was, what Bacon had done, what Buckingham wanted him to do, and what he eventually did. And having been favoured with a note of the proceedings as recorded in the Chancery Order Book, I am in a condition to explain the nature of the transaction. Upon the legal question or questions involved in it I do not of course pretend to offer an opinion, nor will I undertake to say that my statement is complete or accurate enough to enable a lawyer to form one. But from the particulars which I am about to give, and which may be relied upon as authentic, the moral character of the transaction may be easily inferred.

A father bequeathed certain lands to one of his sons, and also a legacy of 8001. The executors were required by the will to take and receive to his use, until he arrived at the age of 20, "the rents and profits of the several lands and things bequeathed." The father died when the son was only seven. The son, when he came of age, claimed interest upon the 8007. during the interval; and, the executors objecting, filed a bill in Chancery against them. This was in July 1617, when Bacon was Lord Keeper; who referred the case to

They are all taken from a collection of notes and extracts for which I am indebted to Mr. S. R. Gardiner; notes made by himself from the Order Books.

two Masters in Chancery,-one of them being a civilian. On the 10th of November they reported that in their opinion the testator's express intention was that some profit should be made of the said legacies of 800l. to the plaintiff's use, against he should come to the age of 20 years:" and that interest at 6 per cent was a reasonable claim. On the 28th of November, the Court" seeing no cause to alter" the Masters' report, ratified it: and when the executors neglected or refused to obey, there followed a succession of orders for compelling them. On the 29th of January, 1617-8, (oath being made that they had broken the decree) "attachment issued." On the 28th of April 1618-the sheriff returning the defendants' not found'-further orders are given to seize them. In the beginning of June, being examined upon interrogatories, they are reported to have "confessed a contempt against the authority of the Court.” On the 20th of June, it appearing "that they had committed a manifest contempt in disobeying the said decree," they are ordered to be committed to the Fleet. On the 7th of July the Lord Chancellor being informed that they still refuse to obey, "will try once more whether the defendants will submit: if not, they are to pay ten per cent. since they were served with the writ for the performance of the decree. On the 28th of November " Plaintiff's counsel says that the defendants had not obeyed, and it is ordered by the Lord Chancellor that if they do not yield by the first day of next term they are to pay a fine of 2007."

All this had been done in reliance upon the report of the two Masters in Chancery; for the cause had not been heard in Court. Now, as it can never have been supposed that the judgment of two Masters in Chancery was infallible, I presume that there was always some legitimate course open by which a suitor dissatisfied with their decision might obtain a rehearing of his case. But on the other hand, as a refusal to obey the decree of the Court can never have been the legitimate course, I conclude that in this case the defendants had put themselves in the wrong by seeking redress the wrong way, and so compelled the Court in vindication of its own authority to adopt those measures. But at the same time the very report of the Master in Chancery upon which they were committed to the Fleet for contempt in disobeying the decree, shows that they had something to say for themselves; and that what they really wanted was a rchearing. And therefore though the Court was quite right, no doubt, in insisting upon obedience, it does not follow that it was not wrong in refusing to reconsider the decree. This was now the question; and the state of the case as I conceive it to have stood at the end of November will be best explained by the following report

from the Master in Chancery to whom the question of contempt had been referred in the beginning of June.

June 15, 1618.

According to an order of the sixth day of this present June, I have considered of the defendants' examinations mentioned in the said order. And I find therein a contempt confessed by them in not performing a decrec of this court. For excuse whereof the said Doctor Steward sayeth that he and the other defendants have been always ready and offered to pay the legacy unto the plaintiff which was left him by his father's will, if the plaintiff would have taken the same, and setteth down divers other reasons why he performed not the said decree, some whereof are grounded upon the said will, and some upon a certificate, which he alledgeth to be unjust, whereupon the said decree was made, which reasons the said Doctor Steward humbly desireth may be heard and considered of. And the said defendant Thomas Steward for his excuse sayeth that he taketh it not to be the testator's meaning that such a sum should be paid unto the plaintiff as by the said decree is ordered unto him, the same being far greater than the legacy left him by the said will. All which I humbly leave to your Lp's further order.

EUB. THELWALL.'

Finding that his excuses and his request for a hearing had been passed without notice, and only followed by sharper orders on peril of heavier penalties to perform the original decree, Dr. Steward now made his appeal to Buckingham; to whom his case (as set forth by himself in that mood of mind) may easily have seemed not only to be a very hard one, but to bear very hardly upon Bacon. The result of his appeal was the following letter:

TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR.2

My honourable Lord,

I having understood by Dr. Steward, that your Lordship hath made a decree against him in the Chancery, which he thinketh very hard for him to perform; although I know it is unusual to your Lordship to make any alterations when things are so far past, yet in regard I owe him a good turn which I know not how to perform but this way, I desire your Lordship, if there be any place left for mitigation, your Lordship would shew him what favour you may for my sake in his desires; which I shall be ever ready to acknowledge as a great courtesy done unto myself; and will ever rest

Your Lordship's faithful friend and servant,
G. BUCKINGHAM.

Newmarket, the 2d of Decemb. 1618.

One of the Masters in Chancery, but not one of those who signed the first report.

*2 Harl. MSS. vol. 7006. f. 110. Original. Docketed, "The Lo. Marquis to your Lp. touching Dr. Steward."